Khaled al-Jeratli | Hassan Ibrahim

The chaos of weapon proliferation throughout Syria raises questions about how to address it, especially as the new Syrian government has begun removing weapons from the hands of former military personnel of the Assad regime and members of irregular militias that fought alongside it since its arrival in Damascus and the fall of the regime on December 8, 2024.

Events in the Syrian coast that occurred in early March revealed the danger of this phenomenon, as violent acts initiated by armed groups described by the government as “remnants of the regime,” led to hundreds of casualties and injuries, with investigations ongoing to uncover the circumstances surrounding these events.

The new Syrian government has taken a firm stance on the proliferation of weapons, working to confine it to the state as stated by Syrian officials, starting with President Ahmed al-Sharaa. However, the reality reflects the difficulty of this task, as the government continues to focus on combating the spread of weapons in areas considered hubs of the ousted regime, while dealing with less seriousness in other areas under its control, with exceptions such as what occurred in Busra al-Sham in eastern Daraa two weeks ago.

Enab Baladi is attempting to conduct a survey on the form of weapons spread in Syrian provinces and the changes that have occurred since the fall of the regime until today.

It also discusses the state’s options regarding this problem, which poses a security threat surrounding Syria, and the importance of completing disarmament steps in the near future.

Cheap and easy to obtain

The authorities are trying to control the rampant weapons through settlement operations for former regime forces elements or confiscating them from the “remnants” (in caches, houses, or warehouses or following bloody confrontations), or by receiving quantities of weapons after agreements with notables from villages and towns in the rural areas of Daraa, Homs, Hama, Latakia, and Tartus. Prior to this, fighters from the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation seized sites, warehouses, and stores belonging to the regime forces.

These measures remain insufficient compared to the quantities of rampant and widely circulated weapons in Syria, without stringent laws that facilitate the task of civil or military entities that have controlled various areas of the Syrian geography.

Syria has turned into an open storage for weapons, a stage for exhibiting and testing various kinds, and a market for their circulation and trade, making the sound of gunfire and carrying rifles a characteristic of daily life over the past 14 years.

The proliferation of weapons and the state of conflict have placed Syria in the eighth position globally, the second in Asia, and the first in the Arab world in terms of crime levels, with a rate of 68.1, making it the third most dangerous and violent country in the world in terms of conflict spread, intensity, and danger to civilians.

In 2017, the number of small arms in Syria was estimated to exceed 1.54 million pieces, which corresponds to 8.2% of the total population at that time of approximately 18.9 million, according to a report by the Small Arms Survey, a non-governmental research organization specializing in arms issues based in Geneva.

At that time, the organization estimated that about 655,500 pieces were owned by civilians, while it estimated the number of weapons owned by police and security forces at around 124,000 pieces.

These previous figures may have doubled after the fall of the regime, and the looting operations carried out by rebels or civilians on storehouses belonging to military units and security centers and authorities in various regions and provinces that were under the previous regime’s control before its fall and the collapse of its army on December 8, 2024.

According to Enab Baladi‘s observations in six Syrian provinces, it is easy to obtain light and medium weapons, with transactions conducted through three methods: shops, social media, and personal acquaintances or being related to fighters.

Enab Baladi has observed a decrease in weapon prices after the regime’s fall ranging between 50% and 70%, attributed by traders to two reasons:

• The abundance of supply and the spread of weapons found on the streets or the looting and control of stores or headquarters that belonged to the previous regime’s forces.
• Some people’s desire to sell weapons for fear of possession after the stabilization of the security situation and the assumption of the General Security Service’s responsibility for maintaining security.

From north to south… available at varying prices

The prices of individual weapons have recorded a significant decline in Daraa, with the Russian rifle “AK-47” (Kalashnikov) previously sold for between 500 and 1000 US dollars; today, its prices range between 100 and 150 dollars, amid the absence of weapon shops. Meanwhile, well-known traders and brokers are spread among the residents of each village, often associated with one another, and sometimes some offer weapons through social media groups.

In Hama city, Enab Baladi has observed three shops selling traditional military weapons publicly after the fall of the Assad regime, with prices for Russian rifles ranging between 150 and 400 US dollars, grenades from 30 to 50 US dollars, and pistols priced between 350 and 3000 US dollars depending on the model and quality.

Enab Baladi‘s correspondents in Damascus and its countryside confirmed the absence of shops selling military weapons, which was corroborated by Ahmed Balla, the owner of a hunting rifle shop in Douma, rural Damascus, who stated that sales are limited to hunting weapons at shops that have become active after the fall of the previous Syrian regime.

