Ali Darwish | Hani Karazi

On December 8, 2024, the Military Operations Administration and the Southern Operations Room entered Damascus and overthrew the regime of the ousted Bashar al-Assad within 11 days, making the Military Operations Administration the primary military force on the ground.

Establishing a new army was one of the main topics discussed by the new leadership, which took steps to achieve this, most notably appointing a Minister of Defense and a Chief of Staff, and holding organizational sessions with military faction leaders to initiate the integration of factions into the Ministry of Defense.

Rebuilding a new army after the collapse of the former regime’s army faces many obstacles, such as the existence of factions with different loyalties and ideologies, and the exposure of Syrian military warehouses and units to intensive Israeli strikes shortly after the regime’s fall, which weakened Syrian military capabilities.

The restructuring of the army raises questions about the future of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and southern factions in the new army, the army’s ideology, and whether it will rely solely on volunteer elements, especially following the cancellation of compulsory conscription.

Steps to restructure the army

The first step in the formation of the new army was the issuance of a decision by the General Command to promote several individuals (some of whom are defected officers and others military leaders in factions) and grant them military ranks.

The highest military rank for promotion was a major general, awarded to Murhaf Abu Qasra, previously known as “Abu Hassan 600.” He is not a former officer and was the head of the military wing of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which is considered one of the most prominent factions within the Military Operations Administration.

The other general is the defector captain from the previous regime’s army in 2012, Ali Nour al-Din al-Nasan.

Abu Qasra was appointed Minister of Defense, and Ali al-Nasan was appointed Chief of Staff. No decision has yet been issued regarding the positions of the other individuals who were promoted.

The initial promotion, alongside Abu Qasra and al-Nasan, included the promotion of five individuals to the rank of brigadier general and 42 individuals to the rank of colonel, followed by an annex to the decision that included promoting six individuals to the rank of brigadier general.

Some of those promoted were defected officers, while others were military leaders from various factions, including non-Syrian figures.

Reuters reported from two “informed” sources that American, French, and German envoys warned the new administration in Syria that appointing foreign jihadists to senior military positions poses a “security concern and a bad” image at a time when they are trying to establish relations with foreign countries.

An American official told Reuters that the warning issued by the United States came as part of Western efforts to urge the Syrian new leaders to reconsider this step, which was presented during a meeting between US envoy Daniel Rubinstein and the commander of the new Syrian administration, Ahmed al-Sharaa.

According to a military source for Reuters, during the promotions, three non-Syrians were awarded the rank of brigadier general, and at least three others received the rank of colonel.

The foreign nationals who were granted the rank of brigadier general include Jordanian Abdul Rahman Hussein al-Khateeb and the Uyghur (from China) Abdul Aziz Dawoud Khudabardi, nicknamed “Zahid,” who is the leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria.

 

The officers who defected from the previous regime’s army should actually be the backbone of the army, as they are the most capable, both organizationally and professionally, of building this army.

Fayez al-Asmar, Defected colonel and military analyst

 

Basis for the promotion decision

The researcher specializing in civil-military relations at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Mohsen al-Mustafa, commented on the promotion decisions, saying, “It seems that the main reference upon which the General Command relied in assuming responsibility for managing the country is revolutionary legitimacy, in light of the near-complete suspension of the constitution and the absence of legislative authority.”

The researcher told Enab Baladi that with the significant transformations taking place in Syria, and due to necessities that the General Command interpreted based on national interest, the new leadership began to take strategic decisions aimed at restructuring and developing the army and security.

According to al-Mustafa, the decision does not grant foreigners any commanding military authority within the army but only extends their promotion to higher military ranks, indicating that these officers had previously held military ranks, either through the military leadership of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham or as defected officers working within the “Deterrence of Aggression” operations room.

Military analyst Colonel Fayez al-Asmar appeared hesitant regarding the legality and constitutionality of the new administration issuing the promotion decrees if they are not based on constitutional amendments, especially since there are foreign nationals from various nationalities granted ranks without obtaining citizenship.

