Military factions in northwestern Syria have shifted from using drones for surveillance to carrying out attacks against the positions of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian regime.

According to Enab Baladi’s monitoring of the factions’ media since last September, drones are being used in offensive operations that include dropping bombs on military vehicles or fortifications, as well as using suicide drones.

The use of drones by these factions to carry out attacks and training on them first appeared for the Syrian National Army (SNA) factions supported by Turkey on August 20 of last month, in images published by the Ministry of Defense of the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) showing training on suicide drones.

A fighter in the Syrian National Army carries a drone during field exercises for special task units – November 23, 2024 (Ministry of Defense of the Interim Government)

Does it make a difference?

Drones have evolved, and their usage has increased, becoming seen as tools for deterrence and stabilization. Attacking advanced positions of the SDF and the regime creates a strategic disruption in the targeted area, thereby diminishing the strength and paralyzing the positions of the regime and the SDF, according to Nawar Shaaban, a researcher at the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies.

The researcher explained to Enab Baladi that the opposition factions use drones to target advanced fortification positions to clear them out, stating that they are not offensive or defensive weapons, but are currently considered tactical for stabilizing and securing certain lines and axes.

The military use of drones should be within the context of a ground battle, and the drones currently available to the opposition factions cannot be used as offensive weapons, unless regarded as support for ground operations, according to Shaaban.

In other words, they are used to target primary defense lines to clear axes and lines before advancing. However, the opposition factions do not use them this way but rather as a deterrent. For example, if a certain location is targeting them with artillery, they target it with drones to clear it out, according to Shaaban.

On the other hand, the regime and the SDF used drones in military attacks prior to the opposition factions.

The regime has used drones randomly, primarily targeting civilians, causing panic and prompting new waves of displacement, which has exacerbated the security fragility in areas controlled by the opposition in northwestern Syria.

Meanwhile, the SDF uses drones strictly for military attacks, with limited targeting of civilians, mainly focusing on the positions of the Syrian National Army and sometimes Turkish forces.

Elements of the Syrian National Army during military exercises using FPV drones – August 2024 (Ministry of Defense of the Interim Government)

What type of drones do the opposition factions have?

The National Army factions in Aleppo countryside or the al-Fath al-Mubin Operations Room in Idlib do not announce the types of drones they possess, but they can be observed during training or their use in operations to identify some of their types.

Private sources from the National Army mentioned to Enab Baladi earlier that the “army” has locally manufactured or modified drones for all combat tasks (combat, reconnaissance, suicide) and is training on them in preparation for any military action.

Syrian drone expert Ali al-Salloum stated to Enab Baladi previously that the National Army possesses some drones considered hobbyist quadcopters, limited to simple reconnaissance and dropping some bombs.

The situation is similar with al-Fath al-Mubin, which is backed predominantly by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Idlib, but it has shown early interest in the issue of local manufacturing and is superior to the National Army in producing drones for reconnaissance and offensive uses, benefiting from local initiatives in utilizing available resources, despite technical and material challenges.

According to al-Salloum, it seems that al-Fath al-Mubin is seeking to achieve this through cooperation with local experts or acquiring knowledge from external sources. “This ability to learn and adapt is a strong advantage,” according to the researcher.

Aleppo countryside… Close ties to Turkey

On August 20, the Ministry of Defense of the Interim Government published images showing the National Army for the first time utilizing suicide drones (FPV). This was followed by recorded footage three weeks later showing the National Army conducting military strikes against SDF positions using drones.

According to Enab Baladi‘s monitoring of the National Army media, the prominent factions using drones to carry out attacks include the Sultan Murad Brigade and the Joint Forces, which comprise the Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade known as “al-Amshat,” along with the Hamza Brigade known as “al-Hamzat.”

These factions are among the closest formations of the National Army to Turkey, known for manufacturing and developing drones.

In the past two months, these factions have published on their media platforms video recordings of conducting attacks against SDF positions, including strikes on bunkers, fortified sites, and military vehicles.

Idlib… Accusations of Ukrainian involvement

Since last September, Russian officials have repeatedly accused Tahrir al-Sham, influential in Idlib and part of al-Fath al-Mubin, of receiving an offer from Ukraine involving the release of known Chechen fighters hostile to Russia in exchange for providing the HTS with drones.

In turn, Tahrir al-Sham and the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) have repeatedly denied the Russian accusations.

Within the context of increasing Russian tension regarding the relationship between Tahrir al-Sham and Ukraine, the “Russian Spring” website published a release from the Unity and Jihad Group, commenting on the release by stating that Idlib factions are learning to use drones based on the Ukrainian experience against the Russians.

The Unity and Jihad Group is one of the most notable Islamic military factions fighting alongside Tahrir al-Sham, aligning with its policies, and includes elements from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Several groups within al-Fath al-Mubin, which includes Tahrir al-Sham and other groups, are working to develop locally manufactured weapons, including drones used for reconnaissance and conducting attacks. It is not difficult to also acquire commercial drones and make modifications to turn them into suicide drones or for dropping bombs, similar to the methods followed by other factions.