He mentioned that prices for hunting rifles have decreased, starting from 500,000 Syrian pounds to 2 million pounds, whereas prices reached up to 5 million pounds before the fall of Assad’s rule.

In Deir Ezzor, the price of weapons has decreased by 50%, and there are no shops for selling weapons; buying and selling occurs secretly through traders, fearing accountability from the authorities, whether the Autonomous Administration or the Syrian government, while shops for military clothing and ammunition are widespread.

A member of the Public Relations Office at the General Security Service in Aleppo, Aqil Hussein, told Enab Baladi that strict instructions were issued after the liberation of Aleppo from the previous regime’s forces (November 30, 2024), prohibiting carrying weapons in the city or between residential areas by either civilians or military personnel.

He added that these instructions were a first step towards limiting the manifestations of armed violence, and a decision was subsequently issued prohibiting carrying weapons, which enabled the authorities to clearly control the spread of armed manifestations, with weapons being confined to police and security personnel.

 

Currently, in Aleppo, there is no mandate imposed on civilians or those with personal weapons to surrender them to the state; only former security personnel, militia members, and previous military forces were forced to hand over their arms in accordance with settlement procedures, and later a process to license weapons for those whose work requires obtaining a license will be opened.

Aqil Hussein, Member of the Public Relations Office at the General Security Service in Aleppo

 

In rural Aleppo, shops were required to obtain a license from the Military Police, with the approval for the license being linked to the shop supplying ammunition to a military faction.

The weapons market in rural Aleppo witnessed a resurgence after the fall of the Syrian regime, according to a weapon trader in the city of Azaz, who told Enab Baladi that most shops were active in selling weapons, but after four months, they shifted from military weapons to fishing and hunting weapons due to fears of new regulations and decisions, with caution to avoid financial losses.

In Idlib, the shops that sell weapons are not very active and require licenses tied to decisions previously enforced by the Salvation Government that once controlled the city, including a decision in January 2021 that mandated the closure of all shops selling weapons in Idlib and its countryside, rescinding all licenses from licensed shops and granting a deadline of 15 days for compliance or face accountability for non-compliance.

Shops selling weapons in Idlib need to meet several requirements when applying for a license to operate, including:

• Inspection of the shop in terms of location and readiness (it must be outside residential areas to maintain public safety).
• After matching conditions and required documentation, a license is granted to the applicant, allowing them to sell and purchase the designated military weapons in the license.
• It is prohibited for shops to sell any type of explosives such as “C4” (a quick-burning explosive mixture) or “TNT” (one of the most common explosives worldwide).

A shop owner selling weapons in Sarmada, north of Idlib, told Enab Baladi that prices have decreased due to the oversupply; for instance, the price of an “AK” rifle has dropped from 900 to 1500 US dollars to 750 US dollars; additionally, the rifle and pistol are the most sought-after items.

Flourishing in Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad

In the city of Ras al-Ain, there are four shops selling weapons of various types, and in the city of Tal Abyad, there are three shops, all operating without any official licenses. These shops sell weapons to everyone, regardless of age or criminal record, and they are openly displayed and sold via WhatsApp groups.

Malik Azeddine, one of the weapon dealers in Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain, told Enab Baladi that the arms trade has seen significant flourishing in the two cities after the collapse of the regime, especially among rural residents and livestock breeders, as this trade does not require any license or permission to operate.

He added that the deterioration of security conditions and the increase in theft cases have driven many to purchase individual and medium-sized weapons, such as the Russian “Kalashnikov” rifle, “P-KC” weapons, and pistols.

Azeddine indicated that some residents are also opting to buy heavy weapons, such as the “RPG” launcher and even 23mm anti-aircraft guns, which are available in the area. He noted that most tribes buy dozens of various weapons from him daily to form their own military factions and arm their members, as a customary practice.

Enab Baladi contacted the public relations department responsible for conveying journalists’ inquiries to ministries and government institutions to obtain clarifications from the relevant bodies regarding measures to control weapons and the steps to legislate issues related to carrying weapons or organizing their use through licenses or other conditions. However, no response was received by the time this report was published.

