Hassan Ibrahim | Hussam al-Mahmoud | Hani Karazi

Recently, the Syrian scene has become a theater for signs of rivalry between Russia and Iran, the closest allies to the Syrian regime, who are among the main reasons for its relatively continued grip on power recognized internationally in Damascus.

This rivalry has gone beyond the political arena and has emerged economically and militarily, portraying features of pushing and jostling on Syrian soil, which has for years been under the control of two allies, or as the regime calls them “friends” and their tools.

The regime’s critical level of inactivity in the Axis of Resistance in recent weeks, as political analyses suggest, amidst the conditions of the Gaza War, the assassination of the political bureau chief of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran, the military commander of the Lebanese Hezbollah, Fuad Shukr, in the party’s stronghold in southern Lebanon, and earlier the death of Druze children from the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan, due to a rocket explosion that targeted them, has become evident. Israel and Hezbollah throw accusations at each other regarding responsibility for this explosion.

Is Russia pressing the Syrian regime to make a settlement in relations with Turkey, or to prevent its involvement in a regional conflict driven by Iran? Does Iran meet this pressure with equivalent pressure or threats? What about the economic penetration of both parties and the cost of disengaging from one of them and its impact on the regime?

In this lengthy report, Enab Baladi sheds light on the features of the rivalry and jostling between Moscow and Tehran over the Syrian file, and the political, economic, and military division of its cake. It discusses with experts and specialized researchers the nature of this jostling and its outcomes.

Syrian political scene in the hands of Moscow and Tehran

If the two countries, which have continuously supported the Syrian regime, share a clear alliance on foreign political issues outside the Syrian arena, the situation has started to differ concerning dealing with the Syrian file, moving beyond the relationship with Damascus to the political paths and crossroads imposed by regional movements and recent intensive political activity. This has placed the Syrian regime’s president, Bashar al-Assad, at the heart of an unresolved conflict, dealt with by “observing from afar” in Gaza, and on the brink of a political path to normalize relations with a neighboring country with regional weight and direct and indirect military presence in northwestern Syria.

These issues, which occupy wide spaces in global news and analysis coverage, have somewhat distanced the two “friendly foes” in their views regarding Syria and its relations with its neighbors and the regional situation.

Iran remains distant from Ankara-Damascus normalization

Among the prominent features of differing views is the Turkish normalization path with the Syrian regime, which returned to the forefront after an official Russian announcement last January about the collapse of the path in the fall of 2023 due to the insistence of both parties (Turkey and the Syrian regime) on their conditions or views on developing relations between them.

The path that collapsed despite Russian push and Iranian blessings turned it into a “quadrilateral” that held repeated meetings at the ministerial and intelligence levels, returned to the forefront at the level of statements by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who went far, hinting at the possibility of a “close meeting” with Bashar al-Assad.

What differed in this return started by Erdoğan at the end of last June, talking about developing relations with Syria “in the same way we did in the past”, was the noticeable absence of the Iranian side from the accelerated pace of statements and the accompanying Russian support, through which Moscow maintained its role as the sponsor of the path, leading to “media speculations” about a possible meeting between al-Assad and Erdoğan in Moscow, before the pace of statements predicting the meeting date decreased, amid the Syrian regime’s insistence on the condition of Turkish military withdrawal from Syria and the return of Turkish conditions to the forefront again.

In this stage, when Iran had not yet healed its wounds, following the assassination of its president and foreign minister and a group of high-ranking officials on May 20, the Iranian role clearly declined in this aspect. Nonetheless, the acting Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Bagheri, visited Syria at the beginning of last June without publicly addressing the rapprochement path, before the visit of the senior advisor to the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Asghar Khaji, to Damascus on July 22, offering the first official Iranian comment on the Turkey-Syria relationship path.

The Iranian position was manifested by Asghar Khaji welcoming the progress in the relationship path between Ankara and Damascus and expressing “Iran’s happiness” at the resumption of talks with hopes for appropriate and good preparations for these meetings to reach progress in bilateral relations.

