Enab Baladi – Hani Karazi

Nine years have passed since Russia’s military intervention in Syria, which initially aimed to protect the Syrian regime from downfall and support it militarily to regain control over Syrian territories. However, the nature of this intervention and its roles have evolved over the years into a political activity aimed at rehabilitating the regime leader Bashar al-Assad and achieving Russian interests in foreign policy, in exchange for military inactivity.

Russia’s intervention in Syria began on September 30, 2015, with the regime then having lost control over more than two-thirds of Syrian territories, before becoming the major controlling party in the Syrian conflict.

Since Russia’s military involvement in Syria, the military course and control map has changed, allowing the Syrian regime to expand into opposition-held territories and altering the political process as well.

During the military intervention, Russian air forces carried out over 100,000 combat sorties in Syrian skies, according to statements by the commander of Russian air forces in Syria, Yevgeny Nikiforov, during a Russian forces celebration at the Hmeimim airbase in Latakia countryside on August 12, 2021, marking the 109th anniversary of Russian combat aviation.

According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), Russian forces have killed 6,969 civilians, including 2,055 children and 1,094 women, from the point of their intervention in Syria until last June.

114 Russian sites

Following their intervention in Syria, Russia aimed to establish bases and military positions that reached 132 sites in 2022. However, the number of Russian military sites in Syria decreased to 105 by 2023 with the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Moscow then quickly increased its military sites in Syria again, rising from 105 to 114 during 2023 and 2024, as per the Jusoor Center for Studies.

The Russian sites in Syria consist of 21 bases and 93 military points: 17 in Hama, 15 in Latakia, 14 in al-Hasakah, 13 in Quneitra, 12 in Aleppo, 8 in the countryside of Damascus, and 8 in each of Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, 6 in Idlib, 4 in Homs, 3 in Daraa, and two sites each in the governorates of Damascus, As-Suwayda, and Tartus.

Most of the increase in Russian sites during the first half of 2024 is attributed to these forces spreading across new sites evacuated by Iranian militias in Quneitra.

Russia also dominated military structures, linking all military forces and aircraft to the Hmeimim base. The Ministry of Defense effectively leads all military operations in Syria in cooperation with Iranian forces.

Dr. Nasr al-Yousef, an expert in Russian affairs, believes that Russia today dominates the strategic decision-making of the Syrian state, indicating that Bashar al-Assad cannot make any decisions without Moscow’s consent. Furthermore, if there is any delay in compliance, he is summoned to Moscow to receive direct instructions for implementation without hesitation.

Al-Yousef indicated that since Vladimir Putin came to power, he set his sights on restoring Russia’s status as a major power, which it lost in the 1990s. Therefore, Syria was the first hub for Russian expansion on a superpower level, and to achieve this, military bases and points were established across Syrian lands.

Al-Yousef emphasized to Enab Baladi that the Hmeimim airport and the naval base in Tartus are powerful arms for Russia against its European enemies. The Mediterranean now separates Russian forces from Europe, allowing Russia to strike Europe from its bases in Syria.

Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks to the Syrian regime leader in Sochi – May 18, 2018 (AFP)

Military inactivity

Despite Russia increasing its sites to 114 this year, this number remains lower than the 132 military bases previously established in 2022.

On March 5, 2020, the Turkish President and his Russian counterpart signed the Moscow agreement, which included articles declaring a ceasefire effective from March 6, 2020, along the confrontation lines between the Syrian regime and opposition factions.

This followed another agreement signed by Russia and Turkey as part of the Astana process in 2017 for de-escalation, followed by the Sochi agreement in September 2018, which stipulated a ceasefire around Idlib.

Despite the Russian-Turkish agreements to freeze frontlines in northern Syria, the regime consistently resorts to shelling civilian gatherings in northwestern Syria almost daily using drones or artillery. In contrast, Russian air forces limit their activities to reconnaissance as reported by aviation observatories.

Dr. Nasr al-Yousef noted that the military inactivity in northern Syria results from Russia’s conviction that no real threat exists to the frozen frontlines it agreed upon with Ankara in 2020. Simultaneously, Russia avoids any military escalation that might harm its relationship with Turkey stationed in northwestern Syria since Moscow continues coordinating with Ankara to restore relations with Damascus.

