Khaled al-Jeratli | Ali Darwish

The end of the Islamic State’s reign did not mark the conclusion of issues in northeastern Syria. It soon became apparent that the factions attempting to expel Islamic State fighters were also competing to annex more territory, creating zones of influence and control. Despite relatively stable lines of control in the following years, the region never saw a day without security tensions.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with American support, established control east of the Euphrates, while the Syrian regime, backed by Russia and Iran, positioned itself to the west. Despite earlier attempts by the regime to cause disturbances in American-controlled areas, their efforts were largely inconsequential, as the US was prepared to respond to any attacks against its influence zones.

The Khasham attack in February 2018 was a clear representation of Washington’s stance on eastern Deir Ezzor. During this incident, groups from the Russian Wagner militia and Iranian-backed factions attacked a small village near an American base east of the Euphrates River. However, American air forces obliterated the attacking forces, killing over 300 individuals, including Russian soldiers, whom Moscow later disavowed. No American soldiers were harmed.

This scenario was repeated on August 7, with an assault by tribal fighters believed to be incited by Tehran and the Syrian regime. However, the American response did not mirror 2018; the US did not issue an official stance at the time of this report, and the SDF struggled to hold their military positions.

In this report, Enab Baladi discusses the potential American stance on the escalation in Deir Ezzor and the motives behind the regime and Iran’s focus on pressuring Washington in Syria, especially as the world watches a potentially imminent Iranian attack on Israel. The US is preparing to support Israel’s defense against any Iranian action using its bases in Syria and Iraq amid a pressure context on northeastern Syria marked by Syrian-Turkish rapprochement, which the SDF would be the biggest loser from if completed.

A region adrift in chaos

After the Islamic State was driven out of northeastern Syria, the SDF established controlled areas with service, security, and economic institutions under the political umbrella of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). This development raised alarms in Ankara, which views AANES as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), considered a terrorist organization by Turkey. Additionally, there is regional rejection from Damascus to Baghdad and Tehran against the existence of a Kurdish entity in the region.

For years, Turkey has continued to shell SDF-controlled areas in northeastern Syria, particularly near its borders, such as al-Hasakah and Raqqa countryside. Alongside sporadic Islamic State attacks, a state of instability emerged in the region.

August 2023 marked a new turning point when the SDF decided to end the control of the Deir Ezzor Military Council over Deir Ezzor province. The council, composed mostly of local Arab tribes, saw its leader Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla) arrested, sparking a tribal uprising that inflicted losses on the SDF.

As a result, tribes of Deir Ezzor rose up against the SDF in support of the Military Council, leading to more than a month of armed clashes where the SDF lost control of several villages and towns. However, they later regained control after bringing reinforcements and imposing curfews.

The tension in Deir Ezzor didn’t end with the dissolution of the Military Council and the establishment of SDF control. Tribal groups known as the “Tribal Forces” have consistently attacked SDF military sites in Deir Ezzor.

A year of attacks

Since August 2023, eastern Deir Ezzor countryside has experienced military and security tensions following the SDF’s arrest of its Military Council leader, Ahmed al-Khabil. Clashes erupted between the Deir Ezzor Council, backed by local Arab fighters, and the SDF across various areas but primarily concentrated in eastern Deir Ezzor, adjacent to regime-controlled territories.

Following days of confrontations, the name of the Deir Ezzor Council vanished from the scene, leaving the SDF and local tribal fighters led by Ibrahim al-Hafl as the main parties.

Ibrahim al-Hafl, a prominent figure from the al-Akidat tribe, emerged as the leader of the Arab Tribal Forces post-August 2023 clashes and is accused by the SDF of allegiance to the regime.

Approximately a year after the tribal uprising, the same groups launched a wide-scale attack on SDF military points, with regime and Iranian militia forces providing artillery cover.

On August 6, the Tribal Forces attacked SDF positions in the villages and towns of Dhiban, Abu Hamam, Granij, Shuaitat, and al-Khushkieh, among other military points in eastern Deir Ezzor countryside.

The SDF accused the head of the regime’s General Intelligence Directorate, General Hussam Luka, of orchestrating the attack. According to an internal memo from the National Defense in al-Hasakah reviewed by Enab Baladi, the regime forces, National Defense, and Tribal Forces executed the attack.

