Enab Baladi – Muwafaq al-Khouja

Caught between opening and closing, the issue regarding the Abu al-Zandeen crossing in northern rural Aleppo has taken center stage in areas controlled by the Syrian National Army (SNA) factions. While there seems to be no sign of untangling this knot, activists and researchers believe that the story has transcended internal boundaries.

The Abu al-Zandeen crossing returned to the forefront of events last week after protesters gathered near it, following the announcement from the Ministry of Defense of the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) about reopening it for humanitarian passage for returnees from Lebanon.

The announcement came on October 23, adding it to the main crossing point, the Aoun al-Dadat crossing.

Protesters emerged from the sit-in tent in front of the crossing on October 25, coinciding with the arrival of delegations from the al-Karama sit-in tent in the city of Azaz, northern Aleppo, where they raised earthen barriers in expression of their protest, according to what Enab Baladi’s correspondent reported in al-Bab.

The Abu al-Zandeen crossing is a land route linking areas controlled by the regime with areas controlled by opposition factions in northern and eastern rural Aleppo, which are affiliated with the Turkish-backed National Army.

Humanitarian and commercial movement has continued through it since opposition factions took control of the city of al-Bab in 2017, and it was closed at the beginning of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Who is behind the closure?

The group behind the crossing’s closure consists of civil activists and residents from al-Bab and the surrounding cities, which fall under the control of the National Army. For more than a month and a half, they have set up a sit-in tent, and numerous other activists from Azaz have visited.

Political researcher Nader al-Khalil believes that the protesters base their opposition to opening the crossing on the public rejection in northern Syria, stating that they view its reopening as the first step towards normalizing relations with the Syrian regime and accepting the status quo.

The protesters also feel that reopening the crossing represents a “betrayal” of the suffering of the social supporters, according to al-Khalil’s statements to Enab Baladi.

These “supporters” include displaced individuals who fled from villages and cities attacked by the Syrian regime to northern Aleppo.

The researcher pointed out that there are two types of factions within the National Army that support the protesters in preventing the crossing from reopening. The first type consists of members linked to social supporters who reject Turkish normalization with a regime process led by Russia since 2022.

The second type comprises factions economically affected by the opening of Abu al-Zandeen, due to their involvement in smuggling operations on both banks, which would deprive them of important financial revenues, according to al-Khalil.

For his part, political activist from sl-Bab, Moataz al-Naser, told Enab Baladi that the protesters rely on their “popular status,” supported by other community entities that adopt their demands or parts thereof to varying degrees.

The community entities mentioned by al-Naser include personalities and political groups, along with some factions supporting for various reasons, ranging from “national motives” to those keen on continuing smuggling to benefit from it, according to al-Naser.

Why doesn’t the knot untie?

The ongoing protests are connected to the behavior of the Interim Government, which manages the Abu al-Zandeen file and is tied to Turkish will, according to the political activist.

Al-Naser believes that the entity responsible for the continuation of the protests is the one advocating for the opening of the crossing, referring to the Interim Government.

He sees that “this entity serves as a facade for passing external dictates, and had it been national, the crossing would have benefited the people of the area.”

The protesters’ demands primarily focus on banning the crossing’s opening, citing the lack of an “official decision-making entity” capable of managing the crossing, as mentioned by the civil activist.

He added that the involvement of foreign and regional parties with intertwined interests (referring to Russia and Turkey), along with “internal actors,” has turned the crossing issue from an internal concern to international and regional agreements and disagreements.

Al-Naser also pointed out a sense of ambiguity among residents in northern Syria, caused by “the obscurity in the dealings of countries regarding the Syrian file.”

This ambiguity has translated into public protests from various factions who consider the opening of the Abu al-Zandeen crossing as agreements to advance normalization with the Syrian regime under Turkish sponsorship and “through its local tools,” as the activist puts it.

Where does the Syrian regime stand?

The issue of reopening the Abu al-Zandeen crossing does not only pertain to opposition-controlled areas in northern Aleppo; a significant part of it is related to the Syrian regime.

Hours after its first reopening on August 18, military parties from the regime were accused of launching shells, forcing those managing the crossing to close it to commercial truck movement.

The researcher at the Jusour Center for Studies, Wael Alwan, stated that the main hindrance to opening Abu al-Zandeen is the Syrian regime, which has its forces on the opposite side of the crossing.