Previous models of disarmament

After wars and conflicts, many countries have adopted local programs, sometimes with international and UN assistance, aimed at controlling the spread of weapons in the hands of civilians and fighters, as well as discharging and reintegrating combatants, including:

Sierra Leone

Following the civil war in Sierra Leone (1991-2002), the government implemented a disarmament and reintegration program in cooperation with the United Nations and civil society organizations to ensure community stability. It successfully:

• Disarmed 75,490 fighters and discharged them throughout the country, including 6,845 child soldiers (506 girls) and 4,651 women. There were no longer illegal armed groups threatening the state.
• Nearly 55,000 former fighters received reintegration benefits, including skill training, formal education, agricultural, fishery, or entrepreneurial support, as well as toolkits for various crafts.
• A total of 42,330 firearms and over 1.2 million rounds of ammunition were collected from combatants and destroyed.

Afghanistan

The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program established by the United Nations in Afghanistan disarmed and discharged 63,000 members of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) from October 2003 to July 2005, leading to significant security benefits across large parts of the country, despite challenges and instability issues.

By December 2008, disarmament intervention programs, along with the subsequent illegal armed group resolution program, had removed about 100,000 small and light weapons and others, with nearly half being destroyed.

State is capable, but scene is complex

In his first meeting with the Syrian government on April 7, President Ahmed al-Sharaa emphasized the priorities of the new transitional Syrian administration, chief among them restricting weapons to the state and forming a professional national army.

The government’s objectives still face obstacles and are considered complex and problematic since the regime’s fall, according to researcher Amer al-Mithqal from the Syrian Dialogue Center.

Al-Mithqal told Enab Baladi that the difficulty of this issue stems from two main factors: the varying levels of authority control over certain areas, such as those controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), or areas inhabited by Druze, such as the As-Suwayda governorate in southern Syria and the neighborhoods of Jaramana and Sahnaya in rural Damascus.

The authority theoretically seems capable of ending armed Druze groups, but they do not want direct confrontation, especially since it could offer Israel justifications for deeper incursions into Syrian territories under the pretext of protecting them.

Moreover, the Syrian government handles minority issues cautiously, working to resolve them through negotiation, which seems to yield gradual breakthroughs, according to the researcher.

From another perspective, al-Mithqal believes that discovering all the pockets and arms caches in a short period is extremely difficult, which is evident in many areas, such as the Syrian coast and the rural regions of Homs, in addition to the existence of expansive pockets that cannot be easily detected for the remnants of the ousted regime.

After events unfolded along the Syrian coast, quantities of weapons emerged that the government had not discovered upon entering the area for the first time. The researcher asserted that this situation could occur frequently in the future unless a comprehensive plan is developed to gradually survey these areas using advanced technology, along with engaging the local community to uncover weapon caches.

On March 25, the Syrian Ministry of Interior announced that it received suicide drones “FPV” from the elders of the town of Qardaha in western Syria.

A brief statement from the Ministry of Interior indicated that the residents of Qardaha, southern Latakia, handed over the FPV drones to the ministry following a meeting between local leaders and the civil peace committee formed by the government after the recent coastal events.

On his part, researcher Mohsen al-Mustafa, specialized in civil-military relations at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, stated that the Syrian state’s capacity to control weapons “appears to be good so far in the current phase.”

He added to Enab Baladi that there are overwhelming complexities over the military scene, but the overall picture is indeed shifting towards controlling weapons and restricting them to the state.

According to al-Mustafa, the state possesses gradual tools to proceed with arms control, which include integration programs, reconciliations, and incentives for joining military and internal security institutions. He indicated that after the activation of the People’s Assembly, a new law for weapon possession will be established to replace the old law, considering the current phase the country is undergoing.

 

The state has progressive tools to proceed with arms control, including integration programs, settlements, and incentives for joining military and internal security institutions, and I believe that after activating the People’s Assembly, there will be a new law for weapon possession instead of the old law that takes into account the current phase the country is going through.

Mohsen al-Mustafa, Researcher in civil-military relations at the Omaran Center for Strategic Studies

 

Selectivity is “dangerous”

As the first steps taken by the government to establish security in areas that it recently entered after the fall of the regime, reconciliation centers were opened throughout the provinces and administrative regions in Syria. These reconciliations targeted former security, army, and police personnel, requiring them to reach a settlement and hand over their weapons.

Reconciliation operations focused on city centers, as there was an urgent priority to maintain security there, while some rural areas that did not form a priority in the government’s initial agenda were overlooked.

In Hama province, for example, the Ministry of Interior launched reconciliation centers in city centers, including Hama, Salamiya, and Masyaf, inviting residents of villages and towns to go to these centers. However, some rural residents refrained from handing over their weapons, while city residents surrendered theirs. Since then, authorities have not conducted search operations for weapons in these areas.

Journalist Eraq Zino, who resides in Salamiya east of Hama, stated that the disparity in the disarmament process created a sense of imbalanced power, leaving city residents feeling insecure.

