Enab Baladi – Hani Karazi

During the years of the Syrian revolution, Russia exploited its military support to the ousted Assad regime to secure gains represented in a series of long-term economic agreements, in addition to maintaining two military bases in Syria.

Following Bashar al-Assad’s fall, analysts are questioning the future of Russian presence and the fate of those agreements and military bases on Syrian territory.

After opposition factions launched the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation, which paved the way for al-Assad’s downfall, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) operating in Idlib sent a message to Russia, affirming that the Syrian people seek to build positive relationships based on mutual respect and common interests with all countries around the world, including Russia, which it considered a “potential partner” in building a bright future for Syria.

In a statement on November 29, it affirmed that the Syrian revolution was never against any country or people, including Russia, nor was it involved in the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The statements of the Salvation Government about the possibility of Russia being a “potential partner” come at a time when Moscow still has investment contracts in Syria signed with the Assad regime, in addition to its continued military presence on the ground even after al-Assad’s fall, according to satellite observations, amid ambiguity surrounding the future of those agreements and military bases.

Long-term Russian agreements

Russia has signed several agreements with the ousted regime, most of which were highly important. Notably, on April 25, 2019, the Russian private company Stroytransgaz (CTG) signed a contract allowing it to invest in the port of Tartus for 49 years.

In April 2018, Stroytransgaz obtained a contract for the extraction of phosphate from the al-Sharqiyah mines in Palmyra, lasting 50 years with an output of 2.2 million tons annually.

After Russia’s dominance over the phosphate mined in Palmyra, the same company (Stroytransgaz) signed in November 2018 with the General Fertilizers Company in Homs a contract to invest in three fertilizer plants for 40 years, extendable.

Assistant researcher at the Jusoor For Studies Center, Abdul Azim al-Mugharbel, told Enab Baladi that Russia signed these agreements with al-Assad because it saw in Syria a crucial pillar for its presence in any future political or military equation that may arise in the Middle East, even after the regime’s fall.

By comparing the announced economic agreements signed by Russia and Iran with the Syrian regime, it can be noted that Moscow secured contracts of major importance, unlike Iran, which focused on quantity over quality, having signed 126 agreements, 78% of which are deemed unimportant, according to the Jusoor For Studies Center.

Regarding the reasons for Russia’s economic superiority over Iran, economic analyst Radwan al-Dibs stated that Russia is a major political, military, and economic power, backed by China, North Korea, and former Soviet republics, whereas Iran is a vulnerable regional state, facing international sanctions and a poor economic system, thus it is natural for Russia to surpass it economically.

In addition to the aforementioned reasons, al-Dibs noted that the ousted regime found it in its interest to ally with Russia, the stronger political and military party, hence it tended to offer Moscow more important and effective economic agreements than those given to Iran.

Military agreements

Militarily, Russia and Syria signed an unspecified agreement on August 26, 2015, concerning the presence of a group of Russian aircraft in Syria, centered in Hmeimim airbase, which became the main platform for the Russian military operation in Syria that began on September 30 of the same year.

By the end of 2015, the base was reinforced with an air defense system, and units of military police participated in providing security.

Moreover, Moscow and Damascus signed in 2017 two agreements that determine the use of Russian military bases in Syria for 49 years, until 2066, with options for automatic renewal for an additional 25 years.

What is the fate of the agreements?

Most of the agreements concluded by Russia with the ousted Syrian regime were of great importance, the most notable being the agreement to invest in the commercial port of Tartus for 49 years.

In Article “2-1” of Chapter Two of the agreement, the first party (Assad regime) commits to handing over to the second party (Russia) the investment of Tartus port for 49 years, without any possible decision to revoke it by the first party before the end of the contract.

In the seventh article of this chapter, paragraph four states that profits will be shared between the two parties, 35% for the first party (the ousted regime) and 65% for the second party (Moscow), with Russia’s profits exempt from any taxes, allowing the second party to repatriate them completely abroad.

However, following the fall of the Syrian regime and the takeover of the Military Operations Administration, questions remain regarding the fate of these agreements and whether they will remain valid.