“We have always supported this path (…) the initial meetings between Syria and Turkey were held in Tehran and then continued in a quadrilateral manner. We are trying to hold these meetings more to progress in Turkey-Syria relations,” the Iranian official added.

These statements indirectly responded to what the Turkish Daily Sabah newspaper reported on the same day, pointing to excluding Iran from the path during its talk about a possible meeting between Erdoğan and al-Assad in Moscow in the current month of August, with the possibility of inviting the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, and speculating that Iran would not be invited to the meeting, which Russian President could mediate, despite no official statements being issued about determining the meeting date and place amid talks about ongoing preparations before mutually announcing the conditions and reducing the pace of statements.

The Turkish newspaper at that time considered this exclusion of Iran as a strong indicator of ongoing differences and competition between Moscow and Tehran regarding Syria and the country’s future after the war. It attributed the reasons for the differences between Moscow and Tehran to permanent Russian caution about the unrestricted and growing power of Iranian-backed militias in Syria and their future after the war, with disagreements over leadership, military operations, the use of Iranian bases, and Tehran’s tough stance in talks, including the Astana format and the Iranian approach towards Israel.

The rivalry for energy-related contracts, economic resources, and the reconstruction of Syria has led to some friction between Iran and Russia, according to the newspaper, which considered in its article that the Russian move to invite Iraq while excluding Iran “kills two birds with one stone.” It can be seen as an attempt to create a wedge between Baghdad and Tehran, compensating for stealing the scene from the Iraqi Prime Minister, who aimed to host the first personal talks between Erdoğan and al-Assad and show the strength of relations between Moscow and Baghdad.

Moscow and Tehran: Competitive cooperation

After the Israeli assassination of the political bureau chief of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), on July 31, during a visit to Tehran, Iranian officials hurried to make statements filled with threats and hints at retaliation, indicating the possibility of using Syria, Yemen, and Iraq as launch points for attacks targeting Tel Aviv and Haifa. This was quickly ruled out for Syria, as translated by what Reuters mentioned on August 1 about a meeting of senior Iranian officials with militia leaders and representatives of Iran’s allies from Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, without mentioning the presence of Iranian arms from Syria.

The Iranian silent exclusion adopted by the Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary-General in his first speech after the assassination of one of the party’s prominent leaders, Fuad Shukr, in an Israeli attack in the southern suburbs of Beirut, on July 30, was contradicted by Nasrallah in his second eulogy speech for Fuad Shukr, on August 7, when he called on Iran and Syria to provide moral and political support and facilitation for the battle against Israel.

The Iranian threats and the potential involvement of Syria in the same retaliation were interrupted by the Russian president when he asked the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, for a “restrained reaction” to the assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran. As Reuters mentioned on August 6, from two senior Iranian sources, Putin advised Khamenei not to attack Israeli civilians, through a message delivered on August 5, by the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Sergey Shoygu, during meetings with senior Iranian officials, while Iran is still considering its response to the assassination.

The talk about Iranian-Russian differences went beyond analysis and journalistic materials, prompting an official Russian denial by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko, who confirmed in an interview with the Russian TASS agency on July 23, that the bilateral relations between Russia and Iran are based on solid foundations of friendship, and no one can drive a wedge between Moscow and Tehran. He also considered that Iran, as a sovereign state, has the right to pursue its foreign policy as it sees fit.

According to the Russian official, Moscow assumes that relations with Tehran enjoy a solid foundation of friendship and neighborliness and are not subject to external influence despite the opponents’ attempts to “play dirty and drive a wedge between the two countries.”

The researcher in international relations, Mahmoud Alloush, explained to Enab Baladi that the relationship between Russia and Iran in Syria is based on the principle of competitive cooperation. There is a strategic intersection of interests between the two countries in supporting the regime during the Syrian revolution, but competitive factors have become more dominant in shaping this relationship after the course of the war and military operations turned in favor of al-Assad, which is a natural shift according to the researcher.

