Enab Baladi – Hani Karazi

Following Russian airstrikes and shelling in northern Syria in mid-October, described as the heaviest in more than three months, pictures and videos have recently circulated on pro-regime Syrian pages, discussing the latter’s military reinforcements to the fronts in Aleppo and Idlib countryside, raising questions about the possibilities of military action, amid the absence of any official clarification from the parties involved on the ground.

In contrast, observers spoke of local pressure on the opposition factions in northern Syria to exploit the circumstances of Israeli strikes directed at Hezbollah and launch military action against regime forces, with reports circulating on social media about a state of alert and heightened readiness among opposition factions.

It remains unclear whether the Russian movements or regime reinforcements are connected to precautionary steps and concerns over factions in the north initiating actions to exploit the volatile situation on the Lebanon front, or if there are genuine intentions from either party to escalate.

Movements over two periods

The discussion of military action in northern Syria has been circulated over two periods, the first of which began in early October when the local Al-Watan newspaper reported that the regime had raised its military readiness on its fronts in the de-escalation zone in Idlib countryside and its surroundings, in anticipation of an attack from “the terrorists,” as it described them.

Meanwhile, 4,280 people were displaced from areas in Idlib and Aleppo countryside, according to documentation by the Syria Response Coordination Group (SRCG) in northern Syria.

The humanitarian team clarified in a statement on October 3 that the movements of displacement come “amid indicators of a possible military operation in the area.”

As for the second wave of news regarding the possibility of military action, it emerged at the end of the same month, when channels on Telegram and groups on WhatsApp circulated information about preparations by opposition factions to launch military operations towards eastern Idlib and western Aleppo countryside.

Moreover, military movements by regime forces have been observed in northwestern Syria in recent days, contributing to the escalation of these reports.

The supervisor of the “Observatory 80,” which specializes in monitoring military movements, “Abu Amin,” told Enab Baladi that the regime was observed sending military equipment, including artillery and missile shells, along with heavy activity of reconnaissance aircraft and suicide drones, noting that no new infantry forces were reported being sent by the regime.

He added that the regime sent military equipment towards eastern and southern Idlib countrysides on the fronts of Saraqib and Maarrat al-Numan, in addition to observing reinforcements heading to the villages and towns of Anjara, Ajel, Oweijel, Kafr Naha, Ikarda, al-Talhiya, al-Kusaibiya, al-Bawabiyah, and Kafr Halab in the southern and western rural areas of Aleppo.

He pointed out that these reinforcements reached Brigade 46, Division 25, the Republican Guards, and al-Quds Brigade in Aleppo countryside.

For his part, researcher at the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies Nawar Shaaban stated that military sources on the ground confirmed the observation of military movements by the regime not seen in six months, specifically on the fronts of Saraqib, al-Atarib, and al-Abzimo, indicating that these reinforcements aim to raise the regime’s readiness in case it faces military action, while at the same time, military preparations are in place for the opposition factions.

Shaaban added, in an interview with Enab Baladi, that the regime had sent military reinforcements a month ago to secure the contact lines and fill the gap resulting from the withdrawal of Iranian militias and Hezbollah towards Lebanon or the Syrian border, but days ago “we began to notice the publication of photos and videos of military gatherings on the regime’s accounts and loyal sites.

He continued that the regime forces have also filled in some trenches to facilitate their ground advance, indicating that the regime has shifted its reinforcement plans from a defensive state to an offensive one.

What is the connection to the Lebanon war?

Hours after Israel announced the start of its ground operation in southern Lebanon in early October, news circulated about preparations by opposition factions to launch military action against regime positions in northern Syria.

Military expert Colonel Abdul Jabbar al-Akidi stated that following the start of the Israeli war on Lebanon, opposition factions found the opportunity ripe to initiate military action, exploiting the state of weakness within the Syrian regime, following the withdrawal of a large number of Hezbollah militias from the fronts of Aleppo and Idlib countryside towards Lebanon or the Syrian border, which had been a military support for regime forces.

Al-Akidi added to Enab Baladi that Hezbollah elements resorted to hiding in Syria for fear of being targeted, and the killing of senior Hezbollah commanders impacted the morale of its remaining personnel in Syria, in addition to the fact that the Syrian regime and its militias have suffered military strikes targeting arms depots, supply lines, and border crossings.

He noted that the second reason enhancing news of military action is the local popular pressure on the factions to open a battle against the regime and regain control over the villages and towns in eastern Idlib and western Aleppo countryside, in hopes of returning to their homes and escaping from tents before the onset of winter.

After the commencement of the Israeli ground assault in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah redeployed some of its forces operating in several Arab countries, including elite units and special operations teams in Syria. Meanwhile, military barracks affiliated with the regime and independent sites in southern Syrian provinces saw the deployment of Hezbollah groups and the reestablishment of positions that had been vacated earlier this year.

