Enab Baladi – Muwafaq al-Khouja

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria confront two parties: the first is military, led by the Syrian National Army (SNA), which is supported by Turkey, and the second carries a negotiating dimension led by the Damascus government, after the Military Operations Administration has frozen its battles amid tripartite understandings between Damascus, Ankara, and Washington that control the decision of peace and war.

Military confrontations between the SDF and the National Army have continued for days, with the latter making slow and unremarkable progress on control maps, while Damascus announces the continuation of negotiations, reaching their final stages.

Reuters reported, citing unnamed sources, that negotiations between Damascus and the SDF could pave the way for an agreement in the coming months, which would lead to some Kurdish fighters leaving northeastern Syria and placing others under the authority of the new Ministry of Defense.

According to leaked information from the negotiations, the SDF wishes to join as a single bloc to the new army, while the Damascus government insists on their integration as individuals and their merger into the Ministry of Defense.

After “Deterrence of Aggression”

Following the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation, which ousted Assad’s rule, factions of the National Army launched the “Dawn of Freedom” operation on November 30, 2024, against the SDF.

The battles began in the northern and eastern countryside of Aleppo, with the first clashes occurring in Tadef, then extending to the outskirts of the Tishrin dam, after which the pace of progress slowed down and remained at a slower rate compared to the earlier days of the operation.

The SDF issues daily updates on its channels about the clashes, discussing mutual targeting and mourning its dead, indicating that a war is still ongoing between the two sides.

The fronts with the SDF against the National Army experience a type of undeclared “escalation control,” interspersed with limited instances of military escalation that began after Turkish-backed factions took control of Manbij in eastern Aleppo on December 8, 2024, as stated by researcher Anas Shawakh from the Jusoor for Studies Center in an interview with Enab Baladi.

International understandings

Researcher Shawakh believes that the military situation in northeastern Syria is tied to international balances and agreements between the United States and Turkey, with part in the hands of the Syrian administration and linked to the outcomes of its negotiations with the SDF.

The future presence of the SDF depends on the US presence and Donald Trump’s decision regarding the continuation or withdrawal of his forces from Syria, and his stance on the Damascus government, as well as how the US-Turkish relations will translate on the ground in Syria, according to researcher Samer al-Ahmad, who specializes in northeastern Syrian affairs.

Al-Ahmad pointed out in an interview with Enab Baladi that Washington plans to negotiate with Ankara to establish a relationship with the new administration in Damascus and “legalize” its presence in the Middle East with the approval of the government, similar to US bases in Iraq and the Gulf Arab states.

The US justifies its presence in Syria by claiming to stop the expansion of the Islamic State group and to eliminate it, supporting its partner in the region, the SDF, in this framework.

Researcher al-Ahmad believes that Washington’s mission to support the SDF will end with the existence of a new administration in Damascus, capable of defeating the Islamic State and taking over the prisons that contain its elements, noting that the transitional Damascus government expressed its desire for that.

Trump’s position regarding the presence of his forces in Syria remains ambiguous, and he has not made a decision about it, despite hints prior to his entry into the White House of his intention to withdraw the US military.

Damascus freezes the fronts

For its part, the Military Operations Administration has stopped its battles against the SDF at Deir Ezzor, dividing the Euphrates River between the two sides’ areas of control, keeping the SDF on the eastern side of the river while the Damascus government controls the western part, in addition to southern Raqqa.

After reports of military operations between the two sides emerged about a week ago, the SDF quickly denied them, stating that communication channels with Damascus are open and “actively” functional.

The SDF Commander, Mazloum Abdi, stated to the Hawar News Agency on January 28 that there is a “third party” and local actors, as well as some countries, trying to create a military confrontation between the SDF and the Military Operations Administration.

Abdi’s remarks suggest a Turkish role in maintaining a state of war, something Ankara has pursued for years to eliminate any presence of nationally Kurdish factions on its southern borders, which it views as a threat to its national security.

Researcher Osama Sheikh Ali, from the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, believes that Ankara’s influence on the factions of the National Army will remain and desires to launch a military operation against the SDF, which obstructs negotiations between the latter and Damascus.

What does the SDF want?

The SDF is trying to maintain a state of calm on the fronts and continue negotiations with the Damascus administration, as indicated by statements from its commander Mazloum Abdi on several occasions.

The SDF proposes solutions in its negotiations that involve merging as a single bloc in the new army while retaining a region it governs in eastern Syria politically, militarily, security-wise, and economically, as researcher Samer al-Ahmad pointed out.

The SDF relies on its experience in ruling northeastern Syria, which lasted nearly 10 years, in addition to supportive US and Western positions.

Al-Ahmad stated that the SDF’s vision for governance in Syria depends on the internal Syrian fragmentation that provides advantages for them, similar to those in the coastal region, As-Suwayda, and other areas, thus building a federal state that follows its “fragile” capital.

On its part, the Syrian administration claims that there is no privilege for one area over another, and everyone must submit to the center and the authority of the state.

The Adana Agreement

The new administration in Damascus relies on negotiations and is trying to take its time, hoping for better results than entering into new battles and returning to a cycle of violence, as researcher Osama Sheikh Ali told Enab Baladi.

Sheikh Ali pointed out that Turkey has been demanding since the era of the previous regime to modify the Adana Agreement to allow it to enter Syrian territory to a depth of 30 kilometers, or to propose a new agreement, which has not yet happened.

Sheikh Ali anticipates that Turkey will try to discuss these demands with the new administration, despite it being a transitional administration, which does not have the authority to take these steps and needs more time.

What is the Adana Agreement?

The Adana Agreement between the former Syrian regime and Turkey was signed in 1998, when relations between the two countries soured over the support of Hafez al-Assad for the leader of the Kurdish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, who is currently imprisoned in Turkey.

The agreement included four provisions:

• Cooperation between the two countries in combating cross-border terrorism, and for Damascus to end all forms of support for the party, expel its leader Öcalan, close its camps in Syria and Lebanon, and prevent the infiltration of its fighters into Turkey.

• Turkey retains the right to self-defense and demands compensation for losses in lives and property in case Damascus does not immediately stop its support for the party.

• Turkey has the right to pursue those it describes as “terrorists” within Syrian territory up to a depth of five kilometers if its national security is threatened and if the regime is unable to combat the party’s operations.

• The territorial disputes between the two countries are considered resolved since the signing of the agreement, without either party demanding territory from the other, which led the Syrian regime to relinquish the Iskenderun region.

Turkey justifies its operations within Syria on the grounds of protecting its border and preserving its national security from entities it classifies as “terrorist groups,” based on the Adana Agreement on one hand, in addition to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which grants the right to self-defense.

Turkey has carried out three military operations inside Syria in conjunction with local factions: the first was in 2016 and targeted areas in Aleppo’s countryside against the Islamic State group, named “Euphrates Shield”; the second was in early 2018 against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Afrin under the name “Olive Branch”; and the third was north of Raqqa, seizing the areas of Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain, which was launched in 2019 under Operation “Peace Spring.”