Enab Baladi – Hassan Ibrahim
Two recorded videos dating back to 2015 spread, showing the Syrian Justice Minister in the Damascus caretaker government, Shadi al-Waisi, during two field executions of women charged with “corruption and prostitution,” where he was present as a Sharia judge in al-Nusra Front (currently Hayat Tahrir al-Sham).
The re-circulation of the videos sparked controversy and shock among the Syrian public, prompting calls for al-Waisi’s dismissal from his position and an investigation into him, as well as a demand for a fair trial, with criticisms and concerns regarding the non-application of the law on everyone and the government’s failure to engage in transitional justice.
Criticism and calls for dismissal and investigation
Enab Baladi confirmed the authenticity of one of the recordings through a military source in Tahrir al-Sham (not authorized to speak to the media), who said that one of the incidents occurred in the town of Maarrat Misrin in northern Idlib, commenting that “the matter is normal based on Sharia law, and if it were an infringement, it would not have been documented, but the scenes of death leave a negative impact on people’s souls.”
The platform “Verify-Sy” reported, quoting a “high-ranking official” in the new Syrian administration, that the man appearing in the videos is indeed the current Justice Minister Shadi al-Waisi, explaining that “the content of the video is an enforcement of the law during a specific time and place, where the procedures were conducted in accordance with the valid laws at the time and within a procedural agreement.”
The official pointed out that this operation reflects a phase that has been surpassed in light of the current legal and procedural transformations, making it inappropriate to generalize it or use it to describe the current phase, due to the differing circumstances and references. He emphasized the legal and procedural commitment to the new rules and principles agreed upon by Syrians, which ensure justice and the rule of law.
Enab Baladi contacted the Damascus caretaker government for clarifications or comments from the government or the ministry regarding the ongoing controversy, but received no response at the time of preparing this report.
The page “Syrian Rights Advocates for Justice and the Rule of Law” called on the current Prime Minister, Mohammed al-Bashir, to dismiss al-Waisi from his position as Justice Minister, stating that it is unacceptable to entrust justice and the judiciary to a “criminal.”
They stated, “It is unacceptable to demand and accept holding accountable offenders of crimes and violations by remnants of the previous regime, while turning a blind eye to those who committed them who are associated with the forces opposing the criminal regime.”
Based on the two recorded videos, the German Bild newspaper considered the new Justice Minister to be a “frightening Islamist,” describing him as the “judge of terror who executed women,” questioning whether Syria’s rulers would show their “true colors.”
A barrier to transitional justice
The recordings returned to the media spotlight a decade after the field executions, which were part of rulings carried out by al-Nusra Front (HTS currently) in areas under their control against several individuals for different reasons, including charges of dealing with the Syrian regime, ties to the Islamic State, and incidents of kidnapping, killing, and theft.
On November 13, 2024, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) in Idlib (the nucleus of the Damascus caretaker government) executed three individuals accused of killing the leader in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Abu Maria al-Qahtani, based on a court ruling certified by the judgments committee, for capital punishment as a “punishment for banditry.”
Bassam al-Ahmad, director of the Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) organization, said that the incident (the field execution) occurred while Syria was experiencing an armed conflict, and the “enforcement of law” at that time and place has conditions and specifications. He stated that the law itself must be compatible with international standards, especially the applicable law of armed conflicts.
He gave the example that the Syrian regime conducted field trials for detainees, trying individuals based on laws it established, but this was a violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, amounting to a war crime, considering that simply having any party create a law does not suffice or justify its execution.
He added that in cases of armed conflict, and the control of any party over a given area, the desire to create laws and courts must comply with international standards and respect the fundamentals of fair trials, including the right to present individuals before a legally constituted court, the ability of individuals to defend themselves, and the right to appeal, as well as the requirement for a public trial, among other conditions.
He clarified that taking legal action or punitive measures against al-Waisi is related to the role he played in those incidents and his involvement, whether it was giving a ruling, facilitating the process, or colluding, executing, or other roles, all of which require an independent and transparent investigation.
Al-Ahmad believes that these incidents and the involvement of figures in the Damascus caretaker government in “violations” pose an obstacle to achieving justice overall, and particularly transitional justice in Syria, regardless of their role in the incident at that time since these events have a negative impact on the credibility of those involved in the transitional justice process, as no individual or entity can work for transitional justice while having a history marked by violations.
He considered that transitional justice itself relies on individuals with a history free of any violations or blemishes.
Mohammad al-Abdallah, director of the Syria Justice and Accountability Center (SJAC), called for al-Waisi’s dismissal, describing his appointment as Justice Minister as a “scandal,” expressing his fears that similar incidents may lead the new leadership in Syria to avoid “engaging in any real operations for transitional justice” to evade accountability.
Confusion and embarrassment internally and externally
Nader al-Khalil
Syrian political researcher
The case of Justice Minister Shadi al-Waissi requires a thorough analysis of the internal and external dimensions, taking into account the current political context of the new administration led by Ahmed al-Sharaa.