According to Alloush, Syria is a point of focus for Russian policy in the Middle East, and the Russians have an interest in minimizing the repercussions of the Gaza war on it, which explains why Iran finds it difficult to leverage its presence in Syria within the framework of its proxy involvement in the ongoing conflict.

The Russians believe that the normalization project between Ankara and Damascus helps reinforce Moscow’s vision for resolving the conflict in Syria at a time when an Iranian conviction about the limits of Tehran’s ability to utilize the Syrian scene in its proxy conflict with Israel is starting to form, as the researcher sees it.

 

The Russian-Iranian rivalry in Syria has not yet reached a stage that threatens the core of competitive cooperation between Russia and Iran, particularly because the conflict in Syria has not ended. Additionally, other factors, such as Turkish and American presences, continue to strongly incentivize the Russians and Iranians to maintain their partnership in Syria.

Mahmoud Alloush, Researcher in international relations

 

Iranian hesitation in the face of Russia

Russian political analyst Dmitry Bridzhe considered the Russian-Iranian competition to be present in the Middle East. Iran relies on ideological and religious issues, while Russia has economic and trade interests, creating a clear difference in the policies of the two countries.

Bridzhe told Enab Baladi that the Russian presence in Syria does not face objections from the Gulf states, Jordan, or Turkey, and there are understandings in this regard. Russia will maintain its bases in Syria, and the competition with Tehran will continue. Tehran has militias in Syria under the name “Axis of Resistance and Defiance,” which differs from Russian policy, which has had understandings with Israel, including avoiding clashes in Syria and allowing Israel to strike Iranian militias in Syria. Both sides prefer not to increase Iranian influence in Syria.

Regarding Russia’s position on a potential Iranian response after the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, the Russian political analyst explained that Moscow seems keen to manage this response so as not to escalate out of control, especially if Syria is used as a platform for retaliation. This reflects Moscow’s desire to maintain stability in Syria to serve its strategic interests.

Amid rising tensions in the region, al-Assad visited Moscow on July 25 without prior announcement and met with Putin. They discussed bilateral relations and the regional situation, which is leaning towards escalation, which also applies to Syria, according to Russian media reports.

Russian continuous support for the Syrian regime is demonstrated through al-Assad’s repeated visits to Moscow, highlighting Russia as a primary player in Syria compared to Iran, which, despite its strong presence, sometimes appears hesitant to take steps that might put it in direct conflict with Russia’s interests, according to Bridzhe.

 

It’s hard to determine who will have the final say in Syria between Moscow and Tehran, but it seems that Russia, thanks to its strong military presence and broader diplomatic relations, might be more capable of guiding the course of events by relying on a strategy of careful balance between different parties, making it an indispensable mediator in the Syrian scene.

Dmitry Bridzhe, Russian political analyst

Rivalry or economic sharing?

After 2011, Russia and Iran started jockeying for economic gains in Syria in exchange for their military support to the regime. These gains gradually increased, with both allies putting their hands on vital economic resources and sectors.

Between 2011 and 2024, the Syrian regime signed at least 126 agreements with Iran in various sectors such as energy, trade, health, education, agriculture, industry, telecommunications, and finance, according to the Jusoor Center for Studies.

Out of the total 126 agreements, 43 have been implemented, while 47 are still being executed. The number of agreements in partial or intermittent execution is 25, while 4 agreements have not been implemented, and the fate of 7 agreements is unknown.

Debt wielding

Amid discussions of Russian-Iranian competition and conflict in Syria, Tehran wielded an economic card seen by experts as a tool to pressure the regime. On July 8, then-Iranian Acting President Mohammad Mokhber sent a “Long-term Strategic Cooperation Agreement with Syria” to the Iranian parliament for ratification before handing over his duties to Massoud Pezeshkian.

In contrast, the Syrian regime’s government has not yet sent the texts of the agreements it signed with Iran to the Syrian People’s Assembly (the Syrian parliament).

The strategic cooperation agreement consists of a preamble and 5 articles. According to paragraph “2” of article “5,” the agreement’s duration is 20 years, extendable “until Syria fulfills its obligations and repays its outstanding debts,” related to credit lines, as reported by Iran’s Mehr News Agency.