Russian forces are spread around the opposition-controlled regions in northwestern Syria as guarantors of the de-escalation agreement signed with Turkey, which entails freezing battlefronts between the regime and opposition.

On September 18, the Russian Center for Reconciliation, a section of the Russian Ministry of Defense, announced thwarting an attempt by “militants” to breach “government forces” in Idlib, resulting in the killing of one “terrorist.”

The Russian announcement regarding repelling an attack launched from areas controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in northwestern Syria is unprecedented, as the Reconciliation Center generally just counts attacks, reporting casualties and injuries without noting Russian military involvement.

While Russian aerial bombardments are absent from northwestern Syria, Moscow periodically announces targeting sites in the Syrian desert for militants from the al-Tanf area, hosting International Coalition Forces led by the US.

These Russian reports come solely from one side, as Washington has not confirmed that Moscow has hit sites near it.

The Jusoor Center for Studies mentioned that Russia repeatedly attempted to break through field barriers in Syria constructed by the US, Turkey, and Iran but realized its inability to do so due to a lack of military balance and each party’s insistence on maintaining influence amidst no political solution in sight for the Syrian issue.

Russian President Vladimir Putin addresses his troops at the Hmeimim base in Syria – November 11, 2017 (EPA)

Russian preoccupation with the Ukraine war

Russian military influence in Syria has seen a limited reduction in favor of Iran, which filled the void as Moscow deployed trained personnel from Syria to Ukrainian frontlines.

Russia’s focus on the Ukraine war has led to an erosion of prior coordination mechanisms with external forces in Syria, designed since its 2015 intervention. This has resulted in unprecedented protocol violations of deconfliction between US and Russian forces. Additionally, Israel no longer adheres strictly to a hotline mechanism, and the interest in joint patrols between Russian and Turkish forces east of the Euphrates has waned, as reported by the Jusoor Center for Studies.

There has been Russian concern over International Coalition movements, particularly regarding provocative flights by US aircraft in Russian-held territories, violating Syrian airspace over al-Tanf, according to the head of the Russian Reconciliation Center, 360 incidents in August alone.

In this context, Russian political analyst Dmitry Bridzhe explained to Enab Baladi that Russian withdrawal in Syria is due to its preoccupation with the Ukraine war where a large number of troops were shifted to Ukrainian frontlines to defend Russian territory, asserting that Russia cannot maintain all its forces in Syria while ongoing hostilities persist between Moscow and Kyiv.

Brygadz added that there is currently a lessened focus on Syria by Russia, occupied with more pressing matters like the Western conflict and the Ukraine war, and building relations with the East, particularly Gulf countries and East Asia.

He pointed out that US President Joe Biden’s firm stance against Russia due to its intervention in Ukraine led to a decline in Russian-American relations, adversely affecting Russian presence in Syria. However, should the Ukrainian crisis find a solution and the US administration change with Donald Trump’s victory, Russian-American relations might improve, thus restoring Russia’s prominent role in Syria as during Trump’s tenure.

The Ukrainian front had cooled off for months, but on August 6, Ukraine attacked the Russian region of Kursk, seizing some territories in the largest foreign attack on Russia since World War II, alongside assaults on other Russian cities, disrupting Moscow airport movements.

Rashid Hourani, a researcher at Jusoor Center, told Enab Baladi that the Russian-Ukrainian war gradually impacted Russian influence in Syria, exploited by Iran to increase its presence alongside the regime to strengthen its position in the south, evidenced by recent Israeli ground interventions deeper into Syria.

Russian failure in controlling security

Despite Russia and Turkey signing agreements for de-escalation and ceasefire in northern Syria, Moscow has failed to deter the regime from escalating against civilians.

Last August witnessed a military escalation, where the Syrian Network for Human Rights documented the killing of 57 civilians in Syria during August alone, 21 of them at the hands of the regime forces. The latter did not cease its attacks on areas controlled by the National Army or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, including an attack targeting a Turkish observation point in the de-escalation zones.

