Khaled al-Jeratli | Hassan Ibrahim | Ali Darwish

The file of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which controls areas east of the Euphrates in northeastern Syria, is interwoven with the interests of Turkey and the United States in Syria. Ankara views it as connected to its national security, while Washington sees it as a strategic partnership to combat the Islamic State group. At the same time, it remains a top priority for the Damascus government, which aims to cross the Euphrates and reclaim the oil-rich areas and agricultural land.

In light of the conflicting signals sent by the SDF regarding its position on negotiations with Damascus, and the pressures it is facing from the north, manifested in attacks by factions of the Syrian National Army (SNA) supported by Ankara, the file remains stalled, with no practical progress made even a month after its inception.

Despite the lack of consensus, and the contradictory alignments between the SDF, Ankara, and Washington, Turkey has carried out three operations against the SDF in northern Syria, in cooperation with the Syrian National Army: Euphrates Shield in 2016, Olive Branch in 2018, and Peace Spring in 2019, and occasionally threatens to launch further operations, in addition to continuously targeting individuals and leaders in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and military sites, vital facilities, and sources of income and energy.

As events unfold in the region, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has altered the balance of power on the Syrian geography, and Damascus is now in the hands of a government formed by the Military Operations Administration based on cadres from the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) that previously operated in Idlib.

The new government faces numerous difficulties, primarily in the security and military sectors, coinciding with the Ministry of Defense’s attempt to conduct talks with military factions, including the SDF, directly to avoid military clashes at this stage. The government prioritizes the negotiation aspect with the SDF, according to the newly appointed Minister of Defense in Damascus, Murhaf Abu Qasra.

Enab Baladi delves into the atmosphere of dialogue between the SDF and the Damascus government, the existing fears of military clashes between the two parties that constitute the major military powers in Syria today, the shifting international positions based on the facts imposed on the ground, as well as the future of the ongoing dialogue between the two sides, based on the opinions of experts, researchers, and close observers of the situation.

What are the negotiations about?

With scant information regarding these negotiations between Damascus and the SDF, diplomats and military officials from the United States, Turkey, the new Syrian administration, and the predominantly Kurdish-led SDF have been engaged in discussions since December 2024, aiming to spare the region from a new armed conflict. They appear to be showing greater flexibility and patience than their public statements may suggest.

According to sources previously reported by Reuters, some of which were part of the negotiations, the negotiators are approaching a potential agreement to resolve one of the most contentious issues looming over Syria’s future: the fate of the SDF, considered a Washington ally and a Turkish adversary.

Reuters reported that six sources indicated that the negotiations could pave the way for an agreement in the coming months, which would lead some Kurdish fighters to leave northeastern Syria while placing others under the authority of the new Ministry of Defense.

They added that several contentious issues need to be resolved, including how to integrate the well-trained armed fighters of the SDF into the Syrian security framework and manage the territories under their control, which include key oil and wheat fields.

SDF leader Mazloum Abdi had previously expressed a willingness for military integration with the Syrian opposition when he stated to the British newspaper “The Times” about a month ago that his forces, consisting of 100,000 members, were ready to dissolve themselves and join the new Syrian army.

Recently, Abdi went beyond his faction’s readiness to dissolve itself, refusing to integrate into the new army as individuals but rather as a military bloc.

Reuters had also reported that a source from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (not named) said on January 16 that the party would agree to leave northeastern Syria if the SDF, allied with the US, retained a leadership role.

The source, who holds a position in the political office of the SDF, stated that “any initiative that leads to governance in northeastern Syria under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces or has a major role in the joint leadership will lead us to agree to leave the area.”

On the other side, the Ministry of Defense of the new Syrian administration sees the SDF as stalling in negotiations regarding restructuring the military forces within the Syrian army.

Syrian Defense Minister, Murhaf Abu Qasra, stated that it would not be right for the US-backed SDF to keep its own bloc within the Syrian armed forces in northeastern Syria.

He added to Reuters that the SDF leadership is procrastinating in dealing with this complex issue, referring to the negotiations for integration with the Ministry of Defense.

Abu Qasra said, “We say that they will enter the structure of the Ministry of Defense and will be distributed in a military manner, and we have no problem with that.”

He considered that the proposal talking about the SDF remaining as a military bloc within the Ministry of Defense is “not correct.”

This was preceded by the conditions set by the head of the new administration in Damascus, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who pointed to the necessity of establishing basic rules to solve the existing problem in northeastern Syria, the first being that there should be no division in Syria in any form whatsoever, even in a federal manner.

