Hassan Ibrahim | Ali Darwish

The face of the Idlib region in northwestern Syria has altered since opposition factions took control of it. Its proximity to the Turkish border and its early liberation from regime control in 2015 made it a destination for the Free Syrian Army factions and later jihadists. The faction Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has recently emerged and continues to lead the governing structure, despite the presence of civilian institutions and entities.

Al-Nusra Front (now HTS), which emerged from al-Qaeda and subsequently separated, provided a large degree of freedom to Syrian and non-Syrian clerics, creating a supportive environment for their fatwas. They implemented Sharia laws, committed violations against minorities, and permitted some of their fighters to administer torture under the pretext of enforcing God’s laws. They also weakened and eliminated many Free Syrian Army factions under the guise of “retribution and apostasy.”

After the group severed ties with al-Qaeda, this approach began to decline gradually, marked by transformations in the hardline rhetoric as seen through the more moderate tone of HTS’ leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, and its clerics. The group aimed to project a more moderate image of its governance in the region, but has continued to establish a religious authority ruling Idlib and western Aleppo countryside, advancing concepts that exclude pluralism. This has opened the door to accusations of practicing vice and takfir within the community, further deepening divisions among its elements.

Years have passed, and with HTS’ change in behavior, dress, and the removal of the leader’s turban, along with talks of minority protection, the establishment of a Sunni entity, the management of halal and haram, and the introduction of a public morals law, religiously justified violations have not ceased. This is according to the latest report by the Office of International Religious Freedom in 2023.

After the term “Sunni entity” was repeatedly mentioned by al-Jolani, it reappeared early this September following its use by journalist Ahmad Muaffaq Zaidan, close to HTS, which triggered a state of outrage and anger for its implications of “exclusion and separation.” It prompted clerics and analysts to warn of its dangers and the consequences of playing the “religion and sect” card.

In this lengthy report, Enab Baladi sheds light on the period of HTS’ presence and governance in Idlib since its inception under the name of al-Nusra Front at the end of 2011. It discusses with officials, clerics, experts, and specialists the transformations of the faction and its religious fingerprints that have impacted the social fabric of Idlib and the political and social ramifications of this approach.

Governance under the banner of religion

From global jihad to pragmatic local jihad, and changes in the group’s ideological structure at various levels, a significant transformation has occurred within HTS over 12 years, maintaining certain leadership figures, while many of its leaders are out of the picture, either by death in battles, assassination, or going underground escaping from “yesterday’s brothers.”

These multiple transformations led HTS to govern one of the most prominent areas outside regime control, encompassing large parts of Idlib province along with areas from western Aleppo countryside, northern Hama, and eastern Latakia. These areas became refuge for hundreds of thousands of displaced and expelled Syrians from various cities and villages where about 3,484,000 people reside, 51% of whom are displaced, according to statistics from the Support Coordination Unit.

HTS’s transformations and decisions were results of changes at different stages, where events and risks almost overwhelmed it in each stage. The group used Sharia implementation as a scapegoat and means to sustain itself. It accelerated this behavior for internal goals concerning the group and preserving its members.

Enforcement of Sharia laws, Clashes with factions

HTS has maintained its Salafi methodology despite all transformations, though it tried in recent years to reduce what researchers call its former “rigidity” by implementing Hisba and Sharia laws (flogging, retribution, and stoning).

Al-Nusra Front, after separating from al-Qaeda in 2016, clashed with local factions for several reasons, one of which was its rigid religious methodology. It engaged in clashes with factions, fought the Islamic State group and even Ahrar al-Sham Movement and other Islamic factions, which were previously with them in the Army of Conquest.

Enab Baladi contacted the spokesperson for the Syrian Islamic Council to inquire about the possibility of implementing Sharia laws by any faction or military entity in Syria since 2012, or the legitimacy of one faction controlling the weapons of another and the related rulings, and the religious impact of HTS’ approach in Syria, but the spokesperson apologized due to “busyness”.

Enab Baladi also contacted the Media Relations Office at the Ministry of Information in the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) operating in Idlib (which is considered the political umbrella for HTS) to inquire about the possibility of implementing Sharia laws by any faction or military entity in Syria since 2012, or the legitimacy of one faction controlling the weapons of another and the related rulings, and Enab Baladi is still awaiting a response to its questions.

