Hassan Ibrahim | Ali Darwish

The operations of the Syrian opposition factions broke the stalemate on the fronts of northwest Syria, after the control map had remained unchanged since March 2020, altering the balance of power and influence, and surpassing the rules of engagement, announcing a new phase in the region, and transcending international agreements that govern it.

Aleppo city, the center of gravity in northern Syria, along with dozens of villages and towns in the countryside of Aleppo, Hama, and Idlib, were swiftly seized by factions from the grip of the Syrian regime and Iranian militias and the Lebanese Hezbollah, in an exceptional event that attracted attention, following the start of battles at dawn on November 27.

The operations of the Syrian opposition were preceded and accompanied by a complex political climate, with indications of Turkish “satisfaction” and a “green light” for action, and a relatively “cold” response from Russia despite its bombardment of the area, along with the routine narrative of the regime and its forces which speak about “confrontation and repositioning” while threatening to retaliate before withdrawing, in a timing that experts and analysts see as favorable and opportune for change, especially with the weakness of Iran and its militias, presenting a new face for Syria.

The battles began with operations of “Deterrence of Aggression”, which commenced from Idlib to Aleppo city and the countrysides of Idlib, Aleppo, and Hama, followed by the “Dawn of Freedom” operations launched by the Syrian National Army (SNA) supported by Turkey on November 30, against regime forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), capturing scattered areas in eastern Aleppo countryside.

In this report, Enab Baladi accompanies the progress of the Syrian opposition operations, highlighting their preparations, the participating factions, and the areas they have controlled, while discussing with experts and analysts the implications of the timing and the gains and losses from it, the impact on internal and external parties active in the region, and the outcomes and future of the operation.

Rapid advance.. The regime collapses

Despite the “Moscow” or “ceasefire” agreement between Russia and Turkey in 2020, which governs northwestern Syria, the regime forces and their allies, along with Russian aircraft, did not cease attacking and targeting the area, leaving the agreement as mere “ink on paper.”

According to the latest statistics from the Syria Civil Defence (White Helmets), its teams responded since the beginning of this year until November 10 to over 876 attacks by regime forces and Russia and their allies on northwestern Syria.

These attacks resulted in the deaths of 80 civilians and injuries to 372 others, while the Civil Defence teams continue to respond and document the shelling, including the killing of 24 civilians and injuring 95 others during November 27, 28, and 29.

In a classic manner, the opposition factions began their offensive on regime positions in western Aleppo countryside, paving the way with artillery, while combat groups advanced to points held by regime forces and Iranian militias, which began to fall one after another at a rapid pace.

Accompanying the announcement of the operation was an unprecedented organization and preparation in areas controlled by the opposition, in various aspects, whether medical, service-oriented, or even military, as all statements were issued from one room without naming any specific faction.

The battle involved factions under the al-Fath al-Mubin Operations Room, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the National Liberation Front, and the Army of Glory (Jaish al-Izza). Factions from the Syrian National Army (SNA) also participated, notably Shamiya Front, Joint Forces, and Nur ad-Din al-Zenki Movement.

In just three days, the factions announced their control over the entire western Aleppo countryside administratively, opening another front in eastern Idlib countryside, entering Aleppo city, and expanding their control to encompass the entire Idlib province administratively, subsequently reaching Hama city, which they had not entered since 2013, at a time when their military control back then was not as pronounced.

The eastern neighborhoods of Aleppo had been out of the opposition factions’ control since December 2016, when opposition fighters and around 75,000 residents took leave of their city after months of siege and battles with back-and-forth movements at the city’s walls, amidst numerous massacres against civilians carried out by regime and Russian aircraft.

Shaheen Brigades

The participating factions in the operation used various types of light and heavy weapons (tanks, artillery, rocket launchers), and medium weapons, including anti-aircraft machine guns of 14.5 and 23 millimeters, as well as different types of sniper rifles previously owned by the factions; one type was locally made, according to what Enab Baladi has observed through the factions’ channels.

Night Fighting Units later participated in the operations, comprised of specially trained groups for nighttime military operations equipped with weapons suitable for the nature of these battles.

The Shaheen Brigades were officially announced for the first time, responsible for using drones during the operation, launching different types of drones, including those that are initially propelled by a person, in the same way as drones manufactured previously by the Islamic State group.

Other drones were launched from a platform of unknown origin, whether locally manufactured or bought from abroad, while another type known by appearance is quadcopter drones, alongside locally made drones developed by the al-Fath al-Mubin factions over the years.

