Enab Baladi – Muwafaq al-Khouja
As Israeli strikes on Syria intensify to cut off supply routes between Iran and Hezbollah, targeting the Syrian depth, Moscow, an ally of the Syrian regime, adopts a bystander position regarding these attacks, limiting its role to denunciation and making statements.
Since the Al-Aqsa Flood operation on October 7, 2023, launched by the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Israel has escalated its strikes in Syria, mainly focusing on southern and central Syria.
Russia has not taken any action in response to these strikes, but it consistently condemns them and releases statements against them.
Among the most notable strikes was the attack on the Scientific Research Center in Masyaf, west of Hama, which is located about 70 kilometers from the Russian Hmeimim airbase in southern Latakia.
The New York Times reported about an airdrop coinciding with the bombing and the seizure of documents from the research center.
Additionally, the Mezzeh area in Damascus has become a stage for a series of assassinations and attacks targeting leaders and members of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Recently, Israel has been targeting the Syrian-Lebanese border, claiming it is cutting off supply routes for the regime and Iran to Hezbollah.
The al-Masnaa border crossing was bombed twice, the latest on October 25, coinciding with another attack on the Joussieh crossing.
Russia controls the regime
Russian affairs researcher Dr. Nasr al-Youssef compares the relationship between Russia and the regime to that of “the rider and the horse, one above the saddle and the other below it,” referring to Moscow’s control over the governance in Syria.
Russia intervened militarily in Syria at the end of September 2015, and its entry significantly altered the map of control distribution between the opposition and the Syrian regime, as Moscow believes its intervention saved the Syrian regime from collapse. After losing control over most of Syria, it now holds more than two-thirds of the control map post-2015.
Al-Youssef believes that “Russia controls Syria as it pleases,” especially what is termed “useful Syria,” specifically the coastal areas.
The central and western regions of Syria gain significance for Russia, particularly amid tensions between Russia and the West.
The significance of the Russian military sites on the Syrian coast rises if this tension escalates from a cold war to a hotter war, according to al-Youssef.
Russia has two locations in western Syria: Hmeimim airbase and the port of Tartus.
Russia monitors the south
Numerous changes have occurred in the Russian deployment in Syria following its war against Ukraine, especially in southern Syria, specifically near the military confrontation line between the Syrian regime and Israel.
Russia established 14 points along the Syrian border with the occupied Golan Heights in southern Syria to monitor the ceasefire.
From time to time, Russia conducts patrols along the disengagement line.
Unlike the northern front of Israel with Lebanon, the Syrian front has been relatively calm, although it has received some strikes that the regime has not announced but have been monitored by Enab Baladi reporters in the south and local news networks.
Military affairs researcher Rashid Hourani from the Jusoor For Studies Center believes that the changes on the southern front are under Russian oversight, including the reduction of international forces operating in southern Syria, an increase in Israeli observation points, and Israeli ground incursion while completing the “Sufa 53” project.
Hourani thinks these changes on the southern Syrian front following the Al-Aqsa Flood operation primarily benefit the regime, as Israel is excluding the regime from military escalation against Hezbollah and Iran.
He added that the Israeli movements in southern Syria, along with the addition of observation points, aim to target Iranian militias present in Syria and control their movements.
Israeli military vehicles have been entrenching themselves along the confrontation line inside Syrian territory and have been building and paving internal roads since mid-2022, establishing what Israel calls “Sufa 53.”
The Israeli incursion into Syrian territory after mid-2022 reached two kilometers in some points, according to Enab Baladi reporters in Quneitra and Daraa, along with Israeli media.
In mid-October, Israel shifted the border fence in the demilitarized zone and established new fortifications, according to Reuters, based on information from a UN peacekeeping force official.
Reuters reported from Syrian military sources and Lebanese security sources that mine-clearing operations along the Syrian-Israeli border accelerated in recent weeks.
