Enab Baladi – Ali Darwish

Almost daily, elements of regime forces near the front lines in northwestern Syria receive orders to launch suicide drones controlled via remote devices. They target both civilians and military personnel before directing the drone towards the target and detonating it.

On the other side, civilians rush for any shelter upon hearing or spotting the drone, or receiving an alert from observation posts, adding a new imminent danger to other types of bombardments, such as long-range precision shells, artillery, rocket launchers, and airstrikes.

Military factions in the region, organized under the al-Fath al-Mubin Operations Room, have adopted initial methods to repel these drones, according to analysts interviewed by Enab Baladi. While these methods have mitigated the drone attacks’ impact on the factions’ movements, civilians remain the biggest losers in these attacks.

Al-Fath al-Mubin is responsible for overseeing military operations in the region and includes several military factions, most notably Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the National Liberation Front.

Measures to repel drone attacks

Suicide drone attacks mainly focus on the southern and eastern countryside of Idlib, the northern countryside of Hama (al-Ghab Plain), and the western countryside of Aleppo, with less frequency in the mountains of Latakia. All these areas are militarily managed by al-Fath al-Mubin.

The regime forces and Russia have intensified their use of suicide drones against opposition areas since the beginning of the year, causing casualties and losses among civilians. However, the rate of military losses has decreased, according to a field commander in al-Fath al-Mubin who spoke to Enab Baladi. This is in addition to what Enab Baladi has observed from factions’ profiles and video clips published by accounts affiliated with the regime on social media.

Enab Baladi contacted al-Fath al-Mubin Operations Room to inquire about their preparations or military tactics to repel suicide drones or reduce their impact, but it declined to answer, preferring to keep the information confidential for military reasons.

The field commander of al-Fath al-Mubin mentioned to Enab Baladi that the operations room has taken some basic measures, like changing shifts at specific times when drones are not present. In the event of drone activity, their personnel refrain from using vehicles until the airspace is clear.

Additional fortifications have been implemented at military points but are deemed insufficient, according to the commander. Nets have been placed in some forward positions to prevent drones from reaching targets.

The commander added that the new fortifications and the use of nets proved effective in coastal areas due to the dense forest cover. However, in other sectors, especially open and sparsely vegetated areas, the impact was less pronounced.

Regarding the use of metal nets on vehicles for drone protection, as seen in Ukraine, the commander indicated that this method is not significantly effective in northwestern Syria because personnel move in vehicles, and an explosive shell would still harm the occupants.

Key role of military observatories

Military observation points in the region play a crucial role in mitigating the impact of suicide drones by tracking launches and issuing warnings.

According to Observatory 80 (Abu Amin), specialized in tracking aircraft movement in the area, the observation points issue warnings of Russian reconnaissance planes (before the launch of suicide drones) and alert if suicide drones head to a specific area.

The observatories advise civilians in targeted areas to use hunting rifles to shoot at drones, avoid vehicles during drone overflights, and limit movements.

In areas close to the front lines, the observatories recommend that residents move at night since the current suicide drones cannot conduct night attacks, and use valleys and low-lying areas to cut off the drone signals.

Observatories also advise against immediately heading to targeted areas, as the regime tends to launch multiple drones to the same location.

Military solutions

Brigadier General (Pilot) Asaad al-Zoubi emphasizes that before executing any military tactics on the ground, communication engineers in northwestern Syria and those working in military and civilian telecommunications must understand the operating frequencies of the drones, whether it’s the communication frequency between operation centers and launch points or the drone frequency during its flight.

Al-Zoubi told Enab Baladi that communication engineers are best equipped to identify the operating frequencies of the drones and the waves they function on, enabling them to assess their jamming capabilities.

Additionally, it is essential to have engineers who understand the drone’s structure and operational mechanics, especially regarding distance.

According to al-Zoubi, the initial and best military tactic involves striking the drones at their launch sites, criticizing the narrow perspective of the factions on this issue.

He explained, “Apparently, they lack sufficient reconnaissance tools for surveillance and combat maneuvering to identify a specific horizontal area. Any movement on the other side or any projectile or drone emerging should be detected so that the site can be immediately addressed with direct fire – a well-established military science concept, offering a response to such attacks.”

Al-Fath al-Mubin publishes videos of artillery and rocket strikes on regime positions, especially following regime and allied attacks on opposition-held areas.

Al-Zoubi also mentioned using hunting rifles to repel drone attacks, stressing the importance of intensifying this method to form a “fire barrier” against drones, increasing the chances of pellets hitting the drone.

