As discussions continue about restructuring the Syrian army and the insistence of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on maintaining its independent entity, questions arise about its structure and the reasons for its insistence on remaining as a block.

The SDF has controlled vast areas in northern and eastern Syria for years and receives support from the US-led International Coalition.

It has a political wing named the “Syrian Democratic Council” and another administrative wing abbreviated as the “Autonomous Administration”.

Establishment and structure

The SDF was founded in 2015 as a military alliance, with the People’s Protection Units (YPG) being its main and influential component.

The US-led International Coalition entrusted it with ground operations against the Islamic State group, aiming to reclaim areas under its control at the time.

The foundational meeting of the SDF included participation from the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), the allied Sutoro Forces, along with other military formations such as the al-Sanadid Forces and several brigades and battalions.

The announcement of the establishment of these forces came less than two weeks after the start of the Russian military intervention in Syria.

Despite the lack of accurate statistics on the number of SDF fighters or its affiliated factions, the number of formations within it was estimated in 2017 to range between 60,000 and 75,000.

At the beginning of 2016, the SDF began recruiting young men from the areas it controls, whether through paid volunteer campaigns or mandatory conscription.

As of February 2017, the forces had graduated 12 training courses, with most participants coming from the areas of al-Shaddadi, Raqqa, and Deir Ezzor, according to the Omran Center for Strategic Studies.

According to a study by the Omran Center for Strategic Studies published in 2017, the Syrian Democratic Forces are governed by a strict organizational structure led by a military council, which is the highest military authority within the forces.

The council includes representatives from all factions and military formations and is responsible for making strategic decisions regarding war and peace, electing the general commander, and determining the forces’ objectives according to field conditions.

The general commander of the SDF is elected directly by the military council, and he leads its meetings alongside the general leadership meetings, overseeing the implementation of its decisions and appointing the official spokesperson for the forces.

The SDF leadership consists of 9 to 13 members chosen through elections among military council members, emphasizing representation of women within the leadership.

The leadership is responsible for executing the military council’s decisions, planning military campaigns, managing troop movements, and enforcing compliance from all factions. No faction is allowed to launch any battle or campaign without consulting the leadership.

The military discipline committee, which consists of 5 to 7 members appointed by the military council, is responsible for addressing disputes among factions, holding accountable those at fault, and resolving conflicts among fighters.

In addition to these bodies, the SDF includes numerous specialized administrative offices, such as the media and relations office, the women’s fighter affairs office, the Autonomous Administration and archives office, and the military information office.

Structure and division of fighters

The researcher specialized in northeastern Syria, Samer al-Ahmad, points to prominent divisions within the SDF.

These include: Asayish (internal security/ police forces), HAT (counter-terrorism forces), YAT (rapid intervention forces), as well as the intelligence service and the People’s Protection Units.

They are joined by regional military councils such as the Deir Ezzor Military Council, Manbij Council, and Raqqa Council, with these councils primarily focusing on protecting their regions.

Al-Ahmad explained to Enab Baladi that the SDF operates under a military style that was supervised by the International Coalition, especially during the battles against the Islamic State group.

He noted that the actual control of military and security decisions within the SDF belongs to leaders from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), who hold sensitive positions in the intelligence service, the HAT, and the People’s Protection Units.

Most of these leaders are not Syrian, but belong to other nationalities, such as Turkish or Iranian.

For his part, the director of the Raman Center for Studies and Consultations, Badr Mulla Rashid, stated that the SDF adopted, after its main battles against the Islamic State group in 2019, a policy of distributing its fighters into small groups rather than moving in large formations.

He clarified that this policy is not new but has been used for a long time, with the forces deploying these small groups over vast areas, enabling them to control military fronts.

Why does the SDF insist on the “one block”?

Al-Ahmad believes that the SDF’s insistence on remaining as an independent block is a natural matter.

He says that these forces have been striving for years to establish a factual reality concerning a federal region akin to the Kurdish experience in northern Iraq.

This is achieved through the establishment of governing institutions under the Autonomous Administration, the creation of legislative institutions represented by the People’s Council, the social contract, and political groupings.

The SDF sees this project as something that cannot be compromised, as it seeks to enter the Syrian army as a block, similar to what the Peshmerga forces did in northern Iraq when they were integrated into the Iraqi army while maintaining their political independence under the authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government.

In this model, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense is responsible for providing salaries and funding, while those forces do not directly fall under the Iraqi government but under the regional government.

The SDF tries to replicate this image, presenting itself as a unifying force for diverse community segments, in an attempt to refute allegations that it is a narrow-minded Kurdish group, according to al-Ahmad.

However, this approach does not reflect the political reality in the region, according to the researcher.

Mulla Rashid added that the United States still considers the SDF a key military entity in the fight against the Islamic State.

It also sees it as the only force capable of preventing the Islamic State from resurfacing, as it continues to control the prisons and camps containing more than 15,000 fighters and 20,000 family members of the group.

He added that if the SDF were to merge directly with the Syrian army, it could face the risks of political and military collapse, in addition to fears of reverting to the initial square regarding cultural and national rights, and local administration in northern Syria.

Mulla Rashid also believes that if the SDF succeeds in achieving its goals, the region may witness a state of calm, with increased cooperation between it and Damascus, especially in areas such as border security and managing clashes with the Syrian National Army (SNA).

This would enable the Damascus government to have broader oversight over the prisons and camps under its control.

However, the SDF’s pursuit of maintaining its status as a military block would ensure the continued dominance of the PKK over the territories controlled by the SDF, which is currently rejected by both Damascus and Turkey, according to al-Ahmad.