The Sawt al-Asima (Damascus Voice) website reported, on October 19, that Hezbollah evacuated all its headquarters and depots from the Tala’i and Khomeini camps in Zabadani, Rif Dimashq, and its personnel withdrew to an unknown location.

Additionally, Anadolu Agency reported on October 18 that Hezbollah transferred hundreds of its elements from Syria towards Lebanon, indicating that elements of the party withdrew from Deir Ezzor, Rif Dimashq, Hama, and Homs.

A battle linked to international agreements

In March 2020, Russia and Turkey reached a new agreement for de-escalation in northern Syria, calling for a ceasefire along the front line between the regime and the opposition.

This agreement included the establishment of a security corridor six kilometers north and south of the main international M4 highway in Idlib, which connects cities controlled by the Syrian regime in Aleppo and Latakia, in addition to deploying joint Turkish-Russian patrols along the road starting from March 15 of the same year.

This was preceded by another agreement signed by Russia and Turkey within the framework of the Astana talks in 2017, for de-escalation, followed by the Sochi agreement in September 2018, which called for a ceasefire in the vicinity of Idlib, although these agreements are repeatedly violated.

Military and political researcher at the Jusoor Center for Studies Abdul Wahab Asi believes that the Astana process has effectively succeeded in establishing a long-term truce, building a ceasefire system, and obstructing military operations, which previously hampered all prior international agreements.

Asi confirmed to Enab Baladi that this truce only succeeded after signing the Moscow agreement in March 2020, following multiple attempts to reinforce the ceasefire system through bilateral agreements between Turkey and Russia without Iran, and then linking these agreements with the de-escalation memorandum, which is considered one of the main outcomes of the process.

In this context, Abdul Jabbar al-Akidi stated that no changes have been publicly announced regarding the Russian-Turkish agreements in Astana and Sochi, thus maintaining those agreements in their current state prevents any military action, as any occurrence is linked to regional and international understandings and not to the strength of military factions or the weakness of the Syrian regime and its militias.

Al-Akidi added that the Russian party still has a strong presence in Syria, and it is considered one of the obstacles limiting the opposition factions’ ability to carry out military action, thus any initiation of such a battle by the factions would require a Turkish-Russian agreement that would lead to neutralizing Russian air support for the regime, since any military operation involving Russia would have dire consequences for civilians.

Al-Akidi stressed that any military action in northern Syria is linked to international agreements extending from the south to the north and from the west to the east, and would even be related to the future of Lebanon and the fate of Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon, and thus the decision for military action does not rest solely in the hands of opposition factions.

For his part, Nawar Shaaban indicated that neither party (the regime nor the opposition) intends to be the instigator of ground action, as both recognize that this would be very exhausting for them under the current security circumstances, but both sides have raised their readiness to act in case they are forced into any battle.

Shaaban noted that opposition factions face challenges preventing them from initiating military action, as military support is lacking, the political landscape does not favor initiating ground action, and the capacity to deal with Russian air operations on the part of the factions is nonexistent.

Russian messages

In mid-October, northern Syria witnessed the most intense military escalation in over three months, as Russian warplanes launched more than 25 airstrikes within 24 hours on various areas in northwestern Syria.

According to the “Observatory 80,” specializing in monitoring military movements, the most violent escalation occurred on October 14, when seven Russian warplanes alternated in bombing the northwestern suburbs of Syria through 15 airstrikes using 21 vacuum bombs.

The supervisor of the observatory told Enab Baladi that the targeted sites were close to displacement camps and were not military points as claimed by the Syrian regime.

The Russian escalation came after a period of calm lasting more than three months, preceding which was the last Russian airstrike on northwestern Syria on July 10, which targeted the periphery of the village of al-Hamama in the western Idlib countryside with vacuum missiles.

Since then, Russian aircraft had been limited to reconnaissance flights while regime forces and their militias bombarded the northern Syrian region almost daily through artillery and suicide drones.

Commenting on the Russian escalation, military affairs researcher at the Jusoor Center for Studies Rashid Hourani stated that the goal is to send warning messages to the opposition factions, cautioning them not to exploit the situation the regime is going through amid the Israeli escalation and try to advance and seize its territories, as Moscow believes that “the factions would then face a fierce Russian response.”

Hourani added to Enab Baladi that Russia intends, in this regard, to send a message to Turkey that it (Moscow) is ready to provide support to protect and defend the regime from any military move by the factions, stressing that it is dissatisfied with any action that violates agreements concerning northwestern Syria between Ankara and Moscow.

The local Al-Watan newspaper, which is close to the Syrian regime, described Russia’s intensified targeting of Idlib and Latakia countrysides as a warning to the opposition factions against the repercussions of any “foolishness,” especially since Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is mobilizing its fighters on the front lines aiming to launch a wide military operation against regime positions.