Enab Baladi – Hussam al-Mahmoud

Recent consecutive Turkish and Russian statements have cast a shadow over the trajectory of Turkish rapprochement with the Syrian regime, revealing a confusion stemming from conflicting remarks from influential parties in the rapprochement file.

While Turkey appears eager for rapprochement, Russia, the regime’s main ally, criticizes Ankara’s role, considering it acts as an “occupying state” in Syria—a tone that is unusual for Moscow.

Turkish hopes

One of the most notable remarks in this context came from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who expressed, on November 13, his hope for a possible meeting with Syrian regime president Bashar al-Assad and to move forward in normalizing relations between the two sides.

Erdoğan told reporters on the return flight from Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan to Turkey, “I remain optimistic about al-Assad, and I still hope that we can meet together, and we hope to put Syrian-Turkish relations back on the right track.”

He also indicated that he had not had the “opportunity” to listen to al-Assad’s speech during the extraordinary Arab-Islamic summit held in Riyadh on November 11 because he went to meet the Saudi crown prince, according to the Turkish Anadolu Agency.

Cameras documented Erdoğan’s absence from the extraordinary summit hall, with the Turkish ambassador in Riyadh representing Ankara at the summit. This was not a new type of movement between the two sides, as the Syrian Foreign Minister at that time (now al-Assad’s deputy), Faisal Mekdad, withdrew at the beginning of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s speech during the Arab League meeting at the foreign ministers’ level, in which Turkey participated for the first time in 13 years on September 10.

Simultaneously with Bashar al-Assad’s speech at the joint Arab-Islamic summit on November 11, 2023, Erdoğan exited the hall, leaving Turkish representation to Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who removed his translation headphones and was preoccupied with his mobile phone, expressing indifference.

Although withdrawal is not new to the scene, this time it came with a Turkish official clarification or justification, indicating a clear desire to bring views closer, based on the language used by Turkey in this context.

“We have extended our hands to the Syrian side regarding normalization, and we believe that this normalization will open the door to peace and tranquility in the Syrian territories,” Erdoğan said.

He also emphasized that Turkey does not threaten the integrity of Syrian territory or the Syrians dispersed in various countries, and that al-Assad should understand this and take steps to create a new climate in his country, as the neighboring Israeli threat is not a fictional story; the surrounding fire will spread quickly in the unstable territories, according to the Turkish president.

Russian tone intensification

Turkish President Erdoğan’s remarks were met the following day with a Russian dismissal of a potential meeting between Erdoğan and al-Assad and criticism of Turkey’s role in Syria. Russian presidential envoy Alexander Lavrentiev stated that there are no conditions for holding a meeting between Erdoğan and al-Assad, but communications continue between the defense ministries of the two countries.

The Russian diplomat also considered that Turkey behaves as an “occupying state,” indicating that this relates to its support for the Syrian opposition. The main issue is the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syria.

“Let’s call things by their names; they (the Turks) are acting as an occupying state, and it is very difficult for Damascus to enter into dialogue without certain guarantees from Turkey regarding the withdrawal of its forces,” Lavrentiev added.

There was no immediate official response from Ankara to Lavrentiev’s statements by the time this article was prepared, but the press briefing on the same day by the spokesperson for the Turkish defense ministry included a Turkish confirmation of ongoing efforts to restore relations with the Syrian regime based on “mutual respect, goodwill, and good neighborliness.”

These statements reflect the disparity in views regarding the trajectory of rapprochement between Ankara as the advancing party and Moscow as the sponsoring entity, amid the absence of an official comment from the Syrian regime. In the days leading up to this, Turkish and Russian messages did not suggest any progress in the process, despite ongoing efforts and a flurry of statements that have been coming since May.

In early November, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that the differences in positions between Ankara and Damascus had halted the negotiation process between the two parties, as the Syrian regime insists on the necessity of clarifying the issue of the withdrawal of Turkish military units from Syria, while Ankara, in principle, affirms its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria but offers to discuss the matter of troop withdrawal later.

