Enab Baladi – Hussam al-Mahmoud

Recent Turkish statements related to the rapprochement with the Syrian regime have brought the process back to square one, where it has been stuck for over a year, since Russia officially announced the collapse of the previous track (the Quadrilateral) in January 2023, in the fall of 2023.

On August 14, Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler confirmed Turkey’s constitutional and electoral conditions regarding normalization with the Syrian regime, saying that the “Syrian administration” (in reference to the regime) behaves as if it does not want a period of peace, stressing the necessity of adopting a comprehensive constitution for Syria.

The Turkish minister stressed that Turkey can only discuss withdrawal from Syria after a new constitution is accepted, elections are held, and borders are secured.

He clarified that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is endeavoring to create a peace environment in the region, stating, “We can start peace talks with the Syrian regime. We have conditions to start these talks. The Syrian regime says if they tell us a withdrawal date, we’ll meet, and that’s the case.”

He continued, “We envision it as (we don’t want to return to peace),” and added, addressing the regime, “Hold free elections, and whoever comes to power as a result, we say we are ready to work with them,” according to Turkish media.

The Turkish conditions presented by Güler, although not new, have resurfaced recently and several times after “reconciliatory” statements from the Turkish President, leading up to a possible meeting with regime’s head Bashar al-Assad, despite no specific date and place for such a meeting after political animosity began in 2011 when Ankara sided with the Syrian revolution and has hosted more than three million Syrian refugees.

On August 12, the Turkish defense minister spoke about Turkish withdrawal conditions from Syria and the rapprochement process with Damascus, which oscillates between ongoing statements and emerging actions on the ground.

Minister Yaşar Güler said that Turkey could meet with the Syrian regime at the ministerial level in the effort to normalize relations if appropriate conditions are met.

According to the Turkish newspaper “Türkiye,” if the appropriate conditions are met, Turkey and Syria can hold a ministerial-level meeting within the normalization efforts. Güler also discussed the Syrian regime’s withdrawal condition, explaining that Turkey can only discuss withdrawal coordination after a new constitution is adopted, elections are held, and borders are secured.

Conditions crisis

In the rapprochement process, which began on December 28, 2022, involving Turkey, Russia, and the Syrian regime before Iran joined, the Syrian regime posed conditions described by al-Assad as “constants” in March 2023, mainly the Turkish withdrawal from Syrian territory. This condition accompanied regime statements before and after each negotiation round at ministerial and intelligence levels, defense ministers’ meetings, and negotiator representatives’ meetings.

The recent Turkish push towards improving relations with the regime, initiated by Erdoğan at the end of last June, when he expressed his readiness to meet with “Mr. Assad” as he termed it, was met with a friendly statement from the regime on July 15, correcting the term “normalizing relations” in the context of discussing Turkish relations with Damascus. He said, “The term can be used with an abnormal enemy, out of the ordinary like Israel. When we say we are normalizing, it is a forced process because we want to impose normal relations that do not exist. However, when we talk about a neighboring country and a neighboring state, and there have been relations for centuries, the relations must be exclusively natural. The term normalization is wrong.”

This sudden goodwill did not explicitly refer to the Turkish withdrawal condition but mentioned the need for an agenda for the meeting between the two sides. Two days earlier, the Syrian Foreign Ministry offered its first official reaction to Turkish calls for a meeting between Erdoğan and al-Assad, stating on July 13 that any initiative in this regard must be based on clear foundations to ensure the return of relations between the two sides to their natural state.

Foremost among these foundations, according to the Foreign Ministry, is the withdrawal of forces “illegally” present on Syrian soil and the fight against “terrorist groups” threatening both Syria’s and Turkey’s security, according to the Ministry’s statement.

Given the return to conditions, Turkish statements’ frequency has slowed, turning into daily topics in Turkish media predicting Erdoğan-Assad meeting locations and dates before Ankara once again showcased its conditions against the regime’s conditions.

The Turkish conditions, previously presented by the Turkish defense minister in September 2023, summarized as holding elections, reaching a new constitution, and forming a government inclusive of all people’s factions, in return for withdrawal from Syria.

Mahmoud Alloush, a researcher in international relations, believes that the circumstances supporting the current normalization project are more flexible than during the initial negotiation track’s launch. Still, the complexity and intertwining factors in this process require “full maturity” for successful implementation, given mutual Erdoğan and al-Assad interest in normalization.

Regarding Turkish withdrawal conditions from Syria, Alloush told Enab Baladi that Turkish demands are designed to respond to the high negotiating ceiling of the Syrian regime and to set broad principles for any future withdrawal negotiations, as Turkey does not present these conditions for normalization.

Ankara seeks to send two messages toal-Assad with these conditions: First, that it is ready for normalization that benefits both parties and does not affect its approach to resolving the conflict and addressing its presence in northern Syria. Second, that the push for normalization does not indicate weakness and that al-Assad’s insistence on prioritizing withdrawal will only undermine a rare normalization opportunity.