A video, which Enab Baladi could not authenticate, showed Hashim al-Sattam, known as Abu Bassam, leader of an Iranian-backed militia in Deir Ezzor called “Sons of the Jazeera and Euphrates Movement,” participating in the battles on the Dhiban front.

From Red February to Tribal assaults: Where is the International Coalition?

The recent attack differed from previous ones, as skirmishes and mutual shelling are ongoing. On August 8, the SDF announced that regime forces had committed a “new massacre” in the villages of Jadeed Bakara and Dhiban by shelling them with rockets and artillery, resulting in 11 civilian victims, mostly women and children.

The SDF stated that the shelling came from regime bases in the village of al-Buleil on the western bank of the Euphrates River.

At the time of this report, the US, which supports the SDF, had not yet issued a stance on the ongoing events. Enab Baladi contacted the US Central Command (CENTCOM) for a comment on the American stance regarding the latest attack but received no response.

During the August 2023 clashes between tribal fighters and the SDF, Washington did not intervene directly but attempted to mediate between the parties to resolve the conflict. The SDF brought in tribal representatives loyal to them, considering Sheikh Ibrahim al-Hafl, a prominent anti-SDF figure in the tribal movements, as an agent supported by the Syrian regime.

Three days into the Deir Ezzor confrontations led by al-Hafl, the US-led International Coalition called for calm and an end to the clashes. In a statement, the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF–OIR) mentioned it was closely monitoring events in northeastern Syria, while continuing to work with the SDF to ensure the fight against the Islamic State.

The Coalition did not actively participate in the combat but provided moral support to the SDF, unlike its response to the 2018 advance of regime forces and Russian Wagner mercenaries towards the Koniko Gas Plant. In that instance, the Coalition obliterated the advancing forces, killing hundreds of their members.

Red February

In February 2018, a military convoy including Russian Wagner mercenaries advanced towards Khasham in eastern Deir Ezzor countryside to capture the Koniko Gas Plant, the largest gas facility in Syria, which has hosted an American military base since 2017.

The plant, controlled by the SDF and the Coalition, saw its convoy bombarded by Coalition air forces and artillery, resulting in at least 300 deaths among the advancing forces and dozens of injuries, along with the destruction of numerous military vehicles.

This event, known in Russia as the “Red February Massacre,” revealed that the Russian military did not fulfill its promises to Wagner’s leadership by providing air cover, either through fighter jets or the S-300 air defense systems if necessary.

Why doesn’t International Coalition intervene now?

According to Aron Lund, a Swedish researcher specializing in Syrian affairs at the Century International research center, there are two factors that could prevent American forces from acting in defense of their SDF partners.

Lund told Enab Baladi that the US seems cautious about becoming embroiled in purely local conflicts where its forces are not threatened directly. It’s possible that the Americans were unsure of how to classify this conflict but there might also be a limit to this restraint.

 

Washington seems wary of getting involved in local conflicts in Syria, but perhaps it hasn’t intervened because it hasn’t yet been able to classify this conflict.

Aron Lund, Research specialist on Syrian affairs at Century International

 

He added that the second factor might be related to the US forces’ current inability to respond swiftly and effectively, particularly as they take necessary precautions concerning the looming crisis between their close ally (Israel) and Iran.

Badr Mulla Rashid, director of the Raman Center for Research and Consultation, told Enab Baladi that several factors differentiate the Coalition’s response in 2018 from the current situation. The attacking force at that time was semi-official Russian (Wagner) forces, and if they had succeeded, they would have cemented new realities as the Islamic State was not yet defeated.

The potential for these forces to have air cover from Russia meant a change in the rules of engagement over Syria, leaving only civilian areas under the Coalition’s control.

 

Iran and the regime are putting pressure through tribal cover and scattered attacks, differing in intensity but aligning in their failure to achieve significant control. Control will remain elusive unless the Coalition expresses a desire to withdraw from Syria.

Badr Mulla Rashid, Director of the Raman Center for Research and Consultation

 

Research assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Osama Sheikh Ali, noted that the current situation differs as the tribal fighters are locals with social dimensions that cannot be ignored. The International Coalition cannot treat the Tribal Forces as they did Wagner; bombing the Tribal Forces would cause numerous social tensions.

Currently, the Coalition is more focused on maintaining stability in the region and avoiding causing another outbreak of conflict. If handling these forces violently, the already fragile stability in the area will be undermined.

When might the Coalition intervene?