Negative impact

Dr. Bassam Sihyouni, a jurisprudence and law professor, told Enab Baladi that “it is not permissible to seize the weapons of a faction fighting to liberate its land from the regime,” noting that scholars have agreed on the prohibition of assaulting Muslims’ money and blood, and there is no legitimate justification for seizing the weapons and money of factions, even if we hypothetically assume there was “real rebellion.” Nevertheless, it is not permissible to seize their weapons and funds, as stated by the jurists of the recognized schools of thought.

Dr. Sihyouni, who played a role in establishing the Salvation Government and previously chaired the Shura Council in Idlib, explained to Enab Baladi that upon examining the arguments HTS leader al-Jolani relied on, they are merely pretexts for looting and controlling the scene. Over time, it is clear he fell into many of the accusations he used against others, clearly invalidating the arguments he used to deceive his soldiers and followers into fighting factions and seizing their weapons.

Al-Jolani significantly weakened the military power of the revolutionary factions, evidenced by the fall of large areas to the regime following each conflict, mainly due to the loss of the revolutionary base and the displacement of fighters from their land as happened in the countryside of Hama and other areas, according to Sihyouni.

The former HTS leader and cleric, Abu Yahya al-Shami, told Enab Baladi that “these are Sharia rulings whose implementation or lack thereof is not a matter of opinion, but Sharia itself governs considering the reality. I have always confirmed that implementing any ruling or imposing any punishment is not permissible except after a public trial with proper procedures under any circumstances, otherwise, what is the difference between a government and a gang?”

On Enab Baladi‘s question regarding the impact of the religious approach adopted by HTS on ruling Idlib and its areas of control, the former HTS leader stated that al-Nusra Front played two contradictory roles that served a united context.

The first role was “rigidity and takfir, repelling people from Islam,” and the second was leniency, permissiveness, and fighting the advocates of adherence and moderation.

This left a negative impact on society, dividing it against itself, and leading a large section to reject scholars and their calls due to the negative image implanted by al-Jolani initially and ultimately, in his fight against committed scholars.

Sharia to preserve the faction

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, under Abu Mohammad al-Jolani’s leadership, first appeared in January 2012, under the name “al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant,” and was a branch of the Islamic State in Iraq pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda.

However, al-Nusra Front, did not want to repeat the mistakes of the Islamic State of Iraq, according to a report by former al-Nusra Front leader Saleh al-Hamwi, including avoiding involvement in civilian affairs and administrations in “liberated” areas, leaving the area’s governance to locals, not highlighting foreign fighters in important positions, preventing them from interacting with locals, and avoiding conflict with any faction in Syria.

The internal conflict within al-Nusra Front between the al-Jolani wing (al-Nusra’s cadres in Syria) and the Iraq wing, led the Islamic State group to restrict al-Jolani and impose the status quo by announcing the establishment of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant on April 9, 2013, which was met the next day by al-Jolani’s rejection of the merger, confirming his allegiance to al-Qaeda and its former leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Conflict shifts the course

Before the declaration of allegiance to al-Qaeda, was different from after it. Al-Nusra Front enjoyed popularity in Syria in 2012 due to its operations against regime forces and staying away from civilian affairs. Even Syrians condemned its classification on terrorist lists in the Friday protests called “We Are All al-Nusra Front,” on December 14, 2012.

Leaders from the Syrian opposition like Moaz al-Khatib and George Sabra criticized the classification, considering it a local faction aiming at overthrowing the regime, refrains from defining itself as the Syrian arm of al-Qaeda, does not attract foreign fighters, and does not interfere in civilian affairs.

The conflict with the Islamic State and the declaration of allegiance to al-Qaeda caused al-Nusra Front to lose many of its members, which was met by al-Jolani and al-Nusra Front leadership with the announcement of the Islamic Emirate and Islamic Sharia to deter members from leaving its ranks, as noted by Saleh al-Hamwi.

Indeed, al-Jolani managed to curb the loss of members but led al-Nusra Front into a new phase characterized by confrontation with its supporting base and other military factions of various orientations.

From 2013 to early 2016, the situation remained the same for al-Nusra Front until, on July 28, 2016, it announced its separation from al-Qaeda and forming a faction called “Fateh al-Sham Front” after the inclusion of several factions.