In February 2017, the Syrian regime signed the “Long-term Strategic Economic Cooperation Agreement with Iran” in exchange for regular oil supplies. The amount of Iranian debt owed by the regime is unknown, but unofficial estimates suggest it is around $50 billion.

Assistant researcher at the Jusoor Center for Studies, Abdul Azim al-Mugharbel, said that one of the main reasons hindering the progress of relations between Tehran and Damascus is the competition with Moscow, which the Syrian regime currently considers more capable of stabilizing its existence compared to Iran. The regime views Iran’s presence as currently threatened and does not wish to tie its fate to Iran’s.

Al-Mugharbel, an economic affairs expert, told Enab Baladi that boosting the Iranian economic presence in Syria would, in turn, lead to a decline in investments from Arab countries in regime-controlled areas. This impacts the course of Arab normalization with al-Assad and reduces his chances of benefiting from these investments to strengthen his economy, besides the regime’s inability to implement significant agreements with Iran due to its weak capabilities.

Economist Radwan al-Dibs told Enab Baladi that one of the reasons affecting the economic relationship between Tehran and Damascus is the severe sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States and European countries. The Iranian economic system is decaying due to sanctions, wars, and Tehran’s expansion into more than one state at the expense of its economy, in addition to the fact that the majority of the Syrian people do not accept Iranian products.

Al-Dibs pointed out that Iran lacks good industries or expertise, operating on a religious revolutionary principle rather than an industrial or commercial one. While Iran has signed many agreements in Syria, most of them remain ink on paper.

According to a study by the Jusoor Center for Studies, the non-implementation of some agreements is also due to the regime’s procrastination. It knows that implementing all agreements would make it entirely dependent on Iran, which it does not desire. The agreements under execution or already executed are with Iranian companies that do not have significant investment weight in the market. Most of their work may be limited to money laundering operations for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

A general trend can be observed in Iranian economic approaches in Syria: success in concluding agreements but failure to translate them into reality, attributed to three main factors, as identified in a 2022 study by the Syrian Dialogue Center: Russian competition, the impact of Western sanctions, and the weak Syrian economy.

Russian superiority over Iran

A comparison of the announced economic agreements signed by Russia and Iran with the Syrian regime reveals that Moscow secured significantly important investment contracts, unlike Iran, which focused on quantity over quality, signing 126 agreements, 78% of which are insignificant.

Iran took several steps to dominate the Syrian economy by signing agreements primarily focused on telecommunications, healthcare, education, energy, banking, agriculture, and livestock, alongside seizing agricultural lands. Its attempts to control phosphates and oil and gas fields were met with substantial Russian presence, seizing those investments.

Conversely, Russia signed several major agreements with the regime. Notably, on April 25, 2019, the private Russian company Stroitransgaz (CTG) signed a contract allowing it to invest in Tartus port for 49 years.

In April 2018, Stroitransgaz received a 50-year contract to extract phosphates from the Sharqiya mines in Palmyra, producing 2.2 million tons annually.

After dominating Palmyra phosphates, the same Russian company (Stroitransgaz) signed a November 2018 contract with the General Fertilizers Company (GFC) in Homs to invest in three fertilizer plants for 40 years, extendable.

The latest Russian economic moves included Syrian Finance Minister Kenan Yaghi announcing in June the revival of the cooperation and partnership agreement with Russia, “elevating Syrian-Russian economic relations to the highest level” during a visit to Moscow.

Researcher Abdul Azim al-Mugharbel stated that Russia aims to expand its economic influence in Syria at Iran’s expense, understanding the importance of preparing to fill any vacuum that might occur if Iranian investments in Syria are targeted by Israel or if Iranian influence in Syria declines in general.

Al-Mugharbel noted that Moscow also finds Syria a crucial base for its presence in any future political or military equation in the Middle East.