According to Alwan, the “Fourth Division” forces and “non-state militia” affiliated with the Syrian regime hinder the reopening of the crossing due to their benefit from the ongoing smuggling situation.

Alwan added that the regime ensures its political, economic, and security interests through the closure of the crossing, as the issue of Abu al-Zandeen extends beyond internal or economic concerns on the local level.

Politically, Alwan believes the regime evades responsibility before Russia, which is seeking with Turkey to open the crossing, while simultaneously responding to Iranian pressures that desire the crossing to remain closed.

Protests have persisted since late July, after the local council of al-Bab announced preparations for the crossing to be temporarily reopened for trade movement between the controlling parties.

A statement was issued by revolutionary actors in al-Bab on July 26, linking their protests to demands from “responsible entities” regarding the reopening of the crossing.

Among these demands was the transfer of crossing management to a civil body under the supervision of institutions, and designating a percentage of the crossing’s revenue for the implementation of infrastructure projects in the city.

The demands also included establishing an effective mechanism for controlling security matters and regulating exports and imports in line with the city’s interests while preserving local production.

Protesters blocked the international road leading to Abu al-Zandeen using cars and motorcycles in expression of their rejection to open the crossing on July 28.

On August 19, protesters set up a sit-in tent in front of the crossing, considering its opening as “treason and normalization with the Assad regime,” supported by military and civilian convoys heading towards the crossing.

The sit-in tent remains in place, with activists and political and civil organizations in al-Bab and Azaz maintaining their protests to this day.

What is the Interim Government’s position?

Despite the ongoing protests and the sit-in tent, the Interim Government is preparing to receive those coming from Lebanon, as confirmed by Jalal al-Tallawi, the media office manager of the Syrian Interim Government, to Enab Baladi.

These preparations involve erecting tents belonging to the al-Bab Civil Registry Center to document entries from the crossing and issuing temporary records for them, along with vehicles for transporting newcomers and ambulances for medical emergencies, according to al-Tallawi’s statement.

Al-Tallawi also mentioned the contributions of organizations working in northwestern Syria, providing tents and relief materials.

Since the most recent announcement for reactivation on October 23, up until the moment this report is written, no cases have entered through the crossing, despite al-Tallawi confirming the crossing’s open status.

Regarding the sit-in tent, al-Tallawi emphasized that the Interim Government respects all opinions and has not targeted the protesters.

“Smuggling impedes efforts”

The Interim Government often collides with protests backed by factions linked to the National Army, which are accused of involvement in smuggling operations between both sides of the crossing.

Researcher Wael Alwan stated that opposition factions and the Interim Government cannot resolve all issues related to Abu al-Zandeen, despite their efforts to regulate smuggling matters.

Alwan hinted at the “incitement of certain powers that benefit from smuggling routes, which are rallying against the opening of the crossing.”

However, political activist Moataz al-Naser mentioned that the armed elements participating in the protests are from the community, viewing the opening of the crossing as a “conspiracy against the revolution.”

What is the solution?

Political researcher Nader al-Khalil believes that resolving the Abu al-Zandeen issue requires a comprehensive approach that considers the interests of all parties, including offering guarantees for the factions and social supporters opposed to the opening.

The approach should also include “partial economic settlements” with some influential factions in the region, according to al-Khalil.

The researcher suggested the idea of “joint management” of the crossing, ensuring that revenues are directed to benefit northern Syria, thus reducing the chances of the regime exploiting the crossing for “illegitimate activities.”

The political researcher considers that the opening of Abu al-Zandeen offers economic benefits to certain segments of Syrians, particularly traders and industrialists in northwestern Syria, if the crossing becomes a point of continuous and active commercial exchange.

If attempts to close it continue, it might not significantly impact the economic reality in the region; however, risks may arise if crossing management is not organized, according to al-Khalil.

These risks stem from reducing international aid that sometimes passes through border crossings with Turkey, allowing the regime to dominate this aid and exploit it “negatively,” as al-Khalil pointed out.

The researcher also fears the regime might take advantage of the unstable crossing situation to pass “drug shipments” or gain greater economic benefits at the expense of the opposition.

He stated, “The opposition controlling the crossing must establish clear lists of imports and exports that serve the northern Syrian economy and prevent the regime from exploiting the new situation.”