Enab Baladi – Yamen Moghrabi

Turkish movements towards Iraq have been active in recent months on both the diplomatic and military fronts, culminating in the announcement of the signing of agreements within the “strategic framework” between Baghdad and Ankara, at a time when the latter carried out an incursion into the Iraqi city of Dohuk last July.

The announcement of these agreements came at a critical time for the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and its military wing, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which have been engaged in military confrontations against auxiliary forces affiliated with the Syrian regime over the past week, primarily the Arab Tribal Forces.

Last March, Turkish officials held talks in Baghdad with Iraqi officials.

The Turkish delegation was then led by the Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, alongside the head of intelligence, Ibrahim Kalin, accompanied by the Defense Minister and the Deputy Minister of Interior.

On the Iraqi side were the Foreign Minister, Fuad Hussein, the Defense Minister, the National Security Advisor, the head of the Popular Mobilization Forces, the Deputy Director of Intelligence, and the Interior Minister of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

The discussions at that time included security issues directly related to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara labels as a terrorist organization. A statement from the Iraqi Foreign Ministry emphasized that the organization poses a threat to both countries.

Last April, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Iraq and signed 27 agreements.

On August 15, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Fuad Hussein, visited Ankara to implement the signed agreements, including their security aspects.

At first glance, the negotiations and statements seem to be an Iraqi-Turkish affair. However, the relations between the PKK and the SDF, and Turkey’s repeated airstrikes and accusations against them, suggest that Ankara’s move, in addition to what it considers “national security,” also aims to besiege the Autonomous Administration and attempt to cut off supplies to it through the Iraqi gateway.

These Turkish moves, if successful, will naturally affect the Autonomous Administration and the SDF, according to researchers interviewed by Enab Baladi. However, these moves may also face internal Iraqi factors that could hinder them.

Ankara aims to besiege AANES

Since the completion of Turkey’s military operations “Operation Peace Spring” and “Operation Olive Branch” in Syrian territories in 2018 and 2019, Turkish officials have repeatedly threatened a third military operation targeting areas controlled by the Autonomous Administration in northeast Syria.

Internal, regional, and international conditions, along with the complexities of the Syrian file, played an important role in delaying the operation that Ankara had previously stated was ready to execute.

Despite the repeated statements, Ankara continued to carry out airstrikes, the largest of which occurred at the end of 2023, in addition to repeated announcements of targeting PKK leaders in Syria. The latest was in June when the Turkish Intelligence Service announced the “neutralization” of Ali Dinçer, nicknamed “Orhan Bingöl,” a responsible in the Jazira area for the party.

Ankara seems to be trying to find other ways to tighten the noose on the SDF, through security agreements with the federal government in Baghdad, and through its relations with the President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Nechirvan Barzani.

Anas Shawakh, a researcher at the Jusoor Center for Studies, told Enab Baladi that the Turkish movements would have their effect, especially with the increasing security and military coordination between Turkey and the Iraqi government, as well as with the Kurdistan Regional Government.

The expected impacts are concentrated on logistical, economic, and security issues rather than military ones, according to Shawakh, indicating that this effect focuses on the PKK and its interests in northeast Syria.

He added that these effects could be reflected in security coordination, resulting in increased security measures or redeployment of the PKK or its affiliated militias in border areas or inside Iraq, particularly in the Sinjar region and its surroundings.

This control, once established or ended, would cut off the main supply and communication route between the PKK’s branches in northern Iraq and northeastern Syria, considering that this area is the main crossing point for weapons, leadership movements, and oil smuggling from and to northern Iraq.

The SDF consistently denies any relationship with the PKK, but there are indicators showing rapprochement with the party spread across Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.

Previously, SDF leader Mazloum Abdi considered in an interview with Al-Monitor in 2023 that the talk about the relationship between the SDF and the PKK was an “excuse” used by Turkey to launch attacks in Syria.

At the time, he added that the SDF consists of “Syrian Kurds” who want to build a “peaceful” relationship with Turkey.

Ibrahim Kaban, director of the Geo-Strategy Research Center (based in Germany), believes that Turkey has a strategy of “imposing a siege” around the Autonomous Administration.

In response to questions from Enab Baladi, he explained that Turkish intervention in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and deepening relations with it and the Baghdad government, attempts to increase Turkish military bases in northern Iraq, and even the airstrikes that hit Iraqi sites adjoining the areas controlled by the Autonomous Administration, all fall within the same context.

Ankara believes that this party significantly contributes to breaking the siege on the SDF, given that the relationship between the SDF and the regime is not good, the borders are closed with Turkey, and thus the only outlet is Iraq.

The Semalka-FishKhabour border crossing is considered the only gateway between northeastern Syria (areas controlled by the Autonomous Administration) concerning humanitarian and commercial exchanges, delivering medicines, and treating patients, especially cancer and burn patients, and citizens’ travel abroad.

The Al-Walid border crossing is closed to commercial movement in the area, while the US-led Coalition Forces use it to transport military and logistical equipment to their bases in Syria and are used in specific cases.

Factors of success and failure

Ankara possesses significant tools to achieve its goals towards the Autonomous Administration, whether militarily through the constant threat of military operations or other files it shares with Iraq, primarily the water issue, and economic and developmental files.

However, these tools also face two main obstacles: the United States and its military bases in Iraq and northeastern Syria, along with its interests with the SDF.

The other factor relates to the perspectives of Kurdish parties in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which may not align with the policies that Baghdad or the region’s government will follow, primarily the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and its leader Bafel Talabani, who has good relations with the SDF.

Previously, Talabani visited the areas controlled by the Autonomous Administration at the end of 2022 and met Mazloum Abdi. He also has good relations with coalition forces.

According to Kaban, it is unlikely that a complete severance of ties between the SDF and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq will occur due to economic or security reasons and even military ones.

The United States considers the Kurdistan Region of Iraq its base of operations in Iraq and Syria, and communication with the SDF happens from there. Therefore, attempts to block the region will fail even if Baghdad pursues it, due to expected American refusal or the lack of consensus among various political movements within Iraq, some of which see the necessity of maintaining relations with the SDF, considering that some of them have military coordination with it to combat the Islamic State.

Shawakh believes that the Turkish movements and expansion within areas in northern Iraq are fully coordinated with the Iraqi federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government led by Barzani. This is where the position of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, headed by Talabani, who has good relations with the PKK, comes in. Talabani previously visited SDF areas and met Mazloum Abdi two years ago under Coalition Forces’ supervision, conducting joint operations against the Islamic State.

Therefore, according to Shawakh, the level of coordination is high between the two parties (SDF-Talabani). However, labeling the PKK as a terrorist organization now represents a threat to any party or force within Iraq attempting to coordinate or support the party, and so far, there has been no counter-move.