Al-Sharaa also conditioned the departure of foreign fighters who cause problems for neighboring countries, in addition to stating that weapons should only be in the hands of the state.

Will the parties clash?

In an interview conducted by the Turkish channel “A Haber” with Ahmed al-Sharaa on January 23, he stated that he had spoken to the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (referring to the SDF) after entering Damascus, but the party did not agree to dissolve itself and hand over its weapons.

He added that he is determined to solve the issue concerning northeastern Syria in cooperation with Turkey and to find a compromise solution, noting that no one can carry weapons outside the framework of the state.

Al-Sharaa indicated that certain parties had attempted to exploit the war from the beginning for their benefit and to organize themselves with Western support.

Al-Sharaa’s remarks carried an escalation in tone, as he stated, “We leave room for negotiation with (SDF) and we have the right to use all means to restore the unity of our lands.”

Researcher Mohsen al-Mustafa from the Omran Center for Strategic Studies dismissed the possibility of military conflict, noting that there are no signs indicating this possibility so far.

The researcher, who specializes in civil-military relations, added to Enab Baladi that the new administration avoids bloodshed to resolve any conflict for now, but the military option remains on the table if a solution is not reached.

At the same time, al-Mustafa sees that current disagreements are not solely military but extend to political aspects as well, and thus the negotiation file is complicated and needs more time for the parties to reduce the gap of existing disagreements one by one.

On the military front, the main dispute lies in the inclusion of the SDF into the new Syrian army as a primary bloc, which the new administration completely rejects. This disagreement is not exclusive to the SDF alone; it extends to encompass all military factions.

As for the political dispute, it lies in the issue of federalism that the SDF demands, and its political umbrella the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which is an unacceptable status in Damascus; it is not specific to the SDF alone but applies to any other Syrian region as well.

For his part, Rashid Hourani, a military affairs researcher at the Jusoor for Studies Center, sees that the administration in Damascus seeks not to let matters escalate to military confrontation, working according to the standards of global armies that reflect the comprehensive citizenship existing in the country.

Hourani stated to Enab Baladi that Damascus is trying, over time, to transform the SDF into a weak and ineffective bloc by supporting splinter groups within it, thus pushing them toward unconditional integration into the new Syrian army.

He pointed out that the administration in Damascus appreciates the external pressures on the SDF and deals with them flexibly while arranging its affairs, although it simultaneously does not want the issue to drag on to focus on matters concerning security, development, and reconstruction.

SDF: A dilemma between Turkey and the United States

The issue of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has long been one of the most contentious issues between Turkey and the United States, stemming from 2014, when former President Barack Obama decided to rely on the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which forms the nucleus of the SDF, as a partner and ally to Washington to fight the Islamic State group. This contradicts Ankara’s view, which considers the SDF and its military backbone, the People’s Protection Units, a terrorist organization and an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

Erdoğan’s cards on Trump’s table

With Donald Trump winning the US elections, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spoke about his contact with Trump and the desire to renew cooperation between the two sides. Turkish demands focused on stopping US support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units and discussing a potential withdrawal of US troops from Syria.

Turkish demands continued in this regard, with Erdoğan stating that he wanted to discuss ending wars and peace and stopping US support for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party during his meetings with Trump, emphasizing the importance of maintaining “friendship” with Washington, as it was during Trump’s first term.

With the fall of Bashar al-Assad and Trump’s previous readiness to withdraw US troops, Turkey sees an opportunity to use the Syrian National Army to eliminate the SDF and finally rid itself of the security threat coming from the south, according to an article by Steven A. Cook, a senior fellow at the Eni Enrico Mattei Fellowship for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Cook stated that from Turkey’s perspective, this appears to be a favorable moment to deliver a devastating blow to the People’s Protection Units (YPG), but several issues complicate this direct scenario. First, the Kurds are unlikely to voluntarily destroy themselves, as they have the capability to respond, which may expose Turkey to unforeseen possibilities, including the likelihood of engaging in a guerrilla war on both Syrian and Iraqi fronts, where the PKK is entrenched.

Second, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the most prominent faction in the Military Operations Administration in Syria, is not necessarily a partner in Turkey’s efforts to eliminate the YPG.

US continues to support the SDF

Since 2014 (when Washington supported the YPG), four US administrations have succeeded one another: Obama’s administration, Trump’s first term, Biden’s, and the new administration with Trump’s return to power, amidst speculation and divisions within the corridors of the US administration regarding the continued presence of its forces in Syria, its support for the People’s Protection Units, the nature of its dealings with Ankara, and potential sanctions against Turkey.