The separation from al-Qaeda led many clerics and leaders within al-Nusra Front to break away from the faction consecutively, most notably “Abu Jleibib” and “Abu Hammam al-Souri” (Farouq al-Souri) and Sami al-Areidi.

A year later, al-Jolani and his leaders took another significant step in the group’s history, with a lasting impact by establishing Hayat Tahrir al-Sham on January 28, 2017, after merging with other factions, including the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement, Ansar al-Din Front, Jaish al-Sunnah, and Liwa al-Haqq. However, some of these factions eventually withdrew or clashed with the group.

Competitors’ retreat provided room for change

The competition of al-Nusra Front on the jihadi Salafist ideology in Syria was not limited to the Islamic State but extended to another faction called Jund al-Aqsa, which was one of the most prominent groups rivaling al-Nusra Front for attracting followers of jihadi Salafist thought.

However, the power of these groups declined consecutively, especially in 2017. A month after forming Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the group announced in February 2017 the elimination of Liwa al-Aqsa (remnants of Jund al-Aqsa in northwestern Syria), preceded by several of its fighters moving to the Islamic State controlled areas in the Raqqa province.

Saleh al-Hamwi believes that by eliminating Jund al-Aqsa and the decline of the Islamic State’s power, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham no longer faced competition on the ground (with the same ideology). Considering that HTS members had no real alternative allowing them to leave the faction, the group leaders became “bolder in making organizational and ideological changes.”

Al-Jolani continued his pragmatic approach by trying to convince his members after Turkey entered areas under their control that HTS is not a problem for Turkey, and the peaceful stance toward Turkey does not contradict Sharia.

“No transnational jihad nor hostility to the West”..

“Sunni entity” in Idlib

In 2020, al-Jolani’s talk about abandoning transnational jihadist aspirations and focusing solely on governing the area under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham control was enough to chart a path towards rapprochement with the West. This was preceded by his 2019 announcement of a new phase focused on fighting Iran and Russia.

The matter went beyond not being hostile to the West, reaching cooperation and coordination with some countries and their intelligence agencies. This was confirmed by the issue of the “treason” file, which shook the pillars of Tahrir al-Sham and toppled its top leadership. The repercussions led to the defection of the third man, Jihad Issa al-Sheikh (Abu Ahmad Zakour), and the imprisonment of the second man Abu Maria al-Qahtani before he was acquitted. He was then assassinated last April.

Al-Jolani needed a religious narrative that highlighted his strategic shifts and his move towards “Syrianizing” the faction, something undertaken by several religious figures, notably Mazhar al-Wais, Abdul Rahim Attoun, and al-Qahtani (before his imprisonment and assassination). These scholars of the Tahrir al-Sham appear after every political or military event to define the vision and position of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, using methods and vocabulary derived from the Islamic discourse, providing a religious aura and ideological extension to the rhetoric of mobilization and persuasion, according to research conducted by specialist researcher Azzam al-Kassir.

“A Sunni entity”

The term “Sunni entity” was not new to the region; it was first mentioned by al-Jolani in 2016, followed by mentions of the same entity twice in 2022 and 2023. However, its resonance was stronger in 2024 when it was brought up by journalist Ahmad Muaffaq Zaidan during a seminar at the book fair, posing the question, “Why don’t we also accept the Sunni entity identity in Idlib out of necessity?”

Zaidan later appeared in a filmed interview, during which he stated that the term is not new as he frequently uses it in the “Khaldunian tribal Sunni political” sense, meant to rally Sunnis everywhere, rather than implying any geographic or divisive interpretations.

Preacher and Sheikh Abdul Razzaq al-Mahdi expressed the concern that a formal declaration of the “Sunni entity” on this small piece of land might prompt the regime to recognize it, resulting in cooperation with Iran, even gradually, to empty Sunni areas, especially rebellious regions in Daraa and Homs, displacing their inhabitants to Idlib and northern Aleppo.

The Syrian Islamic Council warned of the dangers associated with the use of the term “Sunni entity,” expressing dissatisfaction with its circulation as it threatens Syria’s unity, entails significant injustice to Muslims, and contributes to the establishment of entities on sectarian bases, such as Kurdish, Alawite, or Druze entities.

What about minorities?

