What are the implications of the resumption of Russian-Turkish patrols in al-Hasakah?

Russian-Turkish joint patrols on the M4 international highway - February 11, 2020 (Screenshot from Russian Zvezda channel)

Russian-Turkish joint patrols on the M4 international highway - February 11, 2020 (Screenshot from Russian Zvezda channel)

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Enab Baladi – Khaled al-Jeratli

Joint Russian-Turkish patrols have resumed in areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria, under the Sochi Agreement signed between the two parties at the end of 2019, after more than a year of suspension due to security reasons.

The Russian news agency TASS reported on August 23 that joint ground patrols by Turkey and Russia in Syria have resumed, noting that Moscow plans to continue this joint activity in the future.

For its part, the Turkish Anadolu Agency cited a statement from the Turkish Ministry of Defense announcing the resumption of patrols after nearly a year of interruption.

The Turkish Ministry of Defense stated on the same day that the goal of continuing the activities of the joint ground patrols is to ensure the security of Turkish borders and civilians in the region.

The statement also pointed out that the patrols aim to identify control points, headquarters, and military structures of the SDF, which Turkey considers an extension of the “Kurdistan Workers’ Party” (PKK) listed as a terrorist organization in Turkey.

The Turkish Ministry also stated at the time that the patrols operate in areas from which the PKK should withdraw according to agreements Turkey has concluded with the United States and Russia.

Patrols have been active in the region since 2019 and stopped in 2023, but left no impact on the ground. So, does their resumption indicate a fundamental change in the course of events in the region?

Patrols over the years

Joint Russian-Turkish patrols usually target two main areas in northern and eastern Syria. Turkish forces enter from the village of Sherk west of the town of al-Darbasiyah to meet Russian forces coming either from their military base at Qamishli Airport or from their base east of Tal Tamr (formerly the livestock complex), as previously observed by a reporter from Enab Baladi in al-Hasakah during the peak period of these patrols’ activity.

The patrol takes a route through southern rural villages, the most prominent being al-Darbasiyah and Amuda, and sometimes reaches the northwestern countryside of Abu Rasin where the contact lines between the SDF and the Syrian National Army (SNA) are located, before turning back.

These patrols consist of several armored vehicles, divided equally between the Russian and Turkish armies, and are accompanied by two Russian military helicopters.

The second patrol area is east of Qamishli city in the al-Hasakah countryside, where Turkish forces enter the area through the Deir Ghosn crossing north of al-Jawadiyah and meet Russian forces coming from Qamishli.

This patrol usually roams villages and towns located along the border from Qamishli through al-Qahtaniyah and al-Jawadiyah until reaching the northern countryside of Maabad and Rmelan. Sometimes, Turkish forces are absent from the joint patrol, and it is completed solely by Russian forces accompanied by SDF forces.

The patrol can reach the triangular border at the village of Andur (the northernmost point in northeastern Syria) northeast of al-Malikiyah town, east of al-Hasakah.

The parties stopped announcing the launch of the patrols, and their movement has been monitored through local news pages in the areas where military vehicles are operating since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine at the beginning of 2022.

What is the aim of these patrols?

During the peak period of these patrols in Syria under the Sochi Agreement between Turkey and Russia, no significant impact was left on the region. The geographical control of the SDF, backed by Washington, did not change, nor did Turkey stop targeting SDF military sites in the region.

This period coincided with accusations between Ankara and Moscow of not fulfilling the conditions of the Sochi Agreement regarding the geography extending from Idlib to al-Hasakah. The most recent Russian statement came from the former special envoy of the Russian President to Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, saying, “Turkey has not fulfilled its commitments regarding the de-escalation zone in Idlib and must adhere to its obligations in this regard.”

While the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has repeatedly said that Russia did not fulfill its commitments regarding the de-escalation agreement in Syria.

Director of the Raman Center for Studies, Badr Mulla Rashid, told Enab Baladi that the launch of joint patrols was a Russian-American effort to restrain the borders of the Turkish military operation that Ankara called “Peace Spring,” aimed at distancing the SDF from the Turkish borders.

He added that the agreement succeeded over the past five years in establishing a new reality on the ground, especially since the aim of the agreement was to stop the intensity of military operations and create reassurance for the Turkish side regarding the spread of the SDF along its southern borders.

Regarding the suspension of these patrols for more than a year, Mulla Rashid said it indicates a lack of desire for coordination due to existing disputes or a desire by Turkey to exert pressure on the Russian side. Therefore, the return of joint patrols is expected to contribute to enhancing security stability and reducing the likelihood of military confrontation between the SDF and Turkey.

The researcher pointed out that the return of patrols could contribute to further entrenching field understandings between Turkey and Russia amid attempts to achieve a Turkish agreement with the Syrian regime.

Impact on the ground

The SDF has not announced an official position on the return of these patrols. It is not clear if the presence of Turkish military vehicles in even a small part of the areas it controls would have a negative or positive impact on it.

The researcher at the Jusoor Center for Studies, Anas Shawakh, believes that the resumption of patrols in Syria reflects the parties’ desire to raise the level of coordination between them in the region.

He added to Enab Baladi that the aim of the patrols since their launch was to enable Turkey and Russia alike to monitor the activities of the SDF or the PKK in northeastern Syria.

For Turkey, these patrols may help enhance the intelligence it uses during operations targeting leaders and members of the PKK in northern Syria.

The researcher believes that the SDF’s approval or rejection of these patrols’ presence would not make a difference, especially since it has been settled since the Sochi Agreement, which allowed for military patrols in exchange for halting Turkish military operations. Therefore, the presence of these patrols protects the region from new military operations.

Researcher Badr Mulla Rashid said that based on the terms of the Sochi Agreement, the absence of joint patrols poses a threat to the SDF, not their continuation.

He added that the continuation of patrols could open avenues for negotiations between Ankara and Damascus to include economic agreements in areas east of the Euphrates River, where the SDF controls. In the best-case scenario for the SDF, this could lead to a tripartite understanding between the regime, Russia, and Turkey, with Turkey accepting a form of “expanded local administration” in exchange for expanding patrol areas and ensuring the withdrawal of the SDF from other border areas with Turkey.

Mulla Rashid pointed out during his interview with Enab Baladi that the regime today could play an indirect mediator role between the SDF and Turkey to reach a form that allows it greater control over the border areas.

The Sochi Agreement

The Turkish and Russian presidents, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin, signed an additional protocol on October 22, 2019, in Sochi regarding areas in northeastern Syria, after the agreement was known as the “de-escalation agreement” and was related to opposition-controlled areas in Idlib and Aleppo.

The additional protocol to the agreement stipulated the complete withdrawal of the SDF from the Syrian border strip by 30 kilometers within 150 hours, in addition to withdrawing its weapons from Manbij and Tal Rifaat.

It also stipulated joint Turkish-Russian patrols to a depth of ten kilometers along the border, except for Qamishli, while maintaining the status quo between Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain.

Russian military police began patrolling the Syrian-Turkish border for the first time two days after signing the agreement, on October 25.

The agreement came after a military operation launched by Turkey under the name “Peace Spring” in October 2019 against the SDF and its military backbone, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, with Turkish forces and their local ally, the Syrian National Army, advancing in Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad areas.

The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) has not clearly stated its official position on the agreement since then, nor has it announced its withdrawal from the border areas, knowing that the agreement stipulated its withdrawal as a condition for its completion.

 

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