Enab Baladi – Hussam al-Mahmoud

After the Syrian street split during the onset of the Syrian revolution in 2011, between an opposition public demanding political change and the departure of Syrian regime’s President Bashar al-Assad, and a faction clinging to the current regime and defending it, this division created a relatively confined “partisan” atmosphere between two groups of one people. In recent months, a divergence of views has emerged within the regime’s close circle regarding Iran, al-Assad’s ally and crucial supporter alongside Russia in maintaining his position of power.

This divergence has been highlighted by a group of activists supporting the Syrian regime, coinciding with a continuous wave of Israeli escalation and relentless airstrikes on sites within Syria by the Israeli Air Force.

Bashar Barhoum, a coastal Syrian activist who fiercely defends the Syrian regime in his video recordings, believes that anyone dealing with Iran is a traitor at all levels, describing Iran as an enemy and Israel as an aggressor. He claims that Qassem Soleimani displaced more Syrians than Israel displaced Palestinians in 1948, urging people to avoid any Iranian individuals they encounter.

In a video call with the Al-Mashhad channel at the end of last April, Barhoum stated that he represents the pulse of the Syrian street, not the government, also speaking about Iran’s suspicious role in Syria and noting that Gaza unveiled the true face of the so-called “Iranian Islamic Revolution.” He argued that the Safavid project was more dangerous than the Iranian project.

On the other side, there are also pro-regime Syrian voices expressing adherence to Iran’s role and presence, seeing the relationship between Damascus and Tehran as a “friendship” rather than a colonial expansion as perceived by the first faction. This includes activists like Alaa Mohammed and Syrian actor Maen Abdul Haq, who attacked Bashar Barhoum, accusing him of colluding with Israel to target Iranians in Syria.

Signs of coldness

The rise of these voices has been bolstered by the ongoing Israeli war on Gaza since October 7, 2023, which has resulted in over 40,000 Palestinian deaths and the displacement of about 80% of the 2.2 million Palestinians residing in the strip, with vast areas completely destroyed.

The raging war in the besieged sector for 17 years has been met with intense Iranian support, but only through statements, threats, and warnings. The slogans of “Death to Israel” did not stop any rockets, bombs, or shells from the thousands that fell on Gaza. These voices are also influenced by a noticeable shift in official relations between Iran and the Syrian regime while Iran appears to be an obstacle in projects the regime wishes to complete or severed political relations it aims to restore, as highlighted in the Jordanian Initiative, which called for the regime to implement several changes and offered other matters in return.

According to Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper on May 6, Iran suspects that Syrian regime’s President Bashar al-Assad is willing to make a potential deal with the West against it.

The newspaper added that Iran sensed this closeness between al-Assad and the West because al-Assad adopted a relatively moderate stance regarding the Gaza conflict. It noted that indications of a rift between Tehran and Damascus surfaced after Israel bombed the Iranian consulate in Damascus in early April, causing the deaths of three senior Iranian officers, including Major General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a leader in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Jarida published a report quoting the Supreme National Council of Security in Iran, indicating that Iranian security agencies submitted a report to the council on the possible involvement of the Syrian regime in leaking information to Israel, contributing to the assassination of senior Iranian leaders in Syria.

Division linked to violence

The tug-of-war and division on the nature of this relationship cast a shadow on the Syrian community, controlled by ongoing Iranian presence in some areas, accompanied by settlement attempts in neighborhoods and residential areas, as well as transferring religious rituals from places of worship to streets and public roads, imposing them on the original residents in their environment.

Sociologist Aisha Abdul Malik explained to Enab Baladi that this type of division might manifest on the ground more through the formation of groups or entities not aligned in their loyalties according to their motivations.

The researcher also pointed out that the prolonged stay of Iranian families in Syria contributed to the emergence of Iranian children in Syria. After a period of mingling, there might be a case of affection or acceptance towards this group or that, leading some locals to lean towards one group due to overlapping interests and sectarian affiliation, generating confusion and conflicts within the community.

According to an article from the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies by Hamza Rastanawi, pre-revolution social division was characterized by supporters of the regime for reasons related to class origin or opportunistic reasons, or aspirations for social status, while the opposition included individuals with various backgrounds.

If political division wasn’t the foremost marker in pre-2011 Syria, it was due to the absence of freedom and the modern concept of a political society, leading to more vivid sectarian, ethnic, and regional divisions. This made the political division in the Syrian case, to a large extent, a reflection of these prior divisions.

In 2011, political division became present in towns, villages, and neighborhoods, between young forces excited for political change, which were non-ideological yet not immune to Islamic ideological influences, and forces defending the regime for narrow interests, often aiming to spare the country the expected disastrous outcomes of the conflict.

The boundaries of political division do not align with identity division boundaries (sectarian, ethnic, or familial); the political aspect changes according to circumstances and interests, but identity affiliation is difficult to change. The level of political division in the community is also related to the level of violence; the more violent the conflict, the more apparent the political division.

In the past 11 months, during the Gaza war, Israel has launched uninterrupted raids on Syrian sites and others in Lebanon, targeting and destroying the Iranian embassy, killing Iranian leaders, and assassinating leaders in Hezbollah and Ismail Haniyeh in Iran. Responses from the Axis of Resistance have varied from retaliatory strikes that caused no casualties to threats that did not match the pretext for targeting, illustrating the connection between increased division and the level of violence.