Enab Baladi – Hussam al-Mahmoud

On September 10, the Arab League convened a foreign ministers’ meeting, with Turkish participation for the first time in 13 years, represented by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.

As soon as Fidan began his speech during the meeting, the Syrian regime delegation, headed by Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad, left the hall. This move re-emphasized the lack of tangible progress in the path of rapprochement between Turkey and the Syrian regime.

The regime’s delegation left the hall after agreeing to Turkey’s participation in the meeting. A day before the ministerial meeting held in the Egyptian capital, Cairo, and coinciding with the announcement of Turkey’s participation, the Middle East Eye website quoted a source saying that Syria (referring to the Syrian regime) agreed to Fidan’s participation.

For his part, Mekdad commented on this political move on September 12, asserting that there would be no dealings with the Turkish side until the regime’s demands are met.

Commenting on the withdrawal of the regime’s delegation at the start of Fidan’s speech, Mekdad clarified that if Turkey wants new steps in Syrian-Turkish cooperation and for relations to return to normal, it must “withdraw from the Arab territories it occupies in northern Syria and western Iraq.”

International relations researcher Mahmoud Alloush considered Mekdad’s boycott of the Turkish foreign minister’s speech a political stunt designed to send two messages. The first message to Ankara conveyed that Damascus is ready to begin normalization negotiations with Turkey but won’t abandon the demand for Turkish withdrawal from Syria.

The second message was directed at the Arab countries, expressing discontent with the Arab rapprochement with Turkey. The regime had bet on the Arabs not normalizing relations with Turkey before the Turkish withdrawal from northern Syria, as explained by the researcher to Enab Baladi.

Contradicting Lavrov’s statements

Mekdad’s talk about responding to demands conflicted with statements from Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. At the end of August, Lavrov announced preparations for a new meeting to normalize relations between Turkey and the regime, affirming that it would be held soon.

In an interview with Russia’s RT, Lavrov said, “Last year, we managed, albeit with difficulty, to hold talks where we explored conditions to move towards normalizing relations between Syria and Turkey. These talks were useful even though we couldn’t agree on moving forward.”

According to the Russian minister, the Syrian government (referring to the regime) believes that continuing the normalization process requires defining measures for the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syria. The Turks are ready for this, but no specific criteria have been agreed upon so far.

Lavrov’s statements, which hinted at resolving the stalemate from its initial launch on December 28, 2022, and a subsequent point in May last year, were met with unofficial counter messages from the Syrian regime. On September 4, Syrian sources confirmed to the Al-Mayadeen channel the lack of Turkish guarantees regarding Ankara’s willingness to discuss withdrawing its forces from northern Syria.

The sources also indicated the absence of any indicators warranting a ministerial or presidential-level meeting between Turkey and the Syrian regime soon.

The Syrian regime’s stance on the withdrawal issue and the “reference” set by Bashar al-Assad for normalizing relations seemed distant from Ankara’s rhetoric ignoring the regime’s “discontent” state. Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler, at the end of last August, said it was in the interest of Damascus and Ankara to end the conflict and resume relations, dismissing any insoluble issues.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan believes that the new steps his country is taking with Egypt and Syria aim to create solidarity against the “increasing threat of Israeli expansionism.”

On September 7, Erdoğan said, “Israel will not stop in Gaza; if it continues like this, after occupying Ramallah, it will target other countries in the region, Lebanon and Syria, and then set its sights on Turkey.”

On September 10, after Erdoğan spoke about forming an “Islamic alliance” against Israel, the Syrian foreign minister expressed hope in fulfilling Erdoğan’s remarks about forming a Syrian-Egyptian-Turkish solidarity axis to face threats. He emphasized the importance of the Turkish president retreating from his current policies, as this would benefit both sides in unifying efforts.

Exchanged messages.. What’s new?