Al-Asmar added to Enab Baladi, “This is indeed a violation of laws, not to mention that many of those granted ranks are revolutionary civilians,” and they might have been granted ranks in appreciation of their contributions.

Al-Asmar remarked that al-Sharaa rewards his elements within Tahrir al-Sham or those who are loyal to him, indicating that the control of the army and the armed forces has been firmly in his hands from the beginning. Therefore, there are civilian individuals who received officer ranks as princes and commanders.

He confirmed that this will create complications, especially since there are hundreds, if not thousands, of defected officers from the rank of major general down to lieutenant from various military colleges with all their specializations, who have not yet been called, and “they should realistically be the backbone of the army and its main components, as they are the most organizationally and technically capable of building this army.”

In September 2022, the military college affiliated with the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) operating previously in Idlib (currently considered the nucleus of the caretaker government in Damascus) graduated its first batch of fighters since its establishment in March 2021.

The number of graduates from the course, named “Abu Omar Saraqib,” reached 400 cadet officers, with the attendance of individuals and leaders from the majority of factions and military formations operating in Idlib.

The military college imposes acceptance and enrollment criteria, including academic achievement with a high school diploma, medical, physical, ethical, and cultural conditions, and individuals undergo intensive ideological and religious courses as well.

According to the decision to establish the college, it is directly subordinate to the Prime Minister and enjoys legal personality, financial and administrative independence, and a separate budget that is included within the budget of the government.

 

The new army needs organization and reliance on the expertise of defected officers exclusively, training the revolutionaries, and benefiting from their combat experiences while also doing justice to them.

Colonel Ziyad Haj Obeid

 

Minister of Defense.. Internal and external activities

Murhaf Abu Qasra accompanied the new administration’s delegation during its recent visits to Arab countries, which included Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Jordan, where he met with defense ministers or chiefs of staff from these countries.

Internally, Abu Qasra intensified his meetings with leaders of military factions, and images published by the Ministry of Defense showed him meeting with various military factions, some of which were part of the al-Fath al-Mubin Operations Room that managed military operations in Idlib between 2020 and 2024, while others belonged to the Syrian National Army (SNA) which falls under the Ministry of Defense of the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) operating in the Aleppo countryside.

On January 9 of this year, the defense minister Abu Qasra met with a delegation from the Free Syrian Army that has been stationed for years in the al-Tanf area and enjoys American support.

All these sessions were titled by the Ministry of Defense as “Organizational sessions with military leaders to begin the involvement of factions in the ministry of defense.”

The sessions with the factions, according to the minister, are aimed at laying the groundwork for their integration into the Ministry of Defense, seeking to create a roadmap to achieve stability in the organizational structure of the armed forces.

Abu Qasra pledged in statements published by the Ministry of Defense’s channels to work on restoring the army to its primary goal of being “a protector of the homeland, defending the people, and a source of pride,” aiming to “bridge the gap between the armed forces and the Syrian people.”

The minister stated that the importance of restructuring the organizational structure necessitates working tirelessly to achieve “our fundamental goals within a record time, after which the development phase across all components of the Syrian Arab Army will begin.”

In a recorded video, in response to a question about compulsory conscription, al-Sharaa mentioned that he is examining the matter preliminarily and that there will be a voluntary army, as there is a great turnout, and there is no need to burden Syrians with the “nightmare of compulsory conscription,” with the possibility of conducting some specialties that may involve compulsory conscription for 15 to 20 days in cases of severe danger requiring general mobilization.

Colonel Ziad Haj Obeid believes that halting compulsory conscription is a correct step toward building the new Syrian army, asserting that “it must be a true national army made up of volunteers who serve Syria with sincerity and honor, and that the army should work to protect Syria.”

Colonel Obeid pointed out that the previous regime’s army has become outside the circle of decision-making and is virtually dissolved.

The new army “needs organization and reliance on the expertise of defected officers exclusively, training the revolutionaries, and benefiting from their combat experiences, and ensuring their rights,” according to Colonel Ziad Haj Obeid’s remarks.

