Enab Baladi – Ali Darwish
Drones (unmanned aerial vehicles) have evolved from being solely used for surveillance and monitoring during the last two decades of the past century to becoming multi-tasking weapons, used for air-to-ground and air-to-air strikes, and more recently, transformed into kamikaze (suicide) drones.
Armies and militias of the countries present on Syrian soil (the International Coalition, Turkey, Iran, Russia, and the regime forces) have all employed drones of various types and roles. Meanwhile, this weapon remained largely out of the opposition’s reach except for some factions’ attempts to manufacture and utilize commercial drones for surveillance and reconnaissance.
However, on August 20 this year, the first use of suicide drones by the Turkish-supported Syrian National Army (SNA) factions was witnessed in a training project, the images of which were published by the Ministry of Defense in the Syrian Interim Government (SIG).
The training involved the 105th Victory Flag Unit of the Sultan Murad Division, one of the closest factions of the National Army to Turkey.
What types of drones do the opposition factions have?
Enab Baladi reached out to the Syrian National Army and the Ministry of Defense for information on the types of drones in the army’s inventory but did not receive any due to the sensitivity of the issue.
Special sources from the National Army told Enab Baladi that the National Army possesses locally manufactured or modified drones for all combat tasks (armed, reconnaissance, kamikaze), and are being trained on them in preparation for any military action.
Syrian researcher on drone affairs Ali Muhammad told Enab Baladi that the National Army owns some amateur drones with four propellers, used only for short-distance reconnaissance and dropping some bombs.
The National Army controls large parts of northern and western rural Aleppo (the areas of Operation Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch), in addition to the towns of Tal Abyad in northern Raqqa and Ras al-Ain in northwestern al-Hasakah (Operation Peace Spring area).
Limited impact on military operations
Researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Nawar Shaaban, told Enab Baladi that modified kamikaze drones (commercial drones with an added explosive) do not make a difference in battles against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the regime.
Shaaban explained that this type of weapon is neither offensive nor defensive but is used for sabotage, distraction, and confusion, and does not help achieve a military advance or significant difference unless a large number of them (20 to 30 drones) are used on a specific line of engagement.
When targeting a position or several points on one axis with several kamikaze drones, the point or several points must change their place, which can affect the defense lines, forcing them to retreat or relocate, or abandon high-ground areas.
Modified commercial drones allow for striking distant targets without putting the attacker at risk, according to Shaaban, who expected their use to hit points deep in from two to three kilometers.
The goal achievement rate is up to 50%, as “this type is equipped with larger batteries compared to its size, which increases its speed, making it difficult to control and easy to shoot down,” Shaaban said.
Turkey: A potential reliable source
Turkey, which supports the Syrian National Army, is one of the leading countries in drone manufacturing of various types and has proven their effectiveness in several conflict zones such as Syria and Libya.
The National Army participated alongside Turkey in three military operations within Syrian territory: Operation Euphrates Shield in northern rural Aleppo in 2016 against the Islamic State organization, Operation Olive Branch in western rural Aleppo against the SDF in 2018, and Operation Peace Spring east of the Euphrates against the SDF in 2019.
Despite the support and participation in operations, Turkey did not supply the National Army with its drones, rather, it was the one using them.
Theoretically, factions in northwestern Syria can obtain various types of drones either from Turkey or the black market, according to drone affairs researcher Ali Muhammad.
However, this requires large sums of money and involves significant risks related to quality, safety, and legality, necessitating careful consideration before taking any steps to acquire drones in this manner.
Researcher Ali Muhammad believes that Turkey could be a potential source for acquiring drones, especially if there is coordination or unofficial support from some parties.
Nevertheless, “this depends on the political and military dynamics in the region as there may be restrictions on exporting such technology,” Muhammad explained.
If the National Army obtained drones from Turkey, they would likely be commercial or light military models, such as the “Kargu,” useful for reconnaissance and limited attack missions.
Any attempt to acquire drones from Turkey unofficially may lead to diplomatic tension between Turkey and other active parties in the region (Russia, Iran, the United States), affecting stability in northwestern Syria.
The types of drones possibly obtained from the black market, such as the commercial “DJI Mavic” or modified drones for military use, are “limited in capability and reliability,” according to Ali Muhammad.
Drones from the black market may be used or illegally modified, impacting their performance. Additionally, ensuring quality and maintenance would be a challenge and entail significant legal risks that could lead to sanctions or security problems with other active parties in the region.
Al-Fath al-Mubin accelerates manufacturing
Local military manufacturing has been an ongoing effort by Free Army factions and Islamic factions since 2012, achieving some progress despite numerous challenges.
However, in recent years, with the opposition limited to northwestern Syria, the National Army has shown less interest in manufacturing compared to the efforts made by the al-Fath al-Mubin operations room.
Al-Fath al-Mubin includes factions from the Free Army along with Islamic factions, with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) being the largest in the room.
The room operates in Idlib, parts of western rural Aleppo, eastern Latakia, and northern Hama and has commercial drones for reconnaissance alongside semi-public efforts to manufacture drones locally.
In response to Enab Baladi‘s question about evaluating drone manufacturing between the National Army and al-Fath al-Mubin, researcher Ali Muhammad said that the al-Fath al-Mubin shows clear interest and progress in drone manufacturing, leveraging local initiatives and creativity in using available resources.
Conversely, the National Army lacks initiative in this field despite the availability of materials, weakening its ability to adapt to increasing threats from opposing drones, possibly due to a lack of political or organizational will or prioritizing other focuses.
The underutilization of the National Army’s resources in drone manufacturing represents a missed opportunity to bolster defensive and offensive capabilities, possibly due to a lack of expertise or not having a clear strategy.
The National Army’s reliance on imported or smuggled drones “indicates a lack of confidence or ability to develop local drones, making it less flexible and more susceptible to external pressures,” according to Muhammad.
Factions under the al-Fath al-Mubin room have managed to manufacture drones for reconnaissance and attack missions despite technical and financial challenges.
They work on utilizing locally available resources, such as commercial spare parts and raw materials, to develop drones capable of performing multiple tasks, reflecting the room’s ability to circumvent logistical and supply constraints. Additionally, developing drones requires advanced technical knowledge.
It seems that al-Fath al-Mubin strives to provide this through collaboration with local experts or acquiring knowledge from external sources, “this ability to learn and adapt is a strong advantage,” researcher Ali Muhammad said.