The drones were equipped with munitions, often comprising bombs (locally made or otherwise) or shells of various lightweight types, so that the drone could carry them and reach the target.

There is also another type of drone capable of carrying heavy munitions, the size, type, and weight of which the factions have not yet disclosed.

Regime’s aircraft more active than Russian ones

Conversely, the impact of the Russian aviation did not hold the usual military significance after it was known for its bloody paving and opening routes for regime forces to take control of the areas, especially between 2015 and March 2020, during which it committed hundreds of massacres against Syrians.

The “Observatory 80” platform, specialized in monitoring military movements, said to Enab Baladi that the Russian planes that conduct airstrikes in northwestern Syria take off from Hmeimim airport in Latakia, while the regime’s warplanes take off from three airports: al-Seen in rural Damascus, T-4 in eastern Homs, and Kuwairis in rural Aleppo (before it was controlled by National Army factions).

A defector pilot from the regime forces explained to Enab Baladi that the Russian aviation currently limits itself to some air sorties during the course of the combat operations, targeting predetermined objectives, and executes strikes on the frontline due to its accuracy, unlike Syrian aviation, in order to minimize the risks of execution for regime forces and their allied militias; this contrasts with its behavior in previous years, when Russian aviation would intensify its airstrikes on the popular base, adopting the scorched-earth style to empty the area of its people.

The officer deemed this organizational structure of the military operations from the factions as having reduced the risks posed by Russian aviation targeting combat lines, which is an achievement for the factions; noting that the regime currently bears the greater responsibility for conducting airstrikes.

To minimize the impact of Syrian-Russian aviation, it is essential to continue with organization and communication and monitoring operations, as far as the Russian aviation is concerned, while the regime’s aviation may be dealt with using anti-aircraft machine guns of 23 and 57 millimeters, which can impede its influence on the front line, according to the officer.

The officer pointed out that the Military Operations Administration expanded its front systematically and gradually, which necessitates intensive sorties along a wide and broad front line, which in turn diminished the effect of Russian aviation on hampering the factions’ advance.

“Professional management”

The defector colonel from the regime forces and military expert Abdul Jabbar al-Akeidi attributed the rapid progress of the opposition factions to several reasons:

1. The good preparation of the factions involved in the Military Operations Administration under the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation, and their military expertise; as their members have been trained well over the past four or five years of military stagnation, have gone through training courses and camps in specific specialties, and are benefiting from modern technology in manufacturing, especially in drone technology and armored transport vehicles.
2. Outstanding professional leadership in managing the battle, which confused the regime as they entered from the western rural areas at first, then expanded laterally to the right and left (towards northern and southern Aleppo countryside) towards Sarmin, and the fighters circumvented from the Khan Tuman and Andan areas, and severed supply lines to Nubl and Zahra, disrupting the supply line of personnel to the militias affiliated with the regime.
3. The regime forces have been inherently collapsing since 2015, and the Iranian militias are fatigued, while Iran is currently in a difficult position, and the Lebanese Hezbollah is collapsing.
4. The difficult economic situation of the regime, with neither Russia nor Iran providing it with support, while it is buried in debts.
5. The weakness of the military doctrine of regime elements, as the Iranian militia members fight on unfamiliar grounds, whereas the opposition factions fight based on a correct combat principle, reclaiming their lands from which they were displaced.
6. Most crucially, the continuation of the momentum of the factions in their advance without respite, preventing the regime’s army from catching its breath.

Al-Akeidi added to Enab Baladi that the factions should fortify defenses, strengthen lines, and reassure civilians from all components in Aleppo, including Kurds in the Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods in Aleppo, and Shiites in the towns of Nubl and Zahra.

Following control of the area and its sweeping clean from regime forces and the “shabiha” and security personnel, and any remaining cells, it should be left for civil administration, while heading to other fronts, as the “goal is Damascus, to overthrow the regime, and to establish a civil democratic state, a state of freedom and justice for all Syrians,” as expressed by al-Akeidi.

Perfect timing.. Allies of the regime are preoccupied

Before pulling the trigger, the past three months have witnessed waves of displacement for thousands of families in the Idlib and Aleppo countryside to areas in northern Idlib, moving further away from the front lines with regime forces, following widespread talk of a “potential military operation,” without precisely identifying the party that would launch it, amid an escalation by the Syrian regime and its forces in northern Syria.

At the beginning of October, the local Al-Watan newspaper, which is close to the regime, reported that the regime had raised military readiness on its fronts in the “de-escalation zone” in the countryside of Idlib and its surroundings, in anticipation of an attack from “terrorists,” as it described them.