Internal and external determinants for building the army

The foundations for building armies in countries are directly linked to national demands and the nation’s goals, which are defined at the highest leadership levels and upon which the comprehensive national strategy is built, branching into specialized strategies including defense and security.

There are key factors affecting army building related to the purpose of the army: whether the state has an expansionist vision or is focused on defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity against internal and external threats. Additionally, the state’s doctrine, its history, culture of its society, regional ambiance, and international relations are all contributing factors.

The state’s geographic position and its economic, political, human, scientific, and technological capabilities (elements of state power) are critical factors in building the army envisioned by the state, meaning that the state’s regional and international positioning and role dictate the form, size, and nature of the army it builds.

Recent wars have demonstrated that professional armies built on volunteer foundations are more effective than those built on compulsory service.

I believe that the new Syrian leadership’s direction is correct, but many internal and external determinants and influences need to be handled wisely to build the army on sound national foundations that guarantee it is an army of the state rather than serving the ruler.

Regarding promotions, they are necessary during the transitional phase to build the nucleus of the main leadership structure, but they should be based on professionalism as much as possible since qualifying professional military leadership is not an easy task.

In summary, the locals know their own needs best; what suits one country may not suit another, but the correct approach and sound foundations are clear to those who seek to serve their country faithfully.

Retired Major General Mohammed Suleiman Farghal

Former Assistant Chief of Staff of the Jordanian Army

Challenges of forming the new army

After the fall of the Syrian regime, attention turned to the formation of the new Syrian army, amid concerns about several challenges that may impact the restructuring of the army, particularly with the existence of many local factions with varying military capabilities and ideologies.

On December 24, 2024, the Military Operations Administration in Syria announced the agreement to dissolve all military factions and integrate them under the Ministry of Defense umbrella.

This step followed a series of meetings held by the leader of the new Syrian administration, Ahmed al-Sharaa, with military factions to discuss the structure of the new military institution in Syria.

Before this step was implemented, al-Sharaa stated that a committee would be formed from new military leaders to outline a new structure for the forthcoming army, beginning the process of gradually dissolving the factions and integrating into the army, stressing the prohibition of any weapon outside state control.

He added that there is a consensus among the majority of factions that there should be a united leadership and the formation of a Ministry of Defense after military operations are concluded.

 

Integrating the factions into the army poses the biggest challenge, especially because some hold different political and ideological views, with some factions differing in combat capacity and doctrine, or refuse to join the army unless under certain conditions like the SDF.

Colonel Ahmed Hamada, Military Analyst

 

The dilemma of merging factions

After the announcement of the merger of the factions, the Syrian News Agency (SANA) stated on January 8 that the Syrian Ministry of Defense continues to hold organizational meetings with military leaders to begin the process of integrating the factions into the ministry.

Specialist researcher in northeastern Syrian affairs, Samer al-Ahmad, believes that merging military components as groups poses a significant risk to the shape of the state. This is the premise that Ahmed al-Sharaa is exploring, according to the researcher, as the integration of factions into the army in the form of groups resembles a “militia state,” similar to the situations in Libya and Iraq.

Today, one can look at the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, which includes the Peshmerga forces that are independent in leadership and have previously confronted the Iraqi army, as well as the Iran-affiliated Popular Mobilization Forces, which do not owe loyalty to Iraq.

Al-Ahmad added to Enab Baladi that it is unreasonable to include armed factions within the Ministry of Defense if the government aims to build a national state. It is impossible to merge groups like the Sham Front, Sultan Murad, or the SDF, for example, in their organizational structure, placing the army at risk of subsequent military fragmentation in the event of disputes among leaders.

To avoid this dilemma, military affairs researcher at the Jusoor for Studies Center, Rashid Hourani, emphasized the importance of transferring faction leaders to other factions, which would prevent a leader from a faction from staging a rebellion or insurrection within the army.

Hourani added to Enab Baladi that the optimal solution for merging factions within the army system would be through adopting criteria followed in most armies around the world regarding military personnel, such as age, educational level, and tasks. Thus, the application of these criteria could result in many members of these factions being excluded from military service.

