Enab Baladi – Mahmoud al-Abdullah
The public stances from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the new administration in Damascus indicate that both sides still rely on negotiations and dialogue as a means to achieve tangible results on the ground.
However, this does not mean, according to researchers who spoke to Enab Baladi, the absence of challenges that could lead the process to confrontation and failure.
These challenges are related to more than one track and specifically involve three scenarios that could arise from the ongoing negotiations between the two sides, according to researchers who spoke to Enab Baladi.
The first of these scenarios is reaching agreements that maintain stability in Syria.
The second scenario moves toward military confrontation, which could redraw the map of control anew.
The current situation between the SDF and the Damascus administration may remain without any comprehensive confrontation, ensuring a relative stability for both parties, which is the third scenario that may reflect in the upcoming phase.
Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa stated on February 3 that negotiations with the SDF are still ongoing, noting his reluctance to mention details, “due to the presence of parties that do not wish for the negotiations’ success.”
Al-Sharaa mentioned that the SDF has expressed its readiness to restrict weapons to the Syrian state, with some minor disagreements between the two sides.
In turn, the Commander of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi, in his latest comments on the issue, stated that negotiations with Damascus are ongoing, under the auspices of mediators from members of the International Coalition, adding that his vision for Syria is a “decentralized secular state based on democracy.”
Abdi also indicated that “the Kurds in northeastern Syria want to manage their local affairs in a decentralized state, without separation or the establishment of an independent government or parliament,” according to the Associated Press.
The “most likely” scenario
The SDF demands constitutional recognition of the Kurds and their language and culture, or some form of Kurdish uniqueness in Syria, which does not constitute a major obstacle, according to Osama Sheikh Ali, a researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies.
Sheikh Ali believes, in his talk to Enab Baladi, that one of the anticipated and most likely scenarios from the negotiations is their success and reaching agreements between the two sides, without excluding the possibility of challenges.
He clarified that the most important of these challenges is “the restructuring of the new Syrian army, in addition to the future and shape of the autonomous administration.
The Damascus administration is working on establishing a structure for the new Syrian army, requiring that individuals join the Ministry of Defense after dissolving the military factions and groups.
Conversely, the SDF insists on its presence within the Syrian army as a military block, which poses a challenge to the success of the first scenario, something that Damascus rejects to avoid a state within a state, as mentioned by Sheikh Ali.
Researcher in Kurdish affairs Badr Mulla Rashid stated that integrating the SDF into the Ministry of Defense in the new Syrian army depends on several political, field, and regional factors.
Mulla Rashid added, in his conversation with Enab Baladi, that the success of the negotiation process between the SDF and the Damascus administration requires a consensus based on precise agreements and strong trust, in light of the differing supporting parties and the goals concerning the vision of governance in Syria.
He also pointed out that both sides have different perspectives regarding resources and natural wealth, particularly oil, gas, and wheat crops, as these state resources are under the control of the SDF.
In addition to its refusal to join on an individual level, the SDF is working to keep its civil structures intact, which Sheikh Ali considered a second challenge to the success of the negotiations.
Sheikh Ali believes that there is partial agreement between the two sides concerning granting greater powers to local administration; however, Damascus insists on rejecting any formula that might lead to some form of ethnic or sectarian quota.
What if negotiations fail?
The second scenario anticipated by researchers regarding the negotiations between Damascus and the SDF is the failure of the ongoing process between them and the shift of events toward military confrontation.
Although Damascus favors a peaceful solution over any military confrontation with the SDF, the likelihood of a lack of agreement between the two parties and a military escalation remains, according to Badr Mulla Rashid.
From the perspective of researcher Osama Sheikh Ali, the failure of negotiations and the occurrence of any military confrontation would be “costly by nature.”
He noted that the most significant obstacle to this scenario is the US presence, ruling out Damascus’s desire for a large-scale confrontation or launching battles in northeastern Syria before Washington withdraws from there.
“Freezing the conflict”
The SDF controls vast areas in northeastern Syria and has been receiving military support for years from the International Coalition led by the United States.
After the fall of the Assad regime, this force has come to the fore in the Syrian scene, especially since its disbandment could mean removing the main obstacles ahead of the new administration in Damascus regarding military, field, and political aspects.
Between the success and failure of negotiations and whether the SDF and the Damascus administration will head towards confrontation, a third scenario emerges concerning the continuation of negotiations for a longer period. However, researchers consider this scenario to be “the least likely.”
Researcher Osama Sheikh Ali stated that it is expected that the negotiation process will continue for a longer period with the achievement of some breakthroughs by the SDF making some concessions on specific files it is adamant about, particularly regarding the manner of its integration into the army and other issues related to resources and their management.
He pointed out that the continued presence of the structures of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), the political wing of the SDF, in the upcoming period is a likely scenario, by agreeing with Damascus on the SDF’s exit from areas with an Arab majority in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa and its remaining in the al-Hasakah triangle or in areas with a Kurdish majority.
Badr Mulla Rashid believes that the continuation of what he calls the “lack of agreement” without comprehensive confrontations is the least likely among the other scenarios, due to the necessities imposed for the possibility of the SDF’s political and military work to remain without any official recognition from the new government or the international community, which makes it vulnerable to marginalization and weakens its ability to negotiate or secure sustained international support.
He added that this scenario would entail a continued state of military confrontation and the absence of coordination between the two sides, leading to economic, humanitarian, and security crises, such as shortages of resources and essential services.
What leverage does the SDF hold?
According to researcher Osama Sheikh Ali, the most prominent leverage that the SDF possesses is its military strength and ability to influence, in addition to the issue of detainees and families of the Islamic State group held by it.
He stated that this issue is one of the strongest cards the SDF holds and that it will not easily concede it.
The state that enjoys international recognition is the only one capable of establishing special courts to prosecute the detainees from the Islamic State’s elements and perhaps deport them to their countries, according to Sheikh Ali, who noted that the SDF cannot resolve this issue.
He mentioned that the current situation in the camps housing the families of the Islamic State’s fighters cannot continue for long.
The SDF is working to mobilize Kurdish public opinion by linking the fate of the Kurdish cause to its own fate, meaning that the collapse or end of the SDF would mean the end of the Kurdish cause in Syria, thereby increasing Kurdish support for its project, as Sheikh Ali noted.
The General Command in Syria held a conference to announce the victory of the revolution on January 29, which included military leaders from most military factions.
Among the most important outcomes of the “Victory Conference” were appointing Ahmed al-Sharaa as president of Syria in the transitional phase, along with dissolving all military factions within the Ministry of Defense and rebuilding the Syrian army on national foundations.
The Autonomous Administration criticized the “Victory Conference,” deeming it illegal. In a statement on February 2, it stated that the resolutions issued by the conference should be part of a national conference attended by all components, sects, and segments of Syrian society, not just military leaders.
The statement indicated that contexts taking place outside the framework of a national Syrian conference and without the participation of political, revolutionary, and public forces are considered “incomplete,” noting that the best solution to end the instability is to hold a national dialogue without excluding anyone.
Meanwhile, Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated on February 7 that about 100 armed factions in Syria have agreed to join the Ministry of Defense, with the dissolution of their current units.
Abu Qasra has previously mentioned that the Ministry of Defense is an institutional case, and the priority is to restore an army aimed at defending the homeland, not for private or sectarian interests at the expense of other Syrian components.
He stated that a committee of senior officers has been formed to work on restructuring the new military institution.