Mekdad’s withdrawal and departure from the hall coinciding with Fidan’s speech is not a unique event within the framework of exchanged messages between the rapprochement parties. During the Syrian regime president Bashar al-Assad’s speech at the emergency Arab summit that turned into a joint Arab-Islamic summit on October 11, 2023, Erdoğan left the hall. Turkey’s representation was followed by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who removed his translation headphones and focused on his mobile phone, expressing indifference. However, what’s different in the general path, as remarked by Mekdad in response to the situation, is the regime’s official address of the issue of Turkish withdrawal not only from northern Syria but also from Iraq, despite Turkish-Iraqi understandings regarding military coordination between the two sides.

On August 22, the Turkish presidency denied claims of an agreement between Baghdad and Ankara to end the Turkish military presence on Iraqi soil, following reports that the recent security agreement signed between the two countries included a clause to end Turkish forces’ presence in Iraq, according to the Turkish Anadolu Agency.

Ankara confirmed that such a clause wasn’t mentioned in the “memorandum of understanding on military and security coordination and combating terrorism” signed between Turkey and Iraq on August 15, noting that the two countries will establish a joint training and cooperation center in Bashiqa (northern Iraq), “allowing the elimination of threats posed by terrorist organizations to the sovereignty of both countries, their security, and regional security.”

The memorandum also stipulates the establishment of a joint security coordination center in Baghdad, managed by two generals from Turkey and Iraq, to include civilian staff. The number and type of personnel and operational methods will be determined through technical consultations.

Researcher Mahmoud Alloush does not consider Mekdad’s talk about Turkish withdrawal from Arab lands as a new proposal. Damascus aims to give an Arab dimension to the normalization process with Turkey in hopes of gaining Arab world support in this path.

According to the researcher, the regime’s demands from normalization haven’t changed. Despite these demands, this doesn’t mean Damascus is not ready to start negotiations. Its recent messages indicate readiness to enter this process even before Turkey agrees on a withdrawal timetable from Syria.

Baghdad tried months ago to mediate between Ankara and Damascus, culminating in Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani’s attempts to host meetings between officials from both sides in Baghdad. This came after he revealed on May 31 about a future Iraqi role to achieve “reconciliation” between Turkey and the Syrian regime. However, talk of an Iraqi role gradually faded as the Russian mediation re-emerged, with Iran aiming to reengage in the path.

Assad and Erdoğan meeting

After the Syrian regime president presented what he considered a “reference” for normalizing relations during his speech in the People’s Assembly weeks ago, Turkish media picked up on al-Assad’s remarks and saw it as an openness to rapprochement, sparking speculation of a near meeting between Erdoğan and al-Assad.

Talk of the meeting, once a subject in Turkish and Russian media and among Turkish politicians’ statements, has recently declined in public discourse. Nevertheless, the issue of rapprochement remains present in the exchanged statements and hints.

Researcher Mahmoud Alloush doesn’t see a decline in talk about the meeting but rather a sensitivity to the political realism Ankara is displaying in this context. “It is unimaginable for a meeting to occur between the two sides without an understanding on the principles of normalization. This doesn’t mean a meeting is impossible, as statements are one thing and reality is another. Between statements and reality, there are efforts and mediations by Russia and the involvement of Arab countries like Egypt and the UAE in behind-the-scenes diplomacy between the two sides to facilitate a meeting or launch the negotiation process.”

“The most important thing is reaching an agreement on the principles of normalization; such an agreement indicates both sides’ readiness to engage in the process,” said Alloush.

The rapprochement path between Turkey and the Syrian regime officially began on December 28, 2022, to restore political relations severed since 2011 due to the Syrian regime’s security crackdown on the 2011 popular uprising and Turkey’s support for the protests, then opposition factions, and their spread in northern Syria, along with Turkish-backed military formations.

After a series of meetings at foreign ministers’ and deputy foreign ministers’ levels and one involving defense ministers and intelligence chiefs from the four guarantors at the time (Turkey, the Syrian regime, Russia, and Iran), Moscow announced on January 29 the official breakdown of the rapprochement process between the two sides, as each side maintained a set of conditions they aimed to achieve from this rapprochement.