The opposition factions are advancing and controlling villages, towns, and cities in the northern and eastern countryside of Hama, one after the other, despite the military reinforcements of the regime forces and allied militias, and their readiness to repel the attack from the opposition factions.

On November 30, fighters from the opposition factions reached the outskirts of the city of Hama but later withdrew from it, with no comment from the Military Operations Administration overseeing the battle, following a rapid collapse of regime forces over the past five days.

In their attacks within the last 24 hours, the factions managed to capture the cities of Suran, Halfaya, Taybat al-Imam, and Mardas in northern Hama, followed by the seizure of 14 new villages and towns in Hama and its countryside, with the most notable being the Rahjan, Maar Shohur, and Tal Kafraa.

Military and political importance

Since the beginning of the Syrian revolution, the city has witnessed protests against the Syrian regime; however, the opposition’s presence has been absent from Hama since 2013.

Additionally, the city has not been under the military control of the opposition, and the regime has exerted significant pressure on the city to prevent any military actions within it.

Syrian researcher Abdul Rahman al-Haj stated to Enab Baladi that Hama holds a strategic military position as it represents a junction connecting northern and southern Syria, and both its west and east. It links vital supply and transit lines between Damascus and Aleppo, and controlling Hama would grant the opposition several advantages.

Given the military, political, and symbolic significance of Hama, the opposition’s control over it would represent “a factor of demoralization and psychological defeat” that would significantly affect the morale of the regime and its troops, thus marking “the first step towards a total collapse, which may be seen in Damascus,” according to al-Haj’s expression.

Al-Haj explained that Hama has symbolic importance as it witnessed the “largest” massacre in Syrian history in 1982, which claimed the lives of around 40,000 civilians and represented a turning point in consolidating the Assad family’s rule.

He also added that politically, the city is very close to areas inhabited by Alawites, the social base supporting the Syrian regime, and its control by the opposition raises fears among Alawites of revenge, considering the bloody memory of the massacre in the city and the sectarian massacres committed during the revolution, especially the bladed weapon massacres with a sectarian character in the Hama countryside.

Moreover, nearly all key regime leaders in the military and security sectors come from these areas, and military control over Hama would mean cutting off the regime’s supply lines, and if the opposition expands westward, it would sever the coast from Damascus, leaving the regime with only two strongholds: Tartus and the Alawite mountains, in addition to Damascus, which would be besieged once opposition forces take control of Homs.

Mobilization and preparation

On November 27, opposition factions announced the start of a military operation called “Deterrence of Aggression,” in response to the repeated shelling of regime forces on northwestern Syria, aiming to expand “secure areas” in preparation for the return of displaced people.

Contrary to expectations, the factions managed to seize the entire western Aleppo countryside administratively within the first three days and opened another front in the eastern Idlib countryside.

The opposition factions also entered the city of Aleppo and expanded their control, taking administrative control over the entire Idlib province.

On the fourth day, fighters reached the outskirts of the city of Hama but withdrew from it after the Syrian regime mobilized its forces in the city.

Citizens from Hama told Enab Baladi at that time that reinforcements from the various formations of the Syrian regime were gathering in the city.

The citizens mentioned the absence of the opposition factions’ presence in the main neighborhoods of the city, unlike the rapid progress seen in the city of Aleppo.

On the other hand, the Military Operations Administration, which manages the opposition factions’ battles, did not comment on the issue of its fighters entering and withdrawing from the city of Hama.

The Syrian regime did not noticeably resist the opposition factions before they reached Hama, only relying on airstrikes on residential areas.

Videos released by regime-supporting activists confirmed the mobilization of its forces inside the city of Hama, amidst threats of combat.

What are the reasons for the rapid advance of the opposition?

Colonel Abdul Jabbar al-Akidi, a defector from the regime’s forces and a military expert, attributed the rapid advancement of the opposition factions to several reasons:

1. The thorough preparation of the factions involved in the Military Operations Administration within the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation and their military expertise, as their members have been well-trained over the past four or five years of military stagnation, undergoing training courses and camps in specific specialties, benefiting from modern technology in manufacturing, especially in the production of drones and armored personnel carriers.
2. The distinguished professional leadership in battle management, which disoriented the regime by initially entering from the western countryside and then expanding laterally towards the right and left (towards northern and southern Aleppo) toward Saraqib, circumventing elements from Khan Touman and Andan, and cutting off supply lines to Nubl and Zahra, as well as severing human resource supply lines for the militias affiliated with the regime.
3. The regime’s forces have been fundamentally collapsing since 2015, and Iranian militias are fatigued, while Iran’s situation is currently difficult, with the Lebanese Hezbollah also in disarray.
4. The regime’s economic situation is dire, as neither Russia nor Iran are providing it with assistance, and it is deeply in debt.
5. A weakened military doctrine among regime elements, as Iranian militia members are fighting in lands that are not their own, while the opposition factions are fighting for a cause and correct combat ideology, as they fight to reclaim their lands from which they were displaced.
6. Most importantly, the continuous momentum of the factions’ advance without pause, preventing the regime’s army from catching its breath.