Moreover, a good percentage of these factions’ personnel are university students; therefore, after the conclusion of the military operations currently involving pursuing Assad’s remnants and maintaining security, these individuals will likely prefer to return to their lives and complete their academic specialties, according to Hourani.

For his part, military analyst Ahmed Hamada stated that merging the factions into the army poses the most significant challenge, especially since some have different political and ideological visions. Some factions differ in their capabilities and combat doctrine, while others refuse to integrate into the army except under specific conditions, like the SDF. Furthermore, some Syrian components want their factions to retain their weapons for a specified period, but the decision of the new Syrian state is for the weapons to be in its hands.

Hamada highlighted in his comments to Enab Baladi that the Ministry of Defense and the Syrian state aim to reduce tensions among all factions and thus merge everyone into a new Ministry of Defense, which leads to achieving military stability. However, this requires deep understanding among all parties involved and ensuring that everyone is included in the decision-making process, so that the restructuring of the army serves everyone’s interests.

 

The priority now is to restructure the army and build a new combat doctrine and a regular armament doctrine.

Colonel Ahmed Hamada, Military Analyst

 

Financial problems

Military researcher Rashid Hourani considered that the weak financial capabilities are among the most significant challenges facing the restructuring of the army. The factions liberated the country and took over in an economically weakened state, which will compel them to establish an army gradually, in addition to the allocations or gains that some parties are trying to secure.

Hourani further added that the matter of rehabilitation and training requires substantial financial expenditures. Organizing the army differs from organizing the factions as the latter was primarily limited to infantry weapons, while now they may benefit from rehabilitating and maintaining what remains of the previous regime’s military equipment, such as naval forces and aviation.

In the same context, Colonel Ahmed Hamada confirmed that the later stage requires securing financial support to arm the army, pay its salaries, and enhance the military capabilities that have undergone significant depletion due to 14 years of war and Israeli bombardments. However, the priority now is to restructure the army and build a new combat doctrine and a regular armament doctrine.

Israel has intensified its shelling of military sites in Syria hours after Bashar al-Assad’s fall. The Israeli army radio stated on December 12, 2024, that 70 to 80% of the military capabilities of Assad’s regime were destroyed.

The Israeli army radio added that 350 fighter jets attacked sites from Damascus to Tartus, destroying dozens of aircraft and air defense systems, as well as weapons depots.

Obstacles between the SDF and Damascus

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) began working on communicating with the Damascus caretaker government after al-Assad’s fall to reach a consensus on their integration into the new Syrian army.

SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi repeatedly expressed his readiness for military integration with the Syrian opposition, stating on December 20, 2024, to the British newspaper “The Times” that his forces, consisting of 100,000 members, are ready to dissolve themselves and join the new Syrian army.

Badr Mulla Rashid, director of the Raman Center for Studies and Consultations, believes that there are challenges facing the SDF and the Damascus government in reaching a comprehensive agreement, the most significant of which is the SDF’s previous stance on joining the Syrian army, which demands that it maintain its military structure as an armed group rather than as individuals within the Syrian army.

Rashid added to Enab Baladi that the SDF fears the absence of any guarantor to protect its areas of control, whether against retaliatory operations based on its military alignment or its complete exclusion from the equation if it surrenders its weapons. Additionally, the Kurdish bloc within the SDF raises demands for a form of expanded autonomous administration.

The SDF’s demands for merging into the Syrian army contradict the conditions set by the Damascus caretaker government. Ahmed al-Sharaa stated that he agrees to merge all military factions in Syria under the umbrella of the Syrian Ministry of Defense, but this merger must be on an individual basis, not as groups.

Al-Sharaa indicated during a meeting with Al-Arabiya channel that the SDF would join the Syrian Ministry of Defense, noting that the Military Operations Administration is negotiating to “solve the crisis of northeastern Syria.”

