Enab Baladi – Hussam al-Mahmoud

For about a year, the Syrian regime’s efforts have continued to change the structure of the military institution, which has been affected by about 13 years of military operations, both in terms of personnel and equipment. This is in addition to the military aspect falling within the Arab demands on the Syrian regime to reach a political solution in Syria according to the Arab perspective.

During this period, the regime issued a set of laws and decrees, along with making statements and commitments to changes in this institution, which has been fully engaged in a direct confrontation with the people’s demands for political change and the overthrow of the regime in 2011. The regime also worked to expel its security and official presence from wide geographical areas, many of which it regained through the force of artillery and the intervention of allies.

Early this August, Syrian regime’s president Bashar al-Assad issued Legislative Decree No. “20”, amending Paragraph “W” of Article “26” within Legislative Decree “30” of 2007, which includes the Military Service Law. It came in three articles, the first of which amended the age of those eligible to pay the military exemption fee from 40 years to include anyone who has reached the age of 38.

The decree also introduced the possibility of paying an exemption fee of 3,000 US dollars if the medical examination shows that the person has a minimum or partial disability capable of performing the service, regardless of reaching any age.

The decree exempted volunteer soldiers who serve for ten years from the reserve service, according to the volunteer contracts (fighter contract) that were recently announced.

Researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Muhsen al-Mustafa, explained to Enab Baladi that the amendments brought by the decree did not address the age of reserve military service itself but rather Paragraph “W”, which allowed those eligible to pay a financial exemption fee (whether enlisted or not) to pay an amount of 4,800 US dollars or its equivalent in Syrian pounds, with a reduction of 200 dollars for each month of service the enlisted performs.

Paragraph “W” was added by Legislative Decree “37” of 2023.

The researcher interpreted the addition of Decree “20” to allow the payment of a reserve service exemption fee for disabled individuals (worth 3,000 dollars) as being in line with the regime’s current approach to presenting itself as providing more “care” to disabled citizens by allowing them to pay a lower fee than the one mentioned in Paragraph “W” of Article “26”. Additionally, expanding the age range of those who pay the exemption fee means greater financial returns for the regime.

Volunteer contracts

Volunteer contracts in the army appeared when the Ministry of Defense in the regime’s government announced its desire to enhance its human resources through “incentive-rich” volunteer contracts of a specified duration, under which the individual enlists as a non-commissioned officer.

The volunteer contract included two service periods, five years and ten years, with volunteer salaries reaching up to 1,300,000 Syrian pounds for both periods, with allowances (each dollar equals 14,800 pounds according to the specialized currency and gold monitoring site S-P Today). This is in addition to bonuses, including a starting service bonus, an annual bonus, and a non-refundable marriage grant of two million pounds.

These changes coincide with the regime forces entering a phase of relative undeclared calm due to the decline in the intensity of military operations in some provinces, currently focusing on using drones and missiles to target sites in northern Syria where Syrian armed opposition factions are concentrated, without engaging in continuous combat operations.

The Syrian regime issued a series of decisions related to the military institution and its personnel. The Director of the General Administration in the Ministry of Defense, Ahmad Suleiman, revealed in an interview with the Syrian Al-Ikhbariya channel on December 1, 2023, that there is a direction to establish a “modern and advanced professional army” by Assad’s decision, along with a gradual reduction in reserve service duration over the coming years to reach a sustainable solid block within the armed forces.

On June 26, a series of military decisions were issued, under which those completing five years of reserve service will be discharged at the end of this August. A similar discharge will be carried out at the end of October, before discharging those who complete four and a half years of mandatory service at the end of the year, and those who complete four years at the end of February 2025.

It is supposed that five discharge operations will be carried out during 2025, ending on October 31 of the same year, under which those who complete two years of reserve service will be discharged.

What does this step mean?

Reducing the age of those eligible to pay the reserve service exemption fee raises questions about the purpose of this step. Military analyst Tarek Haj Bakri sees that the primary reason for reducing the age (expanding the age range) of those eligible to pay the exemption fee lies in the cessation of battles aimed at toppling the regime. This happened after the “revolutionary factions” turned into “opposition factions,” giving the regime reassurance alongside the presence of guarantors, preventing the advancement to “liberate” cities under regime control.

According to an analytical article at the Omran Center for Strategic  Studies by researcher Muhsen al-Mustafa, published on August 6, entitled “Reserve Service in Syria: Transformations and Objectives,” the plan regarding reserve service is driven by an attempt to relieve social pressure within the regime-controlled areas, especially after extensive waves of migration, with reserve service being one of its causes, independent of other economic or social reasons.

The plan is also linked to the human complement ratio of the regime’s forces, with new recruits joining, or replacing discharged individuals with volunteers the military institution tried to attract through previously announced volunteer contracts aimed at drawing loyalist militia elements and integrating them as individuals, not as blocks, working to end the militias by drying up their human resources without touching their entity currently.

Additionally, the issue of the financial exemption creates a state of “taxation” that benefits the Ministry of Defense’s treasury. The exemption for reserve service, born in recent years, became available in 2020 for expatriates, and by the end of 2023 for residents in Syria who meet the age requirement.

Change in the military context: Sidestepping other issues

The Arab-driven Jordanian initiative that partially re-integrated the Syrian regime into its Arab surroundings more than a year ago did not directly stipulate the restructuring of the Syrian regime’s military forces.

The Jordanian initiative consists of three phases: short-term, medium-term, and long-term. Its second phase stipulates the withdrawal of Iranian forces from Syria, the reduction of their military presence, and the withdrawal of militias and Lebanese Hezbollah forces, along with engaging in reconciliation with the opposition.

The initiative’s third phase included the regime announcing the end of military operations related to the “armed conflict,” except for combat training against entities specified by the United Nations.

Some Arab demands included in the initiative have not found their way to implementation. On the contrary, they have worsened, like the issue of drug smuggling from Syrian territory to neighboring countries, specifically Jordan, Syria’s land gateway to the Gulf countries. Additionally, some accelerated steps within a series promoting changes that don’t directly affect people’s lives, came in contrast to the expected and planned solution according to the UN and international standards (resolution 2254). For example, the regime conducted parliamentary elections in mid-July amid the continuous disruption of the work of the Constitutional Committee, which should end with a new constitution followed by new elections leading to change.

Regarding the restructuring of the security institution, which appeared publicly at the beginning of this year officially, it has not translated on the ground in a way that serves people’s interests. Decisions issued by the Ministry of Interior last May (specifically aimed at changing some behaviors of the institution in dealing with specific security and civil cases related to citizens in those controlled areas) did not acknowledge the more than 136,000 detainees in Syrian regime prisons, according to estimates by the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR). Moreover, arrests continued, affecting 209 individuals last July, including 14 children and three women.