During the latest attack, assailants seized SDF positions in the villages and towns of Dhiban, Abu Hamam, Granij, Shuaitat, and al-Khushkieh, releasing videos of their control over the towns, although the authenticity of some footage remains unconfirmed or doubtful.

This advancement exceeded previous attacks limited to skirmishes and is larger than the August 2023 attack.

According to researcher Badr Mulla Rashid: “The Coalition seems to have allowed the attackers to extend their control further than before, previously stopping them at the river. Absent an American withdrawal intent, the goal likely is to cause maximum human damage to the attacking forces.”

Researcher Osama Sheikh Ali told Enab Baladi that the Coalition clarified its support for the SDF and maintaining stability, allowing the SDF to use “limited force” during previous clashes, particularly when the tribal fighters’ attacks began in August 2023. This episode started as a local uprising, involving regime forces and Iranian-backed militias, with figures known for their ties to Iranian militias and Tehran’s support participating. Thus, the SDF employed available force under these conditions.

The recent scenario repeated itself as the Coalition allowed the SDF to use artillery to shell the spread of these forces across the Euphrates.

According to Sheikh Ali: “The Coalition is unlikely to intervene and bomb the attacking forces. However, should the situation deteriorate and Coalition forces or American bases be directly targeted, it could come to that.”

SDF absorbs attacks

The rapid capture by Tribal Forces and the regime contrasted with the SDF’s withdrawal from these positions, which seemed like a sign of SDF weakness. However, military researcher at the Jusoor Center for Studies, Rashid Hourani, suggested this could be a tactical military retreat.

Hourani told Enab Baladi that the main reason for the SDF’s immediate withdrawal can be attributed to the “lack of cohesion among its fighters.” The fighters lack the militant ideology to join battles in Deir Ezzor and face tribal fighters incensed by the SDF’s exclusionary policies in their areas, especially since the SDF has not fulfilled its promises of change and reform that it made a year ago, after the arrest of the commander of the Deir Ezzor Military Council, Ahmed al-Khabil, which has further mobilized the tribal fighters.

 

Tribal fighters’ knowledge of operational geography played a role in their advance, while the SDF’s retreat and reassembly to attack is a tactic aimed at avoiding heavy casualties and thus preventing anger from their largely Arab support base.

Rashid Hourani, Researcher at the Jusoor Center for Studies

 

The tactics might be deliberate from the SDF to alert the International Coalition and prompt it to intervene more forcefully to prevent Iranian and militia control in the region.

Researcher Osama Sheikh Ali mentioned that the SDF’s military strength is incomparable to Tribal Forces, emphasizing the ongoing tactic of withdrawal, reinforcement, and re-capture of points as a current combat policy.

Reinstating the Deir Ezzor Military Council

The tribal attacks on SDF positions began after their detention of Deir Ezzor Military Council leader, Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), on August 27, 2023. The continuing absence of the council might serve the coalition as a warning to act.

The loss of the Military Council was a significant factor in escalating the situation. Despite not being the only factor, recent events should prompt the Coalition to reorganize the council, suggests researcher Rashid Hourani.

He added that leveraging local council members and integrating local recruits could be a solution, considering the reluctance of Deir Ezzor locals to join the SDF. This council could potentially become a vehicle for imposing realities on the ground, akin to Abu Khawla’s role.

Researcher Osama Sheikh Ali believes the absence of the council is not the sole cause of declining security. He pointed out that the SDF failed to meet residents’ demands, improve the security situation, and continued to have the PKK cadres meddle in administration.

The SDF has been projecting the Military Council’s involvement in the recent Deir Ezzor events. Following hours of current clashes, the SDF claimed that council forces helped repel the attack. However, since Abu Khawla’s arrest, the faction has remained undermined in influence, according to Sheikh Ali.

During negotiations for the faction’s restructuring, the SDF aimed to preserve it without allowing substantial ground influence, as per information obtained by Enab Baladi from former Military Council leaders who attended meetings with SDF commanders.

During these negotiations, the SDF leadership imposed stipulations on the former council leaders present but left them free to exercise discretion in their choices.

Regional factors

The tribal fighters’ attack occurred after steps taken by the SDF to release tribal members detained for Islamic State affiliation and participating in operations, and their attempts to organize local elections.

These moves were messages from the SDF to the local environment, signaling that they would be more flexible than previous direct appointment practices, according to researcher Badr Mulla Rashid.