Other regional and local challenges also emerge, notably concerning the foreign elements of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) present in the region, facing pressure from both Turkey and local forces to leave and hand over all decision-making aspects to the Syrians, according to the Kurdish affairs researcher Badr Mulla Rashid.

Despite these challenges, Rashid believes there are positive signs so far toward reaching a resolution between the SDF and Damascus, especially following the reported meeting between Mazloum Abdi and Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus, and the existence of agreement on significant points between them, with the main disagreement revolving around Islamic State prisoners held by the SDF. The SDF’s merger into the new Syrian army could potentially lead to a new problem regarding who will ensure that Islamic State elements do not escape from the prisons since their escape would pose a threat to the stability of the Syrian state.

The SDF, supported by the International Coalition, controls more than 26 camps and prisons, where approximately 50,000 individuals connected to the Islamic State are detained (41,000 in camps and 9,000 in prisons), according to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy statistics at the end of last year.

On December 19, 2024, Mazloum Abdi told Reuters that foreign Kurdish fighters who came to Syria from across the Middle East to support his forces would leave if a complete ceasefire were reached with Turkey.

Abdi added that despite the arrival of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party fighters in Syria, this does not mean that his forces (SDF) have organizational ties with the group.

However, it is known, according to what experts in Kurdish affairs and studies from research centers have stated, that the dominant voice in the SDF belongs to the cadres of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which controls the SDF, especially in its security and military aspects.

For his part, Ahmed al-Sharaa conditioned the existence of fundamental rules to resolve the ongoing problem in northeastern Syria, namely that there should be no division in Syria in any form, even if it is federal, and that foreign fighters who cause problems for neighboring countries must leave, and that weapons should be restricted to the state.

The conditions proposed by al-Sharaa regarding the exit of foreign fighters and the agreement on a united Syria are categorized by researcher Samer al-Ahmad, specializing in northeastern Syrian affairs, as “preconditions for negotiation,” as he believes that any changes will not occur before the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) approves them.

Al-Ahmad did not rule out that AANES would attend the national dialogue conference as individuals if it accepts the two conditions posed by al-Sharaa earlier.

Al-Ahmad pointed out that several leaders of the SDF and the military councils affiliated with it could join the Syrian Ministry of Defense as individuals, and they might become officers in the ministry, but again as individuals and not as entities.

The south and al-Tanf: Weak points

In the southern provinces, several military forces emerged in the provinces of Daraa and As-Suwayda during the years of the Syrian revolution.

In Daraa, Free Syrian Army factions fought the regime forces since the early years of the revolution until the regime regained control over Daraa with Russian support, according to the settlement agreement in July and August 2018.

After the settlement, the factions in Daraa took several paths, some of which disbanded and refused to be subordinate to the regime’s forces and its security branches. These forces played a prominent role in supporting other areas in Daraa that were being subjected to raids or sieges after the settlement. They clashed with the regime in Daraa al-Balad in 2021 until an agreement was reached that ended the regime’s siege at that time.

Other factions became subordinate to the former regime’s security forces or Russia, with the most prominent being the Youth of Sunna faction, led by Ahmed al-Awda, which joined the ranks of the 5th Corps of the regime’s army supported by Russia under the name “8th Brigade.” In 2022, it became subordinate to the Military Security.

As for As-Suwayda, it enjoyed a degree of military independence during the years of the revolution, especially after the establishment of the Men of Dignity Movement by Wahid al-Balous, allowing the province’s residents the opportunity to avoid joining the regime’s army.

In As-Suwayda, there are factions with two different references; the first are those under or supported by religious leaders, such as the Men of Dignity Movement and Sheikh al-Karama Forces led by Laith al-Balous, while other factions were established with the support of the former regime’s security forces and are spread across different areas of the province, clashing multiple times with the factions of the clerical reference.

After the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation

Following the launch of opposition factions in northern Syria of the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation on November 27, 2024, the factions of Daraa, Quneitra, and As-Suwayda formed a southern operations room on December 6, 2024, expelling the regime from these provinces and heading towards Damascus.

