Enab Baladi Issue # 89 – Sun, Nov. 03, 2013 – Editorial

Opponents to Assad attribute the “fall” of Al Safira into Assad’s control to the game of balance between friends of the Syrian opposition and allies of Al Assad. They inferred that from the cut-off of weapons flaw from Turkey to armed fronts in Syria. However, this fall warns that the armed opposition is failing following its internal division, and its declared allegiances to supporting states. The battle on the ground proved that the power which several armed groups are trying to exercise in “liberated areas” is not a contributory factor in backing fighting fronts or in further advancement in liberating more areas as long as each of these factions is following its supporters’ agendas; in addition to the absence of a direct coordination or a clear strategy that unites all armed groups against Al Assad.

As for the Syrian people, they have long expected the fall of Al Safira; while fighters were alone at Al Safira defending three fronts for almost a month, a formation of “public security” was graduated specializing in protecting military leaders and prominent political personnel. During the same time, pledges of allegiances were made between Islamic formations, which were also restricting the freedom of civilians, and northern Syrian tribes.

On the other side, Assad army, Hezbollah militias, Abo Alfadel Al Abbas brigade, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards all formed a well-organized, and a central-authority entity that managed to maintain its solidarity despite losing 47 thousands of its members.

The scenario of Al Qusayr (Homs) was repeated in Al Khalidiya (Homs), and in Al Theyabiya (Damascus Suburbs), and today it is being repeated in Al Safira (Aleppo). The Syrian revolutionists are risking the Syrian Revolution by not learning from the previous lessons.