Over the years, the demographic diversity that once characterized the city of Idlib has decreased. The city used to be a mosaic of ethnic, doctrinal, and sectarian pluralism. According to estimates, the city used to have around 3,000 Christians in the center of Idlib city, as well as in the villages of Yaqoubiya, Quniya, and Jadida in Jisr al-Shughour. There were also approximately 13,000 Druze in 18 villages, the most notable ones being Kaftin, Kfar Bani, Bnabel, Qalb Lawzeh, Kfarkila, Abrita, and Jad’in. However, their numbers have significantly decreased due to violations and the resulting fears among them.

According to the Minority Affairs Office in the Salvation Government, the government is working to rebuild a shattered community greatly affected by the conflict and chaos of the past thirteen years, which left wounds still in the process of healing.

The Minorities Office stated that significant efforts are being made to enhance inclusivity and understand the concerns of these minorities, ensuring that all people living in the area have their rights protected. This effort is seen as a significant incentive for residents to return to their areas.

A source from Jisr al-Shughour told Enab Baladi that before 2011, about 1,000 Christian families lived in three villages (Quniya, Yaqoubiya, Jadida). Today, only around 200 elderly families remain.

A local source from the village of Kaftin, from the Druze sect, told Enab Baladi that residents lived in fear over the past years, careful not to go out at night unless absolutely necessary to avoid assaults or killings. However, following al-Jolani’s visit to the Jabal al-Summaq area in 2022, the situation improved slightly, with HTS returning homes and land seized from some residents, except for those found guilty of violations or involved with regime forces or its affiliated militias (Shabbiha).

Despite this, fears remain, and Druze individuals prefer not to mention their sect and instead claim they have converted to Islam. The local source noted that the increase in Druze numbers is due to births over the past years.

Violations against members of different sects and religions in areas under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham based on religious grounds continue, albeit at reduced rates compared to the past.

The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) estimates that the vast majority of civilian Christian properties in Idlib province, whose owners are outside areas controlled by Tahrir al-Sham, have been seized by the HTS or their relatives have been prevented from overseeing them.

A massacre in the village of Qalb Lawzeh in northern Idlib on June 10, 2015, marked a turning point in the history of the Druze community in Idlib. Around 25 individuals in the village were killed by members of al-Nusra Front, who justified a few days later that some elements participated in the incident without directives from their commanders and that it was an unjustified mistake.

A month after the massacre, al-Jolani assured the protection of Druze and Christian villages in Idlib countryside, and he stated Islamic preachers would be sent to their villages to clarify their mistakes, as he described.

Some incidents have reflected changes in Tahrir al-Sham policies and views towards minorities. Al-Jolani’s meetings with Druze figures from Jabal al-Summaq villages in northern Idlib countryside during the inauguration of a water well project on June 9, 2022, promised to address any injustice.

On July 19, 2022, al-Jolani visited residents of Quniya, Yaqoubiya, and Jadida, followers of the Christian faith in southern Idlib. This was followed by the reopening of the St. Anne Church in Yaqoubiya village in western Idlib, for the first time since opposition factions took control of the area, on August 28, 2022, attended by dozens of people without any comment from Tahrir al-Sham.

Public morals

Management of halal and haram

This approach has strengthened some concepts and imposed certain decisions for religious reasons to implement “Sharia rulings and avoid violating them,” either by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham or its political umbrella, the Salvation Government. These drifts also fueled calls from Salvation Government’s jurists to take action in banning events or closing restaurants and facilities for “violating Sharia”.

The latest instance was the Paralympic Games event organized by the Violet organization in the municipal stadium in Idlib, which sparked widespread controversy in August. Clerics and preachers described it as an “abomination, pagan culture, and disbelief,” including Abdul Razzak al-Mahdi and Mousslih al-Alyani, calling for the immediate activation of the Hisba (moral policing) apparatus.

The controversy prompted the Salvation Government to summon the organization, issue a warning, and direct them to suspend all activities, considering what happened in the event was contrary to culture, customs, and traditions, followed by a decision prohibiting any event from being held without its approval.

Only God has the authority to declare something forbidden

In an April 2023 meeting, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani stated that only God has the authority to declare something forbidden, and the authority on earth has the right to prohibit actions and manage what is halal and haram, asserting that prohibitions require definitive evidence and proof.