The “fire barrier” technique was used by the Iraqi army in 1991 to repel swarms of American coalition aircraft by deploying numerous anti-aircraft guns and firing heavily into the skies over Baghdad and other Iraqi cities, increasing the chances of projectiles hitting aircraft by 20%.

Al-Zoubi noted that in northwestern Syria, deploying numerous machine guns to deal with drones is unfeasible due to logistical constraints. However, hunting rifles can create a sort of “fire barrier,” enhancing the likelihood of striking drones.

The more hunting rifles there are, the bigger the “fire barrier.” Civilians previously told Enab Baladi they need more attention from de facto authorities to provide ammunition for hunting rifles.

Activists have circulated videos of civilians targeting drones before they explode with pump-action shotguns, claiming this method has sometimes been effective in preventing drones from reaching their targets after being spotted or warned by observatories.

Yet, these drones sometimes operate in groups (2 to 4 drones in one location), requiring a larger number of rifles and more substantial firepower.

Another tactic mentioned by al-Zoubi involves erecting poles and connecting nets between them to cover a seating area, military point, or meeting place. If a drone approaches, it could either hit the net and explode or get entangled in it. Alternatively, a fishing net could be mechanically elevated from the ground as the drone approaches.

Al-Zoubi pointed out that these initial tactics could be beneficial until the drones’ frequencies are identified or electronic guidance devices are obtained. “These measures may not fully address the issue but can mitigate the losses.”

If there are specialists in wireless communications, they could generate signals matching the drone frequencies to jam and cancel their attacks and explosions.

Drone specialist researcher Ali Salloum told Enab Baladi that defensive systems against drones should be developed or acquired based on electronic jamming and counter-drone attacks.

Advancing danger

Pilot Major Yousef Hammoud warned about the dangers of the regime upgrading suicide drones to strike deeper areas, noting that current regime and Russian practices are experimental due to the halt in ground military operations.

Observatory 80 clarified that suicide drones are launched from dugouts and forward regime positions on front lines with opposition factions.

The military brigades operating and launching these drones near the front lines belong to regime forces, including the Republican Guard, Fifth Corps, and 25th Division. These groups are closely associated with the Russians or receive direct support from them. The Fifth Corps was formed by Russia, and notable Russian support for the 25th Division includes military training, such as drone operations.

Drone operators receive orders from joint operations rooms between Russians and regime forces, including operations rooms in the villages of Kafr Halab and al-Bawabiyah in the western Aleppo countryside, with Kafr Halab and Mizanaz villages and the 46th Regiment being key targeting points according to Observatory 80.

Suicide drones are preceded by reconnaissance operations conducted by Russian UAVs.

The effective range of suicide drones currently reaches nine kilometers. There are two types; one has a range of three and a half kilometers, while the other reaches up to nine kilometers. Manufacturing efforts are underway to extend this range to 11 or 12 kilometers, as reported by Observatory 80.

The drones used by the regime vary, some being manufactured, modified, or locally assembled. The payload also varies depending on the target (vehicles, dugouts, fortified houses, infantry), carrying vacuum shells or explosives like TNT and C4.

Deadly weapons

Researcher Nawar Shaaban from the Omran Center for Strategic Studies emphasized that stricter global rules on selling and modifying commercial drones should be enforced to prevent misuse, enhancing monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to detect illegal drone modifications and deployments in conflict zones.

In a previous report, Shaaban revealed that the regime and Iranian militias have used modified commercial drones from China and Hong Kong as deadly weapons, including “iFlight XL10 V6” and “TBS Discovery” drones.

Modifications include improved payload capacity and targeting mechanisms, integrating explosive devices, guidance systems, and remote detonation capabilities for precise attacks.

The regime and Iranian militias acquire these drones through online purchases and smuggling.

Hassan al-Hassan, a Syria Civil Defence (White Helmets) official, previously told Enab Baladi that the only effective way to mitigate the impact of drones is through accountability, emphasizing that only accountability can limit drone impacts.

Al-Hassan stated, “Civilians cannot face these killing tools, and suicide drones represent a new dangerous approach to attacks.”

Sometimes, taking shelter is ineffective, as Civil Defence teams have documented drone attacks that pursued victims inside their homes.

Al-Hassan stressed the urgent need for international cooperation to establish clear guidelines and protocols regarding the use of suicide drones in armed conflicts and to prevent the development of autonomous targeting capabilities.

Countries must ensure that their procedures comply with international legal obligations, particularly those outlined in international humanitarian law, to mitigate these weapons’ risks and support civilian protection.