Leaders of the Daraa factions, led by Ahmed al-Awda, met with the General Command in Damascus, one of these meetings, and among the most important was on December 11.

The meeting concluded with four outcomes:

• Define priorities for work in the upcoming phase across various fields.
• Coordinate work and enhance collaboration in both military and civilian administration.
• Enhance mechanisms and ways of coordination and cooperation among all active cadres in the province.
• Discuss steps to enhance security and preserve national gains.

On December 14, a military convoy belonging to the Military Operations Administration arrived in Daraa province, coming from Damascus, taking over police forces, customs, and the Nassib border crossing with Jordan, and a delegation from it met with civil and military figures at the cultural center in the city of Daraa to coordinate the new work mechanism.

Days after the announcement of the Military Operations Administration about dissolving the factions and starting the restructuring of the army, the Men of Dignity Movement and Mountain Brigade, which are among the most prominent local factions in As-Suwayda, expressed their readiness to integrate into the new Syrian army.

The two factions stated in a joint statement on January 6 that “taking up arms was a defense of the people of As-Suwayda in all their diversity, not out of love for it, and it is a desperate means, not an end,” emphasizing the necessity of establishing a state based on justice and the rule of law, where arms become the monopoly of a national military institution.

This statement came a week after local factions in As-Suwayda prevented a convoy belonging to the Military Operations Administration from entering the city due to lack of coordination with them, as well as the convoy coming at night, which led them to block its entry, according to an Enab Baladi correspondent.

The correspondent added that the local factions demand that the task of maintaining security be the responsibility of the people of As-Suwayda, but in coordination with the Damascus government, as they are more aware of the tribal and social nature in their province.

The media spokesperson for the Men of Dignity Movement, Abu Taimour, said, “We are ready to participate in building Syria and joining the Syrian army, provided that it is an ideological army aimed at protecting the homeland and not sectarian or factional or used as a tool in the hands of the authority.”

Abu Taimour added to Enab Baladi, “If those conditions are met, we have no objection to sending our sons for military service; we await a state based on justice that ensures human rights, the rule of law, and citizenship.”

Regarding the position of other local factions on joining the new Syrian army, the media representative of the Men of Dignity Movement said that “the remaining factions in As-Suwayda still have some fears, but coordination is ongoing with them,” indicating that several accepted and significant factions in As-Suwayda will soon announce their joining of the statement of the Men of Dignity Movement, which declared its readiness along with the Mountain Brigade (Liwa al-Jabal) to integrate into the new Syrian army.

For his part, Rashid Hourani ruled out that the factions of As-Suwayda would remain independent of the decision of the state’s army as was the case during the previous regime, pointing out that the role of these factions will gradually diminish and ultimately end with the passing of time.

According to Hourani, this is due to various reasons; first, the factions of As-Suwayda relied on volunteering from local community members under special circumstances no longer prevailing today, in addition to the cessation of the support they received from donations from the local community in As-Suwayda or from outside, while the factions that merged with the new army are taking on the role of maintaining security.

In the triangle of the Syrian-Iraqi-Jordanian border (al-Tanf area), the Free Syrian Army controls the “55 km” area and has not exceeded its areas of control since 2017.

However, after the Military Operations Administration approached its control of the city of Homs, the faction headed towards the cities of Palmyra and Qaryatayn located east of Homs, capturing them on December 7 (just hours before the regime’s fall) after the regime’s forces withdrew from them.

Free Syrian Army consists of groups previously in the former Free Syrian Army that came from the areas of Deir Ezzor, Palmyra, and the rural areas of Aleppo after battles against the Islamic State, which ended with the group controlling their regions.

They are stationed at the al-Tanf military base as the protective forces for the base associated with International Coalition Forces in the area, and the United States is considered the main supporter of the faction since its establishment in 2015.

Photos released by the Ministry of Defense of the Damascus caretaker government on January 9 showed a meeting of Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra with a delegation from the Free Syrian Army led by Colonel Salem al-Antari.

Al-Antari stated in an interview with Alghad channel that the Free Syrian Army is ready to engage in a unified national army.