Discussing the reasons for Russia’s economic superiority over Iran, Radwan al-Dibs said Russia is a major political, military, and economic power, supported by China, North Korea, and former Soviet republics, while Iran is a weak regional state under international sanctions with a failing economy. Thus, it’s natural for Russia to economically outperform Iran.

Al-Dibs added that the regime finds it in its interest to ally with Russia, the stronger political and military party, hence inclining towards granting Moscow more significant and effective economic agreements than Iran.

Competition or coordination?

Economic investments in Syria have witnessed a state of competition and rivalry between Russia and Iran to win. A report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) mentioned that Moscow and Tehran competed for contracts in the energy, phosphate, agriculture, and real estate sectors in Syria. The intensity of the competition increased due to the lack of a comprehensive mechanism to coordinate their investments. Consequently, Russia won contracts in the phosphate, oil, and gas sectors at the expense of Iran’s commercial interests.

A study by the Syrian Dialogue Center considered that the allies of the Syrian regime, Russia and Iran, are engaged in a competition for influence and war spoils, which is evident from the targeting of the same economic sectors by both sides instead of coordinating their acquisitions.

Abdul Azim al-Mugharbel believes that since Russia’s intervention in Syria began to support the regime, there has been a state of competition and sharing of economic gains between Russia and Iran. Accordingly, the investment sharing process started according to economic sectors, where the two sides met in investing in some sectors such as grains, for example, and clashed in other sectors such as petroleum and mineral wealth.

From his side, the researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Nawar Shaban, told Enab Baladi that what is happening between Tehran and Moscow in Syria cannot be considered competition, but rather a kind of working on different axes, despite the clear desire of both sides to establish their presence in different sectors away from security and military affairs.

Shaban explained his vision by stating that if there were competition, Iran would have exploited Russia’s preoccupation with its war against Ukraine and expanded more, despite its efforts in this area, which may not be considered intensive and that were far from Russian influence in Syria.

A critical military relationship on Syrian soil

The allies of the regime have established their military presence on Syrian geography since Iran’s military entry in 2013 and the beginning of Russia’s intervention in 2015. They have fought battles, trained fighters and militias, supplied the regime with weapons and equipment, and committed massacres and violations against Syrians with the Syrian regime’s green light, which considered their intervention legitimate to fight “terrorism.”

The military presence of both allies expanded over the years. The internal protests of Mahsa Amini in Tehran or the Jordanian Initiative did not succeed in reducing Iranian influence in Syria, and the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war was not enough to withdraw Russian forces from Syrian lands.

The freezing of military operations between the control parties in Syria did not stop the movements of Russians and Iranians, each striving for its interests. They worked on increasing their military spread or at least maintaining its size, ensuring their strong presence in the Syrian scene, with notable movements in recent months.

By mid-2024, the number of Iranian military sites in Syria reached 529 after being 570 mid-2023. Iran remains the foreign force with the largest military presence in Syria compared to other foreign powers.

In contrast, Russia increased its number of military sites in Syria during the period between mid-2023 and mid-2024, rising from 105 to 114 sites. Most of the increase in the number of Russian sites occurred during the first half of 2024, expanding to several new sites evacuated by Iranian militias in Quneitra province, according to a Jusoor for Studies Center report.

Military presence post al-Aqsa Flood

In recent months, especially after the al-Aqsa Flood operation, Russia’s role in stabilizing the border between Israel and Syria has grown notably. They established 11 observation points along the demarcation line with the Golan Heights and resumed their military patrols in the south in early November 2023 after more than a year of absence, allegedly to ensure tension reduction in the region between Iranian militias and Israel.

Southern Syria has become a conflict hotspot on the verge of ignition. The enhancement of Russian presence in southern Syria could increase pressure on Iran or help ease the Iranian-Israeli confrontation’s severity, even if Moscow could not replace or eliminate Iranian influence, according to an analysis by the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center.

Following the assassination of the political bureau chief of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, in late July in Tehran, Moscow played a role between exploiting the opportunity to arm Iran and military cooperation with it on the one hand, and controlling its movements in any upcoming response against Israel on the other.