On the other side, the regime denied this incursion through the former head of the Baath Party branch in Quneitra, Khaled Abaza, and former Quneitra governor, Moataz Abu al-Nasr Jamran, with no comment from the regime’s Ministry of Defense.
Russian affairs expert Nasr al-Youssef confirmed that the target of Israeli strikes is not the regime, and if the Israeli army incurs into Syria, it is not to punish the regime, which has remained passive and distanced itself from the “Resistance Axis.”
However, these incursions and Israeli military strikes have raised questions about the possibility of Israel penetrating deeper into Syria and about the Russians’ role if that happens.
Al-Youssef dismissed the likelihood of Russian intervention if Israel were to penetrate further, pointing out that there are specific frameworks to the relationship between Russia and Israel concerning the Syrian matter.
The frames al-Youssef mentioned are part of the “hotline agreement” established between Israel and Russia, which took shape in 2018.
Tel Aviv has created a communication channel with the Hmeimim airbase in 2015 for military coordination, aiming to prevent conflicting Russian and Israeli air operations in Syrian skies.
Researcher Rashid Hourani considers Russia’s role in the south complementary to that of the US and European countries in protecting Israel, particularly on the southern front of Syria, which holds both international and local significance.
Hourani continued that the regime attempted to exploit this front since the beginning of the Syrian unrest in 2011, to convey a message to Europe, the US, and major countries supporting Israel, indicating there would be a slackening of border control if support were provided to the uprising.
However, Russia currently holds military reins in Syria in terms of organization and training, as well as decision-making regarding the regime launching a military operation, according to Hourani’s statements to Enab Baladi.
According to Dr. Nasr al-Youssef, the Syrian regime’s president, Bashar al-Assad, received instructions from Moscow not to engage in the ongoing confrontation between Israel, Iran, and Hezbollah.
The number of Russian sites in Syria increased in 2024 to 114 locations, up from 105 sites in 2023, according to a study published by the Jusoor For Studies Center in July.
These Russian sites are distributed across 21 bases and 93 military points, including 13 sites and points in Quneitra, adjacent to the border with the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
According to Jusoor Center, the increase in Russian sites in Syria that occurred since mid-2023 followed the vacuum left by Iranian militias’ withdrawal from Quneitra province in southern Syria.
In 2018, Israel reached an agreement with Russia to remove Iranians from the Israeli border by 80 kilometers in exchange for allowing the Syrian regime to re-establish itself at the disengagement line under Russian sponsorship.
The number of Iranian sites in Syria stands at 529 locations, including 20 in Quneitra, and is recognized as the largest foreign military presence in Syria, according to the Jusoor Center.
Different approach in the north
While Russia ignores Israeli strikes against the regime in southern and central Syria, its response is different in the north.
Russia supports the regime in its military operations in northwestern Syria, where opposition factions hold control, continuously launching air strikes.
Researcher Rashid Hourani from Jusoor Center stated to Enab Baladi that Russia’s handling of the Syrian regime is different from its approach in the south.
He explained that Moscow treats the regime in the north as a legitimate state, unlike the artificial state it views in the south in relation to Israel.
Despite the de-escalation agreement, Russian aircraft continue to support the regime’s artillery in bombing areas in Idlib and the countryside of Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia.
The regime and Russia assert they are targeting “terrorist” sites, but Enab Baladi reporters and humanitarian organizations confirm that civilian casualties result from these military strikes.
In October, there was a significant military escalation by Russia, with Russian warplanes conducting over 25 airstrikes in a single day (October 14) on various areas in the countryside of Aleppo, Idlib, and Latakia.
The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) issued a report on October 23, documenting the responsibility of the Russian army for the deaths of 11 civilians due to strikes on the outskirts of Idlib city, in addition to destroying the Kilani power station in the Ain al-Zarqa area in western Idlib, depriving thousands of civilians of water.
According to the 16-page report, the northwestern region of Syria experienced significant military escalation between October 14 and 16, manifested in daily Russian airstrikes using high-explosive planes and missiles.