Iran involvement

Turkey’s ambassador to Tehran, Hicabi Kırlangıç, announced on August 18 the need for a “constructive Iranian role” in normalizing relations between Turkey and the Syrian regime.

Regarding Turkish President Erdoğan’s request for normalizing relations with Damascus and the Syrian regime’s condition for Turkish forces’ withdrawal from Syria, the ambassador explained in an interview with Iran’s Tasnim News Agency that Turkey has faced issues with Syria in the past for various reasons.

The Turkish call for Tehran to intervene in the process came after unofficial talks about excluding Iran from the process, given the ongoing Russian sponsorship and Iraq’s efforts to impact Ankara-Damascus relations. The Turkish newspaper Daily Sabah on July 22 anticipated a meeting in August between al-Assad and Erdoğan in Moscow, suggesting that Iran might not be invited to the meeting that didn’t happen.

The newspaper viewed the potential exclusion of Iran from the meeting as indicative of disputes and competition between Moscow and Tehran concerning Syria and the country’s post-war future. The reasons for these disputes included ongoing Russian caution regarding Iranian-backed militias’ growing unchecked presence in Syria, their future after the war, discrepancies over leadership and military operations, and the Iranian stance towards Israel.

 

There is increasing Turkish recognition of the need to involve Tehran as an intermediary to enhance normalization’s success chances, as Iran is often viewed as a potential obstacle to normalization. Any Iranian involvement in supporting this process would certainly increase its success probability

Mahmoud Alloush, Researcher in International Relations

 

On the same day, the Turkish Foreign Ministry denied the newspaper’s claims about the meeting’s time and place without addressing Iran’s exclusion. The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Andrey Rudenko, stated that Russia-Iran relations are solidly based on friendship but noted that Iran, as a sovereign state, has the right to pursue its foreign policy as it deems appropriate.

Researcher Mustafa al-Naimi explained to Enab Baladi that Iran fears any rapprochement with the Syrian regime, particularly after Arab rapprochement, as these steps signal weakening Iran’s regional role, especially in Syria. Therefore, Iran seeks to bolster its presence in the Syrian, regional, and international scene to force other parties to negotiate with it and treat it as a capable regulator.

Al-Naimi believes Iran has not yet attained such political influence, as its practices through the “parallel state” cannot keep it within the international framework. The essence of rapprochement aims at dismantling the Iranian axis within the regime’s institutions, which the regime cannot achieve due to Iran’s infiltration into the state’s fabric and conflicting axes controlling Damascus between those aligned with the Arab project and the Iranian project, which are non-identical projects. This means purification between the two axes will continue between the axis supporting Arab efforts for calm and the Iranian axis supporting regional escalation.

 

Iran tries to pressure Turkey through a path involving its presence, but international trends seem to suggest excluding Iran from any forthcoming resolution in Syria.

Mustafa al-Naimi, Researcher in Iranian Affairs

 

Al-Naimi noted that Turkey’s vision for a solution in Syria aligns with international positions aiming for a resolution through the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, including establishing a full transitional governing body and the safe return of refugees. However, Iran exploits the regime’s weakness to maintain its presence in Syria.

Moscow’s current position appears weakest in the face of the Ukrainian incursion into Russian territories, which may reflect on Russia’s role in Syria, potentially allowing the international community to deal with the Iranian presence and exit the “Syrian quagmire” it entered for unachieved incentives versus a significant international reorganization and Iranian competition over geography and resources.

Ground actions

In parallel with Turkish statements, which have resumed their realistic framework, several ground moves aligned with Moscow’s efforts to bridge its “feuding allies,” the first of which was on August 2 when Russia announced establishing a new military base in Ain al-Arab. Deputy Director of the Russian Reconciliation Center in Syria, Oleg Ignasyuk, considered it aligning with ongoing measures “to monitor the ceasefire operations between conflicting parties.”

On August 7, the regime-affiliated newspaper Al-Watan reported, citing “field situation observers,” that establishing a joint Syrian-Russian military base in Ain al-Arab at this tense time would “reassure Erdoğan’s administration from launching hostile acts from Ain al-Arab into Turkish territories,” according to the newspaper.

Turkey welcomed this step, with its Ministry of Defense evaluating it as weakening the presence of the “terrorist organization in the region” (referring to the Syrian Democratic Forces considered by Turkey as an extension of the PKK in Syria).

Besides this step, on August 20, Abu al-Zandeen crossing was opened in the city of al-Bab, east of Aleppo, between regime-controlled areas and opposition-controlled areas managed by the Syrian Interim Government.

This crossing allows the passage of goods between the controlled areas and serves as a land gateway for Turkish goods heading towards regime-controlled areas and the Gulf countries as a land route for Turkish export activity. This route, though inactive due to popular protests and some Syrian National Army factions’ opposition to trucks passing towards regime areas, was subject to repeated unidentified artillery shelling starting on August 21, with ongoing protests and a permanent sit-in opposing its opening.