The Russians returned to southern Syria during this period after their presence had dwindled since 2018 when the regime regained control of the south with Russian support under what was known as the “reconciliation agreement,” which resulted in the withdrawal of heavy weapons from opposition factions and the transfer of those rejecting “reconciliation” to the last opposition stronghold in northwestern Syria.

In 2018, regime forces returned to their positions near the border with the occupied Golan Heights, while Russia stationed in parts of Quneitra and Daraa provinces, then retreated at the beginning of its war in Ukraine.

Assistant researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Saba Abdul Latif, sees that Russia tried in several ways to constrain the Iranian military presence in southern Syria. An agreement between Israel and Russia guarantees the regime’s return to southern Syria on the condition that no Iranian militia be present in the region and no security threat to Israel arises.

Abdul Latif considered in her statements to Enab Baladi that Russian movements aim to constrain, albeit with limited efficiency, due to Iran’s ability to infiltrate southern Syria through its militias that managed to incorporate into the regime forces, thus entering the region under a legitimate cover.

She added that Russia seeks to draw Syria into a safety zone and achieve at least nominal stability, through which it can refloat the regime and close the Syrian file, which has exhausted it, especially with its engagement in a new war in Ukraine.

Despite Russia’s military actions, Iran holds significant influence in southern Syrian cities and towns through its branches and militias from the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Lebanese Hezbollah, compared to external military forces in Syria. It has 20 military sites in Quneitra, 16 in Daraa, and 13 in As-Suwayda.

These movements recalled what the Israeli newspaper Jerusalem Post mentioned on November 2, 2021, about a Russian-Israeli agreement to oust Iran from the Syrian scene, reached during a meeting between then-Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and Russian President Vladimir Putin, stating that Israel is working on “the difficult task of destroying Iran’s regional hegemony dreams,” by launching hundreds of airstrikes against its sites in Syria.

 

Historically, the military relationship between Russia and Iran has been characterized by compatibility and balance and achieving mutual interests at times. However, the relationship has entered critical phases, such as Iran breaching the Russian-Israeli agreement, putting Russia in a significant quandary with Israel. Nevertheless, Moscow managed to exert some pressure on the regime, influencing the relationship with Iran, evident in Israel targeting Iranian sites in Syria, where it is suspected that the regime leaked the locations of the targeted sites.

Saba Abdul Latif, Research assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies

 

The researcher believes that it is not currently in Russia’s interest for Iran to withdraw from Syria because the regime practically lives on the supports of Tehran and Moscow, and if either party withdraws, the situation will become worse than it was, something Russia does not want as it seeks to close the file from one side, and on the other side, no party will be able to bear the burdens of the collapsed regime economically, politically, and militarily.

What’s next?

Both Iran and Russia measure their interests in Syria today based on their ambitions to consolidate influence and each side’s challenges with external rivals or allies. Iran seeks international recognition of its regional role and uses its affiliated militias in Syria to this end. It has also sought to mortgage the country and bind it with irreversible debts and economic and military agreements. Meanwhile, Russia views Syria as an indispensable area of influence, hosting its first base built in the Middle East, “Hmeimim,” the largest foreign base in Syria, in addition to the naval base in Tartus and investments in oil, gas, and phosphate sectors.

With the extended years of war, both countries have an entrenched presence challenging to eliminate by the other party. However, efforts to cancel this presence will be a priority when their political and economic plans collide.

The Syrian regime, which has secured its continuation with the support of Moscow and Tehran, maneuvers in tight spaces with potential developments leading to conflicting interests between the two parties. It has mortgaged Syria’s economic and military future to its allies. It thus shields itself with one when pressured by the other.

While the Syrian regime may prefer Russia over Iran, according to political experts, this does not mean it has the option to decisively choose its alliances. The competition and rivalry between these two countries pose an opportunity for the regime to reduce one’s role while simultaneously posing an existential threat, explaining its preference for “playing on both ropes” rather than showing a clear stance or minimal compliance.