The Russian failure to control security after nine years of intervention in Syria was not limited to the de-escalation zones in northern Syria but also extended to reconciliation areas supervised by Russia.

In southern Syria, Daraa province frequently experiences escalations between local armed groups and regime forces in rural Daraa. Local groups resort to targeting regime forces in response to kidnappings or arrests of the province’s residents by the regime’s intelligence, despite the Russian guarantor.

The writer on Syrian political affairs, Asim al-Zoubi, told Enab Baladi that the Russian intervention ostensibly came under the title “Restoring security to Daraa,” as part of promoting stability to encourage investors to rebuild and refugees to return from neighboring countries, primarily Jordan. However, in reality, Russia disrupted stability in the region, worsening the security situation. Moscow and its ally al-Assad could not restore security to the area, where assassinations and security tensions increased despite these reconciliations.

Russia relied on the Eighth Brigade as its arm to control security in southern Syria since 2018 and continued to support it until 2022, when the Russian-Ukrainian war led to a decline in Russia’s influence in southern Syria, paving the way for Iranian militias to spread drugs and cause chaos and assassinations.

What is the Eighth Brigade?

Russia co-opted the Youth of Sunna faction after the reconciliation settlement in 2018, managed to include it in the Russian-formed Fifth Corps in 2016, and named it the Eighth Brigade, after disarming it of heavy weapons while keeping medium and personal arms.

The Youth of Sunna faction, part of the Southern Front opposing the regime in southern Syria, led by Ahmed al-Awda, was one of the most important organized fighting factions and the only one in the city of Busra al-Sham.

The role of the Eighth Brigade became prominent during the settlement years as separation forces that managed to quell repeated clashes between regime forces and former opposition faction fighters, in addition to supervising the transfer of fighters to northern Syria by Russian orders.

Russia announced that the formation of the Eighth Brigade aimed to curb the security chaos prevailing in Daraa province, represented by killings, assassinations, armed robbery, theft, and drug spread, but it failed in this.

Russia continued to support the Eighth Brigade until the end of 2021, during which period it granted each element in the Brigade a salary of $200, in addition to financial blocks for logistical support, leading to the expansion of its military power in the province.

And at the beginning of 2022, Russian support for the faction decreased, its leadership was subordinated to the Military Intelligence division, but the brigade always denied its connection to the regime.

Tensions in “reconciliation” areas sponsored by Russia also extended to northern rural Homs, where at the beginning of September, Syrian regime forces launched a security campaign in the city of Talbiseh.

The local Sham FM radio reported that the competent authorities, in cooperation with the people of the town of Talbiseh, started a “campaign to arrest outlaws, drug dealers, and kidnapping and looting gangs, who cut the international highway Homs-Hama, aiming to restore security and calm to the region.”

Most of the reconciliations sponsored by Russia, especially in Daraa, were unsuccessful, as they did not achieve what the regime hoped for in security dominance, nor did they meet the demands of the people in the settlement areas given Russia’s failure to fulfill its pledges not to allow regime entry into their areas or conduct arrests.

Raed Jaber, an expert on Russian affairs, told Enab Baladi that the primary reason for Russia’s failure to control security in settlement areas is that Moscow is not currently interested in these files. Its focus has shifted to promoting al-Assad’s rehabilitation through normalization paths, while simultaneously reinforcing its presence strategically in the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa, which is part of Russia’s broader effort to counter the West.

Elements of the Russian military police in Aleppo city (Sputnik)

Russia safe from regional developments

At the end of last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that his country’s forces would remain in Syria “as long as it is beneficial for Russia,” noting that his country does not currently plan to withdraw these military units from Syria.

In February, Bashar al-Assad made statements justifying the Russian presence in Syria, saying that Russia’s intervention alongside him in military operations in Syria was a protection for Moscow. He noted that if Putin had not sent his troops to Syria, his country (Russia) would have suffered from “terrorism.”

The region has witnessed many developments over the past months, most notably the Gaza war and repeated Israeli strikes on Iranian sites in Syria, and the latest Israeli escalation on Lebanon, raising questions about the impact of these developments on the Russian presence in Syria.