The White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby emphasized continued US partnership with the SDF, stating that Washington wants the SDF to focus on fighting the Islamic State and that the US presence in Syria aims to prevent the Islamic State from regrouping after the fall of Bashar al-Assad.

Kirby noted that the US understands Turkey’s legitimate security concerns along that border and affirmed that Ankara has a legitimate right to defend itself against “terroristic” attacks, highlighting active discussions with the Turks about “how we do this and how they do it.”

Senators Chris Van Hollen (Democrat) and Lindsey Graham (Republican) introduced a bipartisan bill called the Countering Turkish Aggression Act of 2024 on December 20, 2024, emphasizing that the US should work with Turkey through diplomatic means to facilitate a sustainable ceasefire and a demilitarized zone along the Turkey-Syria border, especially in the city of Kobani.

According to Hollen and Graham, these sanctions aim to prevent further Turkish or Turkish-backed attacks on the SDF, which threaten the resurgence of the Islamic State, endangering US national security and that of the rest of the world, stating, “We still hope to reach a peaceful solution to the problems facing Syria.”

Is Ankara compatible with Washington in eastern Syria?

Broderick McDonald, an associate fellow at the International Center for Strategic Studies at King’s College London, stated to Enab Baladi that US policy toward Syria remains a looming issue for the new Trump administration.

While the new Secretary of State Marco Rubio has expressed support for continued US backing of the Kurdish-led SDF, other sectors of the Trump administration, such as Michael DeMenno (Senior Advisor for Middle East Policy at the Pentagon), advocate for reducing US forces in the Middle East, viewing this as a goal easily achievable for Iran and its affiliated groups.

 

Internal divisions are likely to emerge among the various factions of the Trump administration regarding the future of American foreign policy toward Syria in the coming weeks and months as the new administration settles into government.

Broderick McDonald, an associate fellow at the International Center for Strategic Studies at King’s College London

 

McDonald believes that diplomatic efforts between the US and Turkey are crucial for finding a permanent solution that protects Syria’s unity and addresses Turkey’s security concerns.

He added that any such agreement must focus on calming the ongoing clashes between the SDF and the Syrian National Army and establishing a permanent mechanism to ensure the secure management of detention centers holding Islamic State detainees, alongside ensuring an inclusive governance structure in Damascus that meaningfully engages all parts of the Syrian community.

The researcher thinks that reaching any agreement will be difficult, deeming it vital to ensure Syria’s unity and prevent the resurgence of Islamic State cells in eastern Syria, which could exploit emerging security vacuums.

What Washington wants and what Ankara accepts

Ankara is closely monitoring negotiations between the SDF and the new Syrian administration, perhaps with a degree of skepticism, according to Dutch researcher and journalist Rena Netjes. Simultaneously, the US and France are striving to mediate a deal between the SDF and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, with previous meetings having taken place between the two parties.

Netjes told Enab Baladi that there are individuals in both camps who oppose the other, representing a significant obstacle between Damascus and the SDF regarding how the latter integrates into the newly forming military force.

The researcher believes it is beneficial to highlight the American push for the SDF to negotiate a deal with other Syrian Kurdish parties united in the Kurdish National Council, yet this effort has failed after years of attempts.

She mentioned a statement from former US envoy to Syria James Jeffrey, who told Rudaw, “We have tried several times, and many of our friends here in Erbil have tried as well. These were significant efforts. I think the problem is not with the people in northeastern Syria, but rather with the people in Qandil.”

Jeffrey noted that those in Qandil “do not want to see this happen at all (referring to internal Kurdish reconciliation), it seems that Qandil is against it, and I believe this is the main reason.”

Netjes believes that what happens in northeastern Syria largely depends on what the new US administration desires, whether it continues to support the SDF as it did previously or seeks to work with the new rulers in Damascus.

Changing prospects linked to SDF’s willpower

The new government faces numerous challenges, especially in security and military sectors, coinciding with the defense ministry’s efforts to engage directly with military factions, either directly or through intermediaries as done with the SDF, without reaching a military confrontation at this stage, at least. The government favors dialogue with the SDF and rules out options for confrontation.

Assumptions governing SDF’s decisions

Political, social, and economic assumptions that still exist in northeastern Syria play a crucial role in shaping the political interaction between the SDF and Damascus, according to Maan Talaa, the research director at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies.

Talaa told Enab Baladi that the political framework for administering these areas adopted by the SDF has often failed in most previous political and security contexts, emphasizing that it is merely a formal framework governed by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and it is structured in a one-sided manner, with a totalitarian perspective.