Abdul Rahman al-Haj, a researcher in jihadist groups and religious movements, told Enab Baladi that three reasons led the opposition factions to carry out the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation. The first was a preemptive measure against operations that the regime was preparing for and mustering forces for (the 25th Division was preparing to advance into areas controlled by the opposition).

He added that the second reason was to prevent Hezbollah from establishing itself in the areas of Aleppo countryside and settling there after the Israeli targeting in Lebanon, and the third was to take advantage of the current regional situation and target Iranian presence and its supply lines.

Al-Haj pointed out that the operation has declared objectives, which are to stop the ongoing aggression of Iranian militias and the regime for long months of daily targeting of the region by suicide drones, considering it a goal with unclear boundaries that can be expanded and interpreted.

Political researcher at the Jusoor for Studies Center, Abdul Wahab Asi, linked the timing of the battle to two main aspects. The first is Syrian and relates to the Astana 22 round, as it usually involves negotiations related to solidifying the ceasefire in northwest Syria or the continuation of disputes among the guarantors, thus continuing violations, or changing the rules of engagement at the front lines.

Asi added, in his interview with Enab Baladi, that the launch of the battle after the Astana 22 round clearly means that something happened in this round that led to the continuation of the ceasefire agreement not being upheld.

What is happening on the ground contrasts with the final statement issued from the 22nd round of Astana talks by Turkey, Russia, and Iran on November 12, where the attendees agreed on the importance of continuing efforts to restore relations between Turkey and the Syrian regime to “combat terrorism” and create suitable conditions for what the statement described as the “safe, voluntary, and dignified return of Syrians” with the participation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The attendees detailed the situation in the “de-escalation zone” in Idlib province and emphasized the necessity of maintaining “calm on the ground” through a complete ceasefire.

According to Asi, the second matter is related to the regional situation, as the battle coincided with the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, making it an investment of time when Iranian militias and Hezbollah were preoccupied with the conflict with Israel.

Asi believes that opposition factions and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) had a high estimation that Russian intervention would be limited and that Moscow would not exhaust its military capabilities and effort in battles in northern Syria, given its military focus on the coastal areas, the capital, and the southern regions adjacent to Israel, noting Russia’s preoccupation with its war in Ukraine.

Regarding Iran’s dealings, the researcher mentioned that Tehran has mobilized both media and field-wise to push Iraqi militias to head towards Syria; however, the intervention of the International Coalition hindered this.

On November 27, US warplanes struck a site of Iran-backed militias in Syria, in response to an attack that targeted its military bases in the area, stating that the strike targeted a facility used for storing weapons for an Iran-backed faction.

Gains.. Return and weakening al-Assad

With the start of the battle and the guns directed at regime forces and their allies, some considered opening a battle to be an absurd act without clear political visions, resulting in chaos and destruction, and possibly being a losing and uncalculated adventure.

In a survey conducted by Enab Baladi in which several people in Idlib were interviewed about their opinions on the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation, the responses indicated satisfaction with the military operations and hope for returning to the towns and villages they were displaced from, considering it a “victory that came after preparation and diligent work.”

Muhammad, a forty-something-year-old displaced from eastern Idlib countryside since 2019 to the Harbanoush camps in northern Idlib, told Enab Baladi that his joy stemmed from a strong desire to return to his town after five years of “oppression and suffering” endured with his family (five members) in tents that do not shield from the heat or cold.

The second reason for joy is to liberate the areas from the control of the Syrian regime forces, weakening al-Assad, who described the “rebels as bulls” and used all means to exterminate civilians and those demanding freedom.

Muhammad does not wish to involve himself in political calculations and rejects any thoughts of conspiracy, surrendering areas, agreements, or intrigues happening under the table, as the important thing is his home that shelters him in his town away from the tents and regime forces, and then begins the “big dream of a free Syria.”

Northwestern Syria houses 5.1 million people, of whom 4.2 million need assistance, and 3.6 million suffer from food insecurity, 3.5 million of whom are internally displaced, while two million live in camps, according to the United Nations. Local statistics talk about 6.6 million people.

Researcher Abdul Rahman al-Haj believes that the opposition’s operations have several gains:

• Gaining land as it allows for the return of hundreds of thousands of displaced people.
• Expanding the area of opposition control, multiplying its leverage in any potential political settlement.
• Demonstrating the weakness of Bashar al-Assad and his inability to maintain control.
• Reintroducing the political settlement in Syria to the negotiation table, with the arrival of US President Donald Trump, who seeks to end wars.
• The possibility that what happened in the north may motivate factions in southern Syria.