However, regional shifts appear more influential in attack timings. The clashes coincided with significant shifts on the Syrian map, notably the Turkish-Syrian rapprochement and Israeli-Iranian escalation, as Iran repeatedly threatens to strike Israel again, a possibility that Washington has repeatedly warned about.

Swedish researcher specializing in Syrian affairs, Aron Lund, posited that such attacks might be designed, wholly or partly, to pressure and distract American forces as the conflict with Iran neared.

At the same time, he didn’t dismiss the possibility that the attacks might be opportunistic, exploiting American forces’ defensive posture within their Syrian bases due to repeated Iranian threats, resulting in limited intervention capability to support the SDF.

 

Iranian militias and regime forces may have seized the defensive position adopted by the US within its Syrian bases, wary of repeated attacks, to strike SDF positions.

Aron Lund, Researcher at Century International

 

Ibrahim Kaban, director of the Geostrategic Studies Center, believes that the developments in Syria and the Middle East are related to all the ongoing movements, especially in Deir Ezzor.

Kaban told Enab Baladi that Iranian movements in Syria against the SDF are also linked to Tehran’s attempts to create confrontations with American forces and could be primarily a form of pressure on Washington.

He added that direct coordination between Ibrahim al-Hafl’s groups and the Baqir Brigade led by Nawaf al-Bashir, in addition to other tribal groups supported by Iran and Syrian intelligence, also aims to destabilize security in rural Deir Ezzor, particularly since these groups naturally view the SDF as hostile.

Turkish-Regime rapprochement

Research assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Osama Sheikh Ali, added that the Autonomous Administration project faced a tight and difficult position due to the course of Turkish-Syrian rapprochement, potentially negatively impacting the SDF if it progressed.

Sheikh Ali added that Turkey’s reconciliation with the Assad regime primarily aims at joint counter-terrorism efforts, which translates to opposition to the SDF.

According to the researcher, it was often said that the regime lacked the power or courage to fight the SDF while it enjoyed American support, but it had the ability to destabilize areas under SDF control east of the Euphrates. It has loyal tribal factions it can easily mobilize.

Researcher Ibrahim Kaban emphasized that advancing agreements between the Syrian regime and Turkey could indeed have escalated the situation, given that Turkey’s longstanding aim in this reconciliation was to combat the SDF.

Kaban told Enab Baladi that a quadruple coordination among Iran, Turkey, Russia, and the Syrian regime on the issue of combating the SDF exists, leading to the recent attacks in Deir Ezzor, with each party having its own objective from the attack.

Iranian focus

Last May, the press secretary for the US Department of Defense, Pat Ryder, spoke about how Iran conducts its operations by training and influencing proxy groups as part of its foreign policy aimed at expelling the United States from the Middle East. This discussion was in the context of Tehran’s activities in eastern Syria.

He added that the goal of removing Washington from the region is to allow Iran to implement what it desires “without hindrance,” and that these efforts are a track that the United States continues to monitor.

Ryder’s comments came in response to a question posed by a journalist during a conference about Iran’s efforts to expand its influence by utilizing local tribes to establish its proxy groups.

The Pentagon spokesperson added that it is important, from the United States’ perspective, when it comes to the Middle East, to respect the sovereignty of the countries it works with, unlike some of these proxy groups (Iranian-backed militias), which have integrated themselves into these nations.

When it comes to open areas like Syria, Washington will continue to focus on the mission of defeating the Islamic State according to Ryder, but it will also maintain awareness of broader regional threats, to prevent potential future situations that could pose threats to American personnel or their allies in the region.

Political analyst specializing in Iranian affairs, Marwan Frazat, told Enab Baladi that the Iranian-backed attacks in Deir Ezzor sent a message to Washington that Tehran can stir up trouble at any moment in areas of American influence, and is capable of igniting the region and changing the rules of the game there.

He added that Deir Ezzor holds significant importance in the Iranian project, as it is the only land connection point linking Tehran to Beirut via Baghdad and Damascus. Tehran may seek to expand this corridor and secure a strategic depth for it from the north and south, as the possibility of losing this corridor if a war breaks out against it in the region is quite high.

He considered that the impact of these attacks may not be apparent in Deir Ezzor today, but it will reflect in other areas and issues. The Iranian message has reached the Americans, and Washington today needs to avoid escalation while the US administration attempts to avoid a major war that threatens the region.