Enab Baladi – Ali Darwish

The intensity of demonstrations against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which holds influence in Idlib, has halved in recent weeks, dropping to about ten protest points from 20 across various cities and towns in Idlib.

The protests began at the end of last February, triggered by the “treason” issue and subsequent arrests by HTS of leaders and militants within its ranks, as well as civilians. These arrests were accompanied by acts of torture resulting in the death of several individuals.

The movement is led by civil activists, supported by well-known military figures and religious scholars in Idlib. Their primary demand is opposition to HTS’s monopolization of decision-making.

HTS has diversified its methods in dealing with demonstrations, alternating between dialogue and promises of reform and suppression through its security forces by arresting and breaking up protests with force and attempting to prevent large gatherings of protesters.

Reasons for the decline

Dr. Abdul Rahman al-Haj, a researcher in jihadist movements, attributed the decline in activity against HTS to six reasons:

• Policies implemented by HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, who responded to some demands without jeopardizing his position and control.
• Divergent interests among the protesters and al-Jolani’s focus on exploiting these contradictions. While pressuring his “jihadist” opponents, he tries to get closer to and address the demands of the civil revolutionary movement.
• Al-Jolani’s success in convincing his opponents that he would not relinquish his position and that no one could displace him without using force.
• Divisions among the public regarding the protests, which have caused a loss of a sense of stability and security, with more hope for reform than radical change.
• Al-Jolani’s ability to dismantle opposition within HTS and quell rebellion within its ranks through the General Security Services, which appears firmly in control and forms the backbone of al-Jolani’s power.
• General acknowledgment among protesters that al-Jolani is a regional and international option to control foreign fighters and extremist jihadist organizations, ensuring their continuous dismantling.

A report by the Jusoor Center for Studies, published on June 10th, indicated that the protest movement is gradually declining due to HTS’ policies of confrontation and containment.

However, this does not imply that HTS can completely end the protests, according to the report, because using force and security measures might push more social groups to join the protests or, at least, to protect them in various ways, especially given the deteriorating economic and living conditions which might further discontent with HTS’s performance and behavior.

This coincides with the absence of political solutions that could reinforce despair, potentially leading to larger waves of protests, with HTS being unable to offer any tangible improvements to the political, economic, and security situation.

Undulating movement

Dr. Muhammad Farouk Kashkash, one of the coordinators of the popular anti-HTS movement, sees that the movement has not declined; rather, it has been undulating since its inception, intensifying and subsiding. He notes that it has intensified in the past two weeks with the return of Binnish and the coalition of towns in the Hazano area, north of Idlib, to protest.

Kashkash told Enab Baladi that the relative decline in some areas like Binnish in eastern Idlib is due to the security grip demonstrated by directing elements of military brigades to the city’s streets. However, “the movement quickly foiled these major efforts of military and security forces through its unity, and the momentum returned to its original state,” according to Kashkash.

In other areas, Tahrir al-Sham leader al-Jolani has “a team that tours the regions, intimidating and threatening the residents with bloodshed,” says Kashkash. Therefore, the movement’s activity declines relatively but soon resumes, as seen in Ariha and Binnish.

Binnish has been one of the most active areas in terms of the number of protests and participants since the movement began. Several tensions arose due to HTS’ use of security forces to stop the protests and arrest several activists.

On July 5th, HTS security forces fired at a protest and arrested some people, leading to an attack by individuals on Binnish’s police station and the burning of a police vehicle.

HTS then dispatched military convoys to Binnish and accused armed elements associated with the movement of inciting chaos.

The Popular Movement in Binnish issued a statement rejecting any form of violence or vandalism against public facilities, stating that what happened at the Binnish police station had nothing to do with the movement. It also deemed the arbitrary arrests by the General Security unjustified, holding HTS responsible for such actions.

The security deployment in Binnish was met with protests in several villages and towns in Idlib, in solidarity with Binnish.

Another escalation in Binnish intensified locals’ anger on July 16th, following an incident where a car allegedly belonging to HTS ran over a girl during a protest.

The next day, HTS reached an agreement with the committee representing the Binnish movement, which included several points, most notably the release of detainees from Binnish over the recent events, the withdrawal of checkpoints and security forces from Binnish, the suspension of all forms of movement and protests in the city for three months, and the return of civilian life to normal.

Options for the movement

Researcher Abdul Rahman al-Haj predicted that the protest movement would gradually decline, especially if al-Jolani adheres to his promises, leading to the realization that the primary demand to overthrow al-Jolani is practically impossible in the current situation.

The ongoing decline of the protest movement would prompt questioning the utility of continuing, leading to its cessation in a short time, al-Haj argued.

Muhammad Farouk Kashkash disagrees, stating that the movement will continue and that a new group has recently joined, convinced of al-Jolani’s incapacity to achieve the promised reforms.

The movement has no choice but “to proceed until achieving its goals, which are closer than ever,” Kashkash said. This is due to several reasons: six months have passed without any tangible reforms despite the promises, the movement has withstood the security crackdown and arrests, it has a clear vision for the post-Jolani phase, and it proposes a sound administrative management for the region.

According to al-Haj, the best option available now after these developments in recent weeks is “to adhere to the achievements made by the protest movement and turn them into irreversible gains, primarily elections.”

He added, “It’s not a matter of al-Jolani but rather establishing a system that the protesters can rely on, allowing their participation in decisions affecting their daily lives,” and to treat this as a step forward that can be built upon until the time is ripe for radical change.

Researcher in jihadist groups’ affairs, Orabi Orabi, told Enab Baladi that the protest leaders’ options to confront HTS tactics to weaken the movement include forming a specific union, calling for large sit-ins and strikes, or the safest and best option, negotiating with al-Jolani. “As long as they still have strength, they should exploit it in negotiations, which I believe al-Jolani will appreciate, granting them some gains and reforms,” Orabi said.

He added that strikes and protests seem ineffective in the northern environment, where the silent majority is not positively neutral but rather negatively neutral, offering no support for the movement. Meanwhile, pro-al-Jolani factions effectively demonstrated their displeasure with the protests and support for al-Jolani.

If the protest leaders continue without major protests and sit-ins, “I don’t think the matter will end favorably for them,” Orabi concluded.

While HTS maintains administrative and military control over Idlib, the region enjoys relative stability on the front lines since the halt of battles in 2020. However, security threats from the Syrian regime and Russia continue to plague the residents, with recurring artillery bombardments and suicide drone attacks on the southern Idlib frontlines.