Political researcher Abdul Wahab Asi considered that the main gain is that the Syrian opposition has gained for the first time since 2013 complete control over a city along with its surroundings, and this city is unlike others because it is a strategic industrial city that could turn into a political capital for the Syrian opposition, leading to a change in the state of conflict and control and the balance of power.

Asi added to Enab Baladi that this will lead to dismantling the political equation set by the Syrian regime with the support of its allies, whether at the level of normalization tracks with Arab countries, with Turkey, or rapprochement with European countries.

The gain from the battle also includes an attempt to redraw the shape of the political solution in Syria, especially if this battle extends to wider areas like Hama, where fighters have reached its outskirts, and if the balance of power changes from the southern front, there will be a significant shift in the solution for Syria.

Regionally and internationally

What’s the political climate?

The battle came in light of complex and intertwined political circumstances, especially for the parties involved in the Syrian file, which have interests and connections in the Syrian geography. This includes an unprecedented description from Moscow to Ankara that Turkey is acting as an “occupying state” in Syria, which Turkish politicians and analysts consider a shift in the Russian stance.

On the international level, the operation coincides with the world’s anticipation of the arrival of the newly elected US President Donald Trump to power, amid expectations of upcoming changes in the future of the region, along with a ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, and warnings from the latter to Bashar al-Assad not to allow the passage of arms to Hezbollah through Syria, stating that he is “playing with fire.”

Turkey watching closely

A day after the battle, Turkish authorities stated that they are closely monitoring events in Syria and taking necessary precautions to protect their forces. Two days later, a “senior Turkish security source” told the British website Middle East Eye that the opposition’s attack aims to stop the strikes carried out by the Syrian regime on civilians and to restore the borders of the “de-escalation zone” in Idlib established in 2019.

The borders mentioned by the source are on the outskirts of Aleppo, but the factions have surpassed them and continue to advance into other areas and neighborhoods, even at the time of preparing this report.

On November 28, spokesperson for the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Öncü Keçeli, stated that maintaining calm in Idlib and the neighboring area, which is at the zero point of the Turkish border, is a priority for Turkey.

He added that several agreements have been reached regarding the “de-escalation zone” in Idlib since 2017, and that Turkey is strictly adhering to the requirements of all agreements it is a party to. He warned on many international platforms that recent attacks on Idlib have reached a level that undermines the spirit and implementation of the Astana agreements.

Keçeli noted that Turkey has emphasized the necessity of putting an end to these attacks, asserting that recent clashes have led to an undesirable escalation of tensions in the region.

Iran in turmoil

Iran, which has the largest military presence in Syria compared to other foreign powers, owning until mid-2024, 117 sites in Aleppo and its countryside, and 27 in the Idlib countryside outside the control of the opposition, called for thwarting the attack, considering it a “Zionist conspiracy.”

The spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Ismail Baqaei, warned against the return of what he termed “takfiri terrorist groups” in Syria, calling for decisive and coordinated actions to prevent the spread of “terrorism” in the region, asserting that these movements are part of a “wicked plan by the Zionist entity and the United States” to destabilize security in West Asia.

Baqaei pointed to the necessity of coordination among the countries in the region, especially Syria’s neighbors, without clarifying who he meant, to “thwart this grave conspiracy,” noting that under the existing agreements between the three guarantor countries of the Astana process (Iran, Turkey, and Russia), the areas surrounding Aleppo and Idlib are considered part of the “de-escalation zones.”

One of the most notable Iranian figures killed in the battle was the commander of Iranian advisers in Aleppo, Major General Kioumars Pourhashemi, known as “Haji Hashem,” who had previously served as a military advisor in what Tehran calls “the axis of resistance in Iraq and Syria.”

Researcher Saba Abdul Latif, a research assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, told Enab Baladi that Aleppo is considered one of Iran’s most significant gains during its intervention in Syria due to its strategic, economic, and even moral importance. Therefore, the factions’ control over Aleppo represents a significant loss for Iran, as it was a substantial investment and an initial share for Tehran in Syria.

Abdul Latif pointed out that Iran has worked over the past years to expand its influence militarily in Aleppo, but with the escalation of the front between Lebanon and Israel, Tehran lost many military commanders and a lot of weapon warehouses, especially in Syria.

She believes that without reinforcements from Iranian militias across the Iraqi border and with a diminished role for the regime in the region, it will be difficult to retake Aleppo without Russian intervention or opening supply lines.