Al-Jolani added that the presence of an executioner at the court doors or a preacher in the markets is a “trivialization of Sharia,” emphasizing the existence of a “general morals police” and an Interior Ministry dealing with violations, which has directives for restaurants and cafes, regulating them within a particular framework.

Early this year, Enab Baladi obtained an unofficial copy of the “Public Ethics Law” project of the Salvation Government, containing 128 articles and divided into five sections that include a set of rules and provisions related to the moral and behavioral system of individuals in Idlib.

The prohibited religious actions stipulated by the Salvation Government include prohibiting blasphemy towards God, the prophets, and religion, demeaning Islamic rituals, symbols, and scholars, prohibiting witchcraft, fortune-telling, and palm reading, prohibiting public eating during Ramadan, prohibiting the opening of shops during Friday prayers, and prohibiting girls aged twelve and above from going out without wearing a covering dress.

Sections on public ethics violations include prohibiting gender mixing unless proven to be close relatives (mahrams), prohibiting musical instruments and audiovisual displays “that violate religion and decency,” and prohibiting smoking in public and service institutions, hospitals, medical centers, pharmacies, and transportation.

 

The Leadership of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham aims to achieve its interests through an approach that ensures such interests. If circumstances require rigidity and renewing the declaration of takfir, its leaders will quickly revert to it. Conversely, if needs dictate leniency and westernization, they will shift accordingly.

Abu Yahya al-Shami, Former jurist and leader in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

 

A generation of jurists

Darat al-Wahi al-Shareef schools are increasingly prevalent in Idlib province, bearing the slogan “Towards a Unique Quranic Generation.” Supported by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, these schools thrive as public schools face shortages in books and lack of support, amid ongoing teachers’ protests for years.

These schools, founded at the end of 2017, have expanded in Idlib’s cities and towns, reaching 13,500 students (7,000 boys and 6,500 girls) in 2021. They aim to:

• Act on the Prophet’s saying, “The best among you are those who learn the Quran and teach it.”
• Master the memorization and sciences of the Quran and live by it.
• Build scientifically and educationally qualified generations to advance the region’s society.
• Instill human and ethical values in students’ minds.

Transformations leading to new realities in Idlib

Fadel Khanji, an assistant researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, stated that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has ideologically reinvented itself, balancing its radical background with the pragmatic necessity of managing local community relations as an administrative authority, while presenting a different image to the outside world.

Khanji told Enab Baladi that this situation led the group to take steps forward and backward based on internal dynamics, primarily the continuous presence of a radical faction pushing for the imposition of “Islamist ideologization” on society.

Pragmatic salafism

The researcher of jihadist groups, Hassan Abu Haniya, told Enab Baladi that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has become hostile to global jihadism after its disengagement from al-Qaeda, whether in its war against Huras al-Din (currently al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria) or the Islamic State group.

Abu Haniya explained that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham adopts a religious approach or policy, considering it as a local movement focused on its activities solely in Syria.

In the end, it has reached this point as a “pragmatic Salafist movement that adapts according to changes,” but remains local without an impact on global jihad. It resembles a dictatorial authoritarian regime, similar to those in the region, according to Abu Haniya. Therefore, there is certainly no democracy; rather, it is an authoritarian movement that controls through the power of arms.

On both political and regional levels, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is considered the lesser of evils for regional and international policies. This led it to renounce global jihad and attempt to portray itself solely as a local movement confronting the regime. It tried to court the International Coalition, particularly the United States, to be removed from the terrorist lists. However, this did not succeed because the United States views it as a “radical” religious movement, making it difficult to accept or legitimize it and also to remove it from the terrorist lists, which Abu Haniya ruled out.

On the regional level, Iran deals with Tahrir al-Sham as an adversary. Despite some level of engagement, Turkey still classifies it as a terrorist movement. Thus, Abu Haniya noted that “al-Jolani’s calculated pragmatic approach” has not changed the international and regional perception of the group, although it has been accepted as the best reality on the ground.

With no acceptance of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda organizations and even other weak movements, and with al-Jolani’s calculated pragmatism within this complex reality in northwestern Syria, there has emerged a form of “necessity legitimacy” rather than legal or political legitimacy, according to Abu Haniya.