Nawar Shaaban, a researcher at the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, believes that the selectivity in disarmament represents a “real danger” to the local community, as it creates an environment of distrust among social components and enhances the likelihood of local conflicts or the return of militia manifestations.

He argued that a comprehensive policy should be adopted for disarmament without regional or sectarian exceptions, linking disarmament to clear reintegration plans and equitable economic opportunities, as well as launching community awareness campaigns that encourage voluntary disarmament, emphasizing the necessity of involving civil society leaders and local dignitaries in the mediation and trust-building process.

 

It is essential to adopt a comprehensive policy for disarmament without regional or sectarian exceptions, linking disarmament to clear reintegration plans and equitable economic opportunities, launching community awareness campaigns to encourage voluntary disarmament, and involving civil society leaders and local dignitaries in the mediation and trust-building process.

Nawar Shaaban, Researcher at the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies

 

On his part, researcher Mohsen al-Mustafa believes it is natural for the Syrian state to focus on disarming areas that were outside its control or considered loyal to the previous regime, as the security threat would be in these areas, not in those considered their popular base from which liberation operations began.

Al-Mustafa told Enab Baladi that weapons in areas known to be rebellious against the authority are viewed as a potential threat, prompting the authorities to enforce stricter disarmament policies as part of reasserting state sovereignty. In traditional supportive areas, weapons are seen as “supportive elements,” leading to a temporary overlook of their presence; however, it is not an urgent priority.

Researcher Amer al-Mithqal believes in this regard that there are current government priorities concerning disarmament, which is natural, considering that security risks arising from the areas under the control of the ousted regime are greater than those in areas previously controlled by opposition forces in northern Syria.

Nevertheless, al-Mithqal argued that there should be no leniency towards the presence of weapons in areas of the government’s popular base, and efforts should be made to disarm there and end the chaos of weapons throughout the country. However, this may take time given the focus on addressing security threats similar to those recently witnessed in the coastal areas.

He pointed out that the selective nature of disarmament is dangerous in itself, as it may motivate other parties to retain their arms, creating justifications for them to keep weapons, especially in the face of instability in many regions. Yet, the current government priorities focus on neutralizing the most dangerous areas before moving on to less dangerous ones.

 

The selective nature of disarmament leads to risks as it may provide incentives for other parties to retain their weapons, creating justifications for them to keep arms, especially in the face of instability in many regions.

Amer al-Mithqal, Researcher at the Syrian Dialogue Center

 

Impactful priority over other matters

The process of seizing and centralizing weapons under state control is linked to several factors that occupy the government’s priority, including issues of civil peace and a long security context to protect against any effective scenario of a military coup that may alter the course of events throughout Syria.

The disarmament process is considered by researcher Amer al-Mithqal at the Syrian Dialogue Center as one of the most important priorities of the nascent Syria, as it mitigates security risks and revenge operations. He considered that keeping weapons in the hands of groups or entities outside of authority may pose a threat of generating chaos and fighting, which threatens the path of transitional justice.

The researcher emphasized that the retention of weapons by one group over another stimulates other groups and forces to arm themselves, highlighting the necessity of controlling weapons to provide local communities with confidence in the authority and enhance its centrality as a governing power.

Researcher Mohsen al-Mustafa views disarmament as one of the fundamental pillars for building a state of law and institutions in the post-conflict phase.

He added to Enab Baladi that for the state, concentrating weapons in the hands of regular forces is a cornerstone in establishing centralized decision-making, ending the phenomena of parallel forces, or local subsidiary forces that undermine state sovereignty. This also allows for the organized restructuring of the military and security sector, reinforcing the state’s authority and facilitating the work of judicial and service institutions.

He also considered that reducing the proliferation of weapons contributes to minimizing local conflicts and creating a safer environment that allows for social recovery, serving as an incentive for the voluntary return of displaced people and refugees, alongside enabling the launch of effective development processes.

For his part, researcher Nawar Shaaban believes that controlling weapons is a prerequisite for rebuilding the civil state and achieving political and social stability.

He stated that from the state’s perspective, disarming weapons from non-systematic groups enhances its legitimate monopoly over force and prevents the fragmentation of sovereign decision-making. From the community’s perspective, disarming weapons ensures security, reduces the likelihood of local conflicts, and protects the social fabric from fragmentation and internal fighting.

He pointed out that controlling weapons is also a necessary condition for the success of transitional justice and national reconciliation programs and forms the basis for the emergence of a state of law and institutions.