International law expert Ibrahim al-Olabi told Enab Baladi that the fate of the agreements previously signed by Russia with the ousted regime still stands as long as neither party has opted to annul them, though there are some agreements that the new Syrian state could annul if they have a coercive act, meaning that implementing the agreement harms national security or the interests of the Syrian people.

Al-Olabi added that the manner of annulling any agreement must be documented within the contractual conditions, but neither Russia nor the regime disclosed the terms of these agreements, making it unclear how they could be annulled by the new Syrian government.

Nonetheless, al-Olabi believes that the new Syrian government could state that it is no longer bound by the Russian agreements in Syria, at which point Moscow may file a legal complaint against it in an international court, and if the court finds that one of these agreements involves a coercive act, it may rule for its annulment.

The future of Russian military presence in Syria

The future of Russian military bases in Syria remains unclear after the opposition factions overthrew Bashar al-Assad and came to power, after 13 years of the Syrian revolution, during which Moscow played a prominent role in suppressing and diverting its course.

On December 11, the Kremlin confirmed that Russia is “in communication” with the new authorities in Syria to discuss the issue of military presence and diplomatic representation for Moscow, indicating that ensuring the security of its two bases in Syria is of “utmost importance.”

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that his country maintains contact with those who control the situation in Syria, hoping for “swift stabilization.”

A report from the Institute for the Study of War noted that the Kremlin cautiously continues to indicate that it is “capable of ensuring the security of its military bases in Syria in the near term,” but it has expressed “uncertainty” about the long-term future of these bases against the backdrop of developments on Syrian territory.

Satellite images from December 10 showed the Russian forces still holding on to their principal marine and aerial bases in Syria, with no signs of a Russian withdrawal from the naval base in Tartus or the Hmeimim airbase near Latakia, according to the Institute for the Study of War.

On December 9, Russian news agency TASS cited a source in Latakia province stating that armed factions “fully control Latakia and Tartus,” but they “did not and will not storm” the Russian Hmeimim airbase located near Latakia and the naval base in Tartus.

The unnamed source mentioned that the two bases are operating “normally.”

The opposition factions’ position regarding the Russian military presence after al-Assad’s fall remains unclear, as the Russian bases currently represent a “major burden” in a war-torn country.

Russian affairs expert Nasr al-Youssef noted that it seems there is some deal between Russia and the opposition factions, which includes Moscow not bombing the factions in exchange for the latter’s commitment not to target Russian military bases in Syria. If Russia had not lifted the air cover from Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the current smooth transition would not have occurred.

Al-Youssef believes that in the medium to long term, the Russians will not remain because the Syrian environment may become hostile and unsafe. It is quite possible that from time to time, these bases could be attacked by faction fighters, especially after “Shaheen” drones have appeared in their possession.

He continued that eventually, the Russians will lose security in Syria; therefore, they may not risk maintaining those bases and might withdraw from the Hmeimim base only, while leaving a presence in the Tartus base, which served merely as a supply point for Moscow through the Mediterranean, rather than a military base in the conventional sense.

Meanwhile, the former head of the Syrian opposition delegation in the Geneva and Astana negotiations, Muhammad Alloush, stated to Russian news agency TASS that the new Syrian authorities will consider the issue of Russian military bases based on the interests of the Syrian people and Russia.

Alloush considered that the military presence is a “sovereign decision of the Syrian state, and this matter will definitely be studied while taking into account the interests of the Syrians along with Russia’s interests.”

Conversely, American site Bloomberg reported that Russia is nearing an agreement with the new Syrian leadership to retain two vital military bases where Russian troops and weapons have been stationed for years.

The US site quoted sources reportedly knowledgeable about affairs in Moscow, Europe and the Middle East, stating that discussions are currently underway between the two sides regarding the Hmeimim airbase and the naval port in Tartus.

According to a source in Moscow, the Russian Ministry of Defense believes it has an unofficial understanding with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) that it can remain in the Syrian bases.