Political researcher Abdul Wahab Asi sees in his conversation with Enab Baladi that if Iran wants to intervene in the battle, it will gather its forces in southern Aleppo, and may then support the Syrian regime to recover what it has lost, even partially.

According to the researcher, Iran’s maintenance of its positions and intervention in the battle requires supplying Iranian militias in Syria, and that these militias are not under pressure from Israeli strikes in Syria, especially in the south.

If there is a change in the southern front in Syria, Asi believes that the position of Iranian militias regarding the battle in Aleppo will shift, leading to a further withdrawal from the north.

Russia: A violation of Syria’s sovereignty

The Russian comment on the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation came two days later (November 29) via a statement from Oleg Ignasiyuk, Deputy Head of the Russian Reconciliation Center (one of the sections of the Russian Ministry of Defense), who stated that the Syrian Army, with support from Russian air forces, killed more than 400 militants from the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group that attacked regime forces’ positions in Aleppo and Idlib provinces.

Hours later, the Russian presidency (the Kremlin) urged the Syrian regime to restore what it termed the “constitutional order” in Aleppo province, considering what happened in the city of Aleppo a “violation of Syria’s sovereignty,” indicating that Moscow is working on “establishing order in the region” and urging Syrian authorities to swiftly restore security.

Moscow, which has followed a policy of systematic killing and “scorched earth” since its military intervention in Syria on September 30, 2015, and has played a significant role in tipping the balance in favor of the regime, is approaching this battle with less intensity and a different shape than its established policy so far.

Syria is “not Moscow’s priority now”

Russian political analyst Dmitry Bridzhe stated in his conversation with Enab Baladi that what is happening in the countryside of Aleppo is the beginning of various scenarios that might occur in Syrian territories, anticipating a “strong aggressive response” from the Syrian regime and its allies.

He noted that the limited Russian strikes in northern Syria result from the Russian military leadership’s engagement in the Ukrainian file, adding that the Ukrainian crisis is one of the most important files, and it seems that the Syrian file is not a priority, nor is it Russia’s number one priority.

Bridzhe considered that the lack of coverage or follow-up by the Kremlin regarding what is happening in Syria is because the Russians understand the complexities of the current political situation in Syria, and that there is no political solution, and other complexities regarding constitutional amendments and the implementation of international resolutions. He pointed out that Russia has not been able to work on all these files clearly.

The Russian analyst asserted that Moscow is only trying to secure Damascus and assist it from the perspective of Russian foreign policy, approved by Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2023, which is to assist the regime in restoring its relations with neighboring countries, including Turkey. He pointed out that Russia has worked on a political solution in Syria, but the Russian steps have not produced results on the ground.

According to Bridzhe, it appears that what is happening in northern Syria is part of opening new fronts against Russian interests, considering it a “second front” against Moscow, and that Russian media and state agencies will talk in the coming days about how the West is trying to open a front against Russia in Syria, especially since Russian media has been discussing in recent weeks the arrival of drone experts from the West and Ukraine to northern Syria.

A Russian-Turkish dispute

Researcher Abdul Rahman al-Haj believes that the military operation indicates the failure of Astana 22 to achieve specific Turkish demands and reflects Turkey’s desire to impose facts on the ground ahead of potential movement by Kurdish forces from the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), attempting to fill the vacuum that the potential withdrawal of Iranian militias might create.

Al-Haj believes that the operation reflects a Turkish-Russian disagreement, as a lack of alignment has emerged between the Turkish and Russian positions regarding normalization with the regime and its conditions, possibly due to al-Assad’s obstinacy supported by the Iranian stance, which may explain the Russian indifference to provide air support in defending against the opposition factions’ attack.

 

In reality, it is in the interest of the Russians to have the decision distributed between them and the Turks, with the Iranian forces being excluded from the equation. For this reason, operations will likely continue in Aleppo province and the northern countryside in particular, and most likely the Sochi agreement will become a thing of the past, along with new maps of control.

Dr. Abdul Rahman al-Haj, Researcher in religious movements

 

The researcher al-Haj predicted that the People’s Protection Units (considered terrorist by Ankara) would be a primary and upcoming target in western Aleppo countryside and in Manbij in its eastern countryside, which would facilitate a wide return of displaced persons and contribute to enhancing Turkey’s national security at the same time.

In light of an exceptional event that has broken red lines and unveiled features of the Syrian regime’s collapse, all possibilities remain open to reshape a new face for Syria, as the regime still exists despite its fragile state, and the fronts are more open than ever before, while anticipation is high for a Russian response or direct Turkish intervention, or Iranian moves, or even factional activities from the south, or an American move through the SDF.