In this context, Dr. Nasr al-Youssef ruled out that events in Lebanon and Gaza would affect the Russian presence in Syria, noting that Russia’s relationship with Israel is good, as the latter has never publicly supported Ukraine, despite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky being Jewish and having repeatedly requested assistance from Israel, which it did not provide.

Moreover, Netanyahu, who is a friend of Putin, did not allow any of his ministers to release statements condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Alongside this, Russia’s relations with Lebanon and Arab countries are good, keeping Russia safe from regional developments, according to al-Youssef.

Jaber believes Russia plans to stay indefinitely. “All Russian military and political circles speak of a strong and permanent Russian presence in Syria,” unless significant circumstances arise and Russia faces confrontation, which the expert currently deems unlikely. Russia also plans to strengthen its presence further in the forthcoming phase.

Should a settlement regarding the Syrian issue be reached, one of Russia’s conditions would concern the nature of the regime’s future relationship with the Russian military presence, according to Jaber.

Jaber added that Moscow seeks to prevent the regime from embroiling itself in regional crises that could harm its interests or al-Assad’s future. Therefore, it insisted on compelling al-Assad not to intervene in the Gaza and Lebanon conflicts, in addition to focusing on constricting American interests in Syria by exploiting the Biden administration’s weakness.

Political activity for normalization with al-Assad

Russia imposed itself as the sponsor of the political solution to the Syrian issue by sponsoring the Astana Talks alongside Turkey and Iran, in addition to playing a role in Geneva negotiations through platforms for the Syrian opposition.

Following political paths, most notably Astana and Sochi, through which Russia enabled al-Assad to regain control over most Syrian areas and freeze military fronts, Russian political activity shifted towards rehabilitating al-Assad through an Arab rapprochement path and a series of meetings with Gulf states.

Russia intensified its political activity to ensure al-Assad’s survival. In July 2023, Russia met with the Gulf Cooperation Council in Moscow to reassure Arab countries that the Syrian regime would adhere to the Jordanian Initiative.

The initiative focuses on facilitating the return of refugees, removing Iranian forces from Syria, combating drug trafficking, agreeing on a more inclusive governance formula, and elections under UN supervision. However, the regime did not comply with these terms, which led to Arab discontent.

Russia also led the Syrian Constitutional Committee (SCC) path and sought to control it to the extent that it disrupted the ninth round, scheduled for June 2022.

Following Russia’s invasion of its neighbor Ukraine, Switzerland, which hosts the constitutional committee talks in its second-largest city (Geneva), has become an unneutral environment in Moscow’s view as it opposes the Russian invasion of Ukraine, like the European Union, the United States, and many countries worldwide.

These facts left the ninth round hostage to an agreement on an alternative country to host the constitutional committee, and Russia began seeking to disrupt this path by insisting on holding the committee in Damascus, Muscat, or Baghdad, which were not accepted by the opposition.

The most prominent Russian activity in the Syrian political file was sponsoring rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus, initiated and sponsored by Moscow on December 28, 2022. However, the Russian President’s envoy Alexander Lavrentiev announced the collapse of the path on January 29, 2024.

Russia renewed this path by sending Lavrentiev to Damascus last June to convince al-Assad to engage in this path, along with Russia’s meeting with Turkish officials to reduce the differences between the Syrian regime and Turkey.

On August 31, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced the preparation of a new meeting to normalize relations between Turkey and the Syrian regime, confirming it would be held very soon.

Analyst Dmitry Bridzhe noted that following the Ukraine war in February 2022, Russia’s focus on the military side in Syria declined, with its activity now focused on the political side, centered on pressure to help Syria restore diplomatic relations with Arab countries and Turkey, in addition to ensuring Syria’s stability through a series of political and economic reforms.

Conversely, Raed Jaber said Russia’s political activity in Syria took a different shape. Instead of Moscow’s previous focus on several political files together, such as issues like the constitutional committee, Astana, Sochi, and Geneva, the current Russian effort focuses mainly on rapprochement between the regime and Turkey.