International relations researcher Mahmoud Alloush explained to Enab Baladi that the current normalization process between Ankara and Damascus faces multiple obstacles, and there has been little progress. The current bet is that Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency may resuscitate this process, given that the conditions are still unsuitable for initiating normalization.

Alloush envisions that before Trump assumes office and the clarity of the policy he will adopt in Syria, it is unlikely that progress will be made in the normalization process. The countries concerned with this path are monitoring the American transition and its potential impacts on Syria to assess the next step.

Is there a Saudi role?

Turkish President Erdoğan’s hopes for a meeting with al-Assad came during the return flight from Saudi Arabia, a country that reinstated al-Assad to the Arab League and seated him at Syria’s chair during the Arab summit in Jeddah (May 19, 2023) for the first time since 2010, before hosting him to participate in two extraordinary Arab-Islamic summits regarding the situation in Gaza (November 11, 2023, and the same day in 2024).

This raises questions about a potential Saudi role in the process of Turkish rapprochement with the regime, at a time when Russian efforts have not achieved more than a series of meetings before declaring the failure of the path at the beginning of the year and attempts to revive it since May.

Mahmoud Alloush mentioned that there are currently no indications of a Saudi role in this regard, and in his opinion, even if the Saudis wished to play such a role, the obstacles to initiating normalization would remain complex, as the issue is not the competence of the mediators but rather the circumstances of normalization.

The path of rapprochement remains a necessity for both Moscow and Ankara.

Significant obstacles face this path, and overcoming them requires a Russian willingness to explore political solutions to the Syrian conflict.

For Turkey, normalization is a means to end the conflict, not an end in itself.

Mahmoud Alloush, Researcher in international relations

Ankara’s conditions and justifications

Until a few days ago, the Turkish reading of the Syrian regime’s position on normalization with Ankara was summarized in the belief that al-Assad and his allies were not prepared to reach an agreement with the opposition and to carry out a significant normalization with Turkey.

Ankara emphasizes the importance of the regime providing a secure and stable environment for the Syrian people, alongside the opposition.

It also considers that any real dialogue from al-Assad should be with the opposition to reach an agreement, according to statements by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, which coincide with those of Defense Minister Yaşar Güler last August, when he confirmed Turkey’s constitutional and electoral conditions regarding normalization with al-Assad, stating that the “Syrian administration” (referring to the regime) behaves as if they do not want a period of peace, stressing the necessity of adopting a comprehensive constitution.

The Turkish minister confirmed that Turkey cannot discuss withdrawal from Syria until a new constitution is accepted, elections are held, and borders are secured, adding, “We view this matter as (not wanting to return to peace).”

He continued, addressing the regime, “Conduct free elections, and whoever comes to power as a result of that, we are ready to work with him.”

In the face of the regime’s insistence on settling the issue of Turkish withdrawal from Syria as a prerequisite for negotiation, Ankara has its own conditions for this normalization, including eliminating “terrorism” in a Turkish context that differs from the regime’s understanding, conducting national reconciliation with the people, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution “2254”, and preparing conditions for the return of refugees, noting that it is not feasible for Turkey to make a radical change or backtrack on its relationship with the Syrian opposition—a matter Ankara has expressed on multiple occasions, the latest being when the Turkish Defense Minister linked the future of the Syrian National Army (SNA) to the future of Syria, saying, on November 12, that “what you call today (the Free Army) will be the Army of the Republic in the future.”

Turkey believes that the presence of its forces in Syria prevents the latter’s division and the establishment of a “terrorist corridor” within it, and avoids new waves of refugees; were it not for the establishment of order in northwestern Syria, five million additional people would have come to Turkey, as many “do not feel safe in their relations with the regime,” according to the Turkish Foreign Minister’s statement last September.

The regime’s insistence on the condition of military withdrawal from northern Syria and the lack of progress in the rapprochement process is met with a Turkish call for “real normalization,” as the Turkish president noted on October 25 that he had asked his Russian counterpart to take steps to ensure al-Assad’s response to the Turkish invitation for rapprochement, indicating that Ankara expects the “Syrian administration” to understand the benefits that “honest and realistic normalization” with Turkey will provide them and to take steps accordingly.