Enab Baladi – Khaled al-Jeratli
As the Israeli escalation against Lebanese Hezbollah began, Israeli strikes expanded into Syrian territory, targeting Hezbollah’s interests in Syria and supply routes to Lebanon.
Official Israeli statements have repeatedly indicated the involvement of Military Security Services (Military Intelligence) in supporting Hezbollah’s and Iran’s activities in Syria, making its outposts susceptible to these strikes.
These statements accused the Military Security of being involved in Hezbollah’s activities, including weapon transfers and recruitment, while the Syrian regime and its president Bashar al-Assad are attempting to maintain a position of neutrality in the war.
Military Security in the spotlight
On November 4, a military unit from Israel entered Syrian territory between the Daraa and Quneitra governorates, arresting someone they claimed had been recruited by Iran in Syria.
One of the video recordings published by the Israeli army from the investigation showed that Ali Suleiman al-Aasi had been recruited by the Military Security, and it later became clear that Iran was behind his recruitment.
The mention of Military Security was repeated on October 30, when the Israeli Alma Research Center spoke about the reasons behind Israel’s targeting of the Kafr Sousa neighborhood in central Damascus.
The Alma Center reported that the targeting affected complexes belonging to the Military Security branch, which manage crossings between Syria and Lebanon from the Syrian side.
On October 25, Israeli army spokesperson Avichay Adraee announced that Israeli aircraft attacked the military infrastructure of Hezbollah at the Jousiyeh border crossing between Syria and Lebanon.
Adraee added that Hezbollah planned to transfer weapons via the al-Qaa crossing, managed by the Military Security affiliated with the Syrian regime.
Why Military Security?
Over the past years, Iran’s infiltration into Syria has been a point of regional discussion, and combating it was proposed as a condition for the Syrian regime’s return to its Arab surroundings in an initiative launched by Jordan early last year.
Iran has penetrated various sectors in Syria—security, military, and economic—but this penetration varies in the face of countering Russian influence and sectors that may be of lesser importance to Tehran, while the land route between Iraq and Lebanon via Syria is considered a top priority for Tehran.
This route extends from Iraq through the al-Qaim border crossing, passing through the city of al-Bukamal, central Syrian governorates, and reaching Lebanon.
In Syria, the Military Security manages official border crossings, with its security and military outposts spread across border areas.
Nawar Shaaban, a researcher at the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, sees that Iran’s connection to the Military Security is not a unique case, but Israel’s discomfort with this infiltration stems from the areas where Military Security forces operate in Syria.
Shaaban stated to Enab Baladi that Iran has infiltrated all the joints of Syria, with military and security apparatuses being part of that, but the geographical area in which the Military Security operates naturally serves Hezbollah’s logistical activities in Syria.
Shaaban believes that the repeated Israeli strikes on the Military Security are linked to supporting Hezbollah through areas where this security institution operates, and Iran’s influence there is not different from other military and security institutions.
According to the researcher, Iran’s infiltration into the Military Security coincides with the Israeli target bank aimed at cutting off Hezbollah supplies, which is a policy that Tel Aviv adheres to in Syria.
He noted that Israel has not targeted the Military Security in other areas outside the geography beneficial to Hezbollah.
Israeli media outlets, including The Times Of Israel, have previously reported that the Israeli army has imposed a “military blockade” on Lebanon, aimed at preventing the smuggling of weapons into the country from Iran, whether through land crossings or via Beirut International Airport.
Since the onset of military operations in Lebanon, Israel has struck certain border crossings between Lebanon and Syria, and some flights coming from Iran have not been allowed to land in Beirut.
Intense Iranian infiltration
While airstrikes target specific Iranian military capabilities inside Syria, no party has challenged Iran’s actual presence in Syria or limited its infiltration into Syrian institutions.
While the United States stands in hostility against Iran, reflected in airstrikes launched in November and earlier this year in Deir Ezzor, the US has not taken clear or public action to curb Iran’s influence in Syria. The repeated US attacks are always “punitive” and come in response to Iranian provocations through missile strikes on its forces east of the Euphrates River but do not intervene beyond that.
Researcher Nawar Shaaban believes that it is always difficult to assess Iran’s ability to penetrate a specific system, but when observing that this system begins to provide logistical services to Hezbollah or to Iran itself, this infiltration can be described as “intense.”
He added that Iran’s influence within an institution cannot be measured by military actions, but rather assessed based on the extent of its services in securing weapon smuggling points, securing shipments, protecting weapon shipments, and safeguarding warehouses, according to Shaaban.
The researcher indicated that the Syrian regime is capable of avoiding separating the Military Security from the geography beneficial to Hezbollah if it decides to spare it Israeli strikes.
He pointed out that such a move would not be easy for the regime due to the accumulated influence of Hezbollah and Iran over the years.
How Iran expands in Syria
Iran’s presence in Syria varies through mechanisms, whether via officers referred to as “advisers,” who are responsible for managing Iranian interests in the country, training militias loyal to Iran in the region, or through militias formed by individuals from various nationalities and countries, including Syrians, united by religious loyalty.
These militias are dispersed across the Syrian geography controlled primarily by the Syrian regime, maintaining their own areas of influence, especially in eastern Syria, particularly in the cities of al-Bukamal and al-Mayadeen in eastern Deir Ezzor, as well as other areas in several governorates, including Rif Dimashq, Dara, Quneitra, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama.
These militias operate according to pre-planned military and security conditions; however, recent US and Israeli strikes have imposed movements different from what these militias are accustomed to, in an effort to avoid as many losses as possible.
The presence of Iranian militias, as well as leaders from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), extends from the Syrian-Iraqi border in the far east, near areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), all the way to southern Syria on the border with occupied Golan.
Israeli strikes against Iranian targets in Syria have increased since the onset of Israeli military operations against the Gaza Strip on October 7, 2023, followed by military escalation from Iran and its allies in the region.
Since Iran’s military entry into the Syrian arena in 2013, there have been no accurate statistics on the numbers of Iran-backed militias. Iran, for its part, denies the presence of any regular forces on Syrian territory, stating instead that there are only “military advisers.”
Iran’s strategic environment
In a study published in December 2020, titled “Iranian Proxy Groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen: A Principal-Agent Comparative Analysis,” published by the US Defense Intelligence Agency, answers were posed to questions about Iran’s strategic environment and the proxy war it has waged against the United States for years.
The study, which spans 154 pages, stated in its first chapter that nearly all Iranian offensive operations against US interests are carried out by Tehran in collaboration with a proxy supported by it, through providing equipment and training, to avoid engaging in conflict with its adversaries.
Regarding Iran’s objectives, the study noted that Tehran employs a “revolutionary approach” in its foreign policy aimed at improving its standing in the Middle East and the international system at large.
It added that the declared objectives of Tehran’s foreign policy are multifaceted but can be broadly categorized into four categories: exporting the Iranian revolution, extending economic and political influence over the region, protecting followers of the Shia regime, and enhancing its conventional power.
Like any government, the Iranian regime seeks to persist at any cost, including leveraging the strengths of groups whether they ideologically align with it or not. For example, after the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime turned a blind eye to the activities of Sunni groups in Iraq’s Anbar province who were involved in smuggling goods that sanctions had prevented from entering the country.
Once US forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011, Iran utilized these same groups as proxies to contain Sunni tribal supply routes, to achieve unrestricted access to ports on the Mediterranean through Iraq and Syria.