The PYD and its military arm, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) constitute the backbone of the SDF, and their leaders play a significant role in managing the Autonomous Administration (the political umbrella of the SDF), whether in service or political matters, alongside their major role in the military and security fields.

Talaa added that the Autonomous Administration, backed by the PYD, seeks to improve local alliances with both tribes and the Kurdish component in an attempt to win the favor of the American ally alone, and at the cost of offering anything in the context of improving alliances. He noted that what happened in the “Hewlêr 1” and “Hewlêr 2” agreements (Kurdish-Kurdish dialogue) is evidence of this same hypothesis up to this moment.

The Hewlêr meeting is a dialogue between the Kurdish National Council and Kurdish parties operating in areas under the control of the Autonomous Administration, organized under the leadership of Kurdistan Iraq’s President Masoud Barzani.

“Hewlêr 1” took place in June 2012, and “Hewlêr 2” in December 2013, with the PYD evading the implementation of the agreement’s clauses, especially those related to the joint governance of the region.

The researcher argues that the autonomous administration perspective on the overall Syrian scene remains unsuccessful at the national level and relies on approaches that hijack the Kurdish issue and frame it according to its interpretations (the autonomous administration) solely.

 

The autonomous administration perspective on the overall Syrian scene remains unsuccessful at the national level, relying on approaches that hijack the Kurdish issue and constrain it to its own interpretations (autonomous administration) only, as well as seizing the concept of governance and limiting it to itself, while attempting to impose anything on Damascus through this lens.

Maan Talaa, Research director at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies

 

Talaa pointed out that the failure of the national perspective to a large extent stems from the SDF’s inability to read the political scene, particularly following the collapse of the regime and what this phase signifies.

SDF’s moves towards regional components

During the past few years, the SDF has faced accusations of excluding other components in the areas under its control, especially political components, whether Kurdish or Arab, and that it has thwarted all attempts to engage in dialogue with it.

The Kurdish National Council, since 2012 and under the sponsorship of the former President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Masoud Barzani, has engaged in negotiations with the Democratic Union Party (PYD), but these negotiations have failed multiple times.

Recently, after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Barzani proposed to resume dialogue and unify Kurdish parties “in the context of the overall Syrian national unity and the pursuit of consensus,” according to Abdullah Kaddo, a member of the Kurdish National Council.

Kaddo stated to Enab Baladi that the dialogue proposed by Barzani aims to establish a shared vision regarding the Kurdish issue, which entails constitutional recognition of the Kurdish people’s national identity and their national rights, including cultural and linguistic rights within a unified Syria, through dialogue and consensus with the new Syrian administration, and supporting it in stabilizing and advancing the country.

Kaddo noted that Barzani has relationships and ongoing communication and consultations with local Syrian active forces, including the new administration, regional (Turkey), and Arab and Western countries.

The Kurdish National Council did not discuss the demands of the SDF, and the SDF leadership may soon address with the Council’s leadership what they have reached through their communications and meetings with the Syrian administration and what the SDF generally proposes regarding its reality and future.

Kaddo revealed that meetings between the leaderships of the Kurdish National Council and the SDF are expected soon to discuss topics related to “the unity of the Syrian Kurdish national ranks,” with the expectation that the International Coalition will play a role in finding a solution in that area.

Regarding the Arab tribes in the region, the SDF attempted to approach them in the months leading up to al-Assad’s fall due to the course of Turkish rapprochement with the ousted regime and Turkey’s repeated threats to launch a military operation similar to Operation Olive Branch in Afrin in 2018 and Operation Peace Spring in eastern Euphrates in 2019.

Abdi met with delegations from the tribes that presented him with several demands, including the release of prisoners, which Abdi initiated when AANES issued a general amnesty on July 17, 2024.

The relationship between the SDF and the Kurdish National Council has long-standing disagreements, extending into Iraqi Kurdistan, where there is a division between two Kurdish currents: the “Barzanians” (referring to the current led by Masoud Barzani) and the “Talabanians” (referring to the second current led by Bafel Talabani).

The SDF is allied with the “Talabanians,” based in the city of Sulaymaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan, who are also allied with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), while the Kurdish National Council leans toward the “Barzanians,” who are close to Turkey.

Disagreements between the SDF and the Kurdish National Council erupted, resulting in the exclusion of the Council from any form of administration in northeastern Syria. Moreover, pro-SDF military groups have detained members of the Council, with some still imprisoned today.