Abu Haniya mentioned that all changes made by al-Jolani after disengaging from al-Qaeda served everyone’s interests, including the regime and Russia. When Hay’t Tahrir al-Sham fights against the Islamic State or Huras al-Din, it pleases the United States and its allies, as well as Turkey, Iran, Russia, and the regime.

Playing on contradictions

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham tries to play on existing contradictions so far, with no clear solutions in the future. Therefore, its future is dependent on the change in this regional and international situation. It strengthens its power and will not allow any force to challenge its authority in this region, according to Abu Haniya.

HTS imposes local Salafist religious policies and this calculated pragmatic Salafism will not turn into a democratic or liberal group. It will continue to impose its control due to the absence of any solution for Syria or regional and international alternatives, and the lack of any power in northwestern Syria capable of removing or imposing fundamental changes in al-Jolani’s perceptions within the framework of Salafism. It cannot go beyond that.

Dr. Bassem Sihyouni, who contributed to establishing the Salvation Government, also pointed out that what al-Jolani is doing is pragmatic operations driven not by a change in religious approach but by an interest-based approach, with tools changing as interests shift and change.

When al-Jolani needed “takfir” fatwas, he sought those who could excommunicate factions under the pretext of cooperating with outsiders. When interests change, the approach shifts to another calling for openness. He may resort to using “takfir” again against specific individuals or groups for political rather than religious purposes.

Sihyouni explained to Enab Baladi that the open-minded tolerate differing views, and what we see from the closure of religious institutes (like al-Shatibi Institute) simply due to disagreement indicates absolute pragmatism. A non-extreme person should allow for the intellectual diversity that the Islamic history is rich with, not close schools and prevent preachers and teachers who hold differing opinions.

Sihyouni considered the absolute authoritarianism in decisions, such as the decision of peace and war and the arbitrary control over institutions, based on loyalty to al-Jolani and not acting except within his opinion and policy, disabling consultation and supervision, strictly controlling financial resources — which are the right of the people and the revolution — and keeping their expenditures concealed.

This is followed by the control over the security and military forces that the faction may use to suppress, imprison, and beat protesters, seize media platforms, track journalists, and other oppressive practices known to all. These actions are similar to those of unjust tyrants, not the actions of wise and righteous people, according to Dr. Bassem Sihyouni.

Authority as the basis for change

Hassan Barid

Former leader in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

Organizations, groups, and states usually form around ideas and principles that gather people who believe in them and are willing to sacrifice for them. Rarely do groups emerge without a unifying idea that brings people together who believe in it.

It’s rare for a group, government, or state to form based on the principle of authority and money, except in the case of the existing governments in the Arab world, which fundamentally do not represent their people or think about their interests.

This introduction is crucial to understand whether there are principles and ideas related to religion or Sharia that made Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and before it al-Nusra Front the reason for the actions, orientations, and international relations that Tahrir al-Sham established even at the beginning of its formation.

Tahrir al-Sham was not established on fixed thought or firm principles around which those who work for or support it gather. Instead, it was a matter of emotions played upon by the leadership of Tahrir al-Sham, especially al-Jolani.

At the start of the revolution, the youth were thirsty for religion and enraged by anything connected to the Baath Party. This is the point from which al-Jolani launched. In this environment, he gathered all cadres and fighters around him as well as some elites. The slogans of liberating al-Aqsa and death to the United States were popular commodities at that time.

For the first time, and even during his disagreement with al-Baghdadi, al-Jolani’s departure from the latter’s umbrella was not for the interest of the nation, jihad, or the revolution, but purely for power and prestige. This was proven later through re-examining the experience of al-Nusra Front and al-Jolani’s previous statements and those around him.

In this context, it was necessary to criticize and attack all factions not following al-Nusra’s approach, whether they were Islamist factions or resistance factions. Fatwas permitting bloodshed travelled across borders, fueled by the experience of Iraq and “the Awakening” project, which was the bogeyman that al-Jolani used to frighten his followers.

The driving force behind the aggression and fight against factions was power, the love of accumulating wealth, and the exclusive representation for states by al-Jolani, while the fighters and elements were moved by the ideology that they were the only Islamic project.

Later, it became clear that these justifications were outright lies and deceit, as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham demolished everything it initially stood for.