- On the international level:
Currently, it seems that there is a hesitance and anticipation from the international community regarding the new administration in Syria, represented by a disregard for the backgrounds of the individuals holding positions of responsibility. As is known, Ahmed al-Sharaa himself was wanted and classified as a “terrorist” by some countries; however, these countries, particularly Western ones, have not taken a direct negative stance against him or the new administration, opting instead to wait and see its actions. Based on this, I do not believe that Shadi al-Waisi’s background will prompt Western countries to take a negative stance at this time.
However, this does not mean that the issue will not be raised later (if the actions of the administration contradict its statements, at least from the Western side). If the new administration fails to meet its commitments or demonstrates practices that contradict human rights standards, al-Waisi’s case could become a leverage point used by Western countries against the government. In other words, this file may be reopened in the near future if the administration’s actions do not match its promises.
- On the regional level:
Most influential regional countries, such as Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, are taking a positive or at least cautiously optimistic stance towards the new administration. These countries focus on outcomes and actions rather than the backgrounds of the individuals in charge. However, some countries that are not welcoming of change in Syria (such as Egypt and possibly the UAE) may exploit Shadi al-Waisi’s case for media and even diplomatic agitation against the new administration. This scenario is plausible, but it depends on the extent of these countries’ influence in the region, which seems limited at this stage.
Thus, yes, al-Waisi’s continued presence does pose a relative embarrassment for the Damascus caretaker government, but we do not know to what degree the influence of limited regional actors will be significant.
- Internally:
Al-Waisi’s continued presence does create a relative embarrassment for the new administration, especially with the rise of some public criticisms and demands for his dismissal, following the circulation of video recordings of executions in which he was present, thus reopening sensitive files related to past practices, putting the government on the defensive in front of public opinion. The ongoing presence of al-Waisi in his position might be interpreted as a disregard for public demands, which could lead to an erosion of trust in the emerging government.
- The possibility of responding to dismissal demands
Ahmed al-Sharaa has long been known for his pragmatism, so he will undoubtedly not hesitate to remove anyone from the scene, at least if they cause substantial political damage to the new administration. However, the decision to dismiss al-Waisi depends on the level of pressure resulting from public and political demands. If the pressure reaches a point that threatens the stability of the government or hinders its ability to operate internally and externally, he is likely to be dismissed. However, if the demands remain within a limited scope of impact, the administration might prefer to wait and not respond immediately to these pressures.
- Conclusion
Shadi al-Waisi’s presence in his position represents a relative embarrassment for the caretaker government both internally and externally. The decision regarding his dismissal depends on the level of pressure and its impact on the stability and image of the government, or to what extent it reaches a stage that threatens political damage to the new administration’s activities. The new administration has sufficient flexibility to make the appropriate decision based on the data, focusing on maintaining its political balance in this sensitive stage.
Who is Shadi al-Waisi?
Shadi Mohammed al-Waisi was born in Aleppo in 1985. He holds a degree in Islamic law and a diploma in educational qualification, and he is currently preparing a master’s thesis in Islamic and judicial studies.
He worked as a teacher of Islamic education in Aleppo, then served as an imam and preacher in the city for seven years, according to his profile published on ministry identifiers.
After the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, al-Waisi became active in the field of Sharia judiciary, where he participated in the establishment of the Sharia Authority in the Dahret Awad district of Aleppo and worked as a Sharia judge. He then joined the founding staff of the Quadripartite Sharia Authority in Aleppo since its establishment on November 10, 2012, holding several positions, starting as a military criminal judge, then an appellate judge, followed by Attorney General, according to the Syrian Memory organization.
Al-Waisi worked on establishing the Judiciary Role Project and chaired several Sharia courts, such as the court in Saraqib, the court in Haritan, and the court in Northern Badia.
After the establishment of the Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib in 2017, al-Waisi held several positions in its Ministry of Justice, including member of the Civil Criminal Court, then President of the Criminal Appeals Authority, then President of the Appeals Court, in addition to being a member of the Supreme Judicial Council in the Salvation Government.
Al-Waisi assumed the presidency of the Ministry of Justice in the sixth term of the Salvation Government (January 19, 2023) under Prime Minister Ali Abdul Rahman Keda. On December 21, 2024, the General Command announced his assignment to the position of Minister of Justice in the caretaker government of Damascus.
Dissolution of Tahrir al-Sham
As for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), it emerged in Syria under the name “al-Nusra Front” at the end of 2011, a faction characterized by its birth from the womb of al-Qaeda, one of the most prominent jihadist factions on the global stage. Later, it announced its separation from any group and considered itself a local Syrian force, yet it remains listed on terrorist lists.
During the “Deterrence of Aggression” battle launched by opposition factions, which ended with the fall of the Syrian regime and Bashar al-Assad’s fleeing to Russia, the leader of Tahrir al-Sham, Ahmed al-Sharaa, repeatedly spoke about the dissolution of the faction, stating that this would occur during the upcoming “National Dialogue Conference” in Syria.
Tahrir al-Sham was at the forefront of the factions that participated in the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation and has distanced itself from officially declaring or appearing as a military faction since November 27, 2024. Everything related to it falls under the work of the “Military Operations Administration” and the caretaker government of Damascus.
The United States, which has classified al-Sharaa as a “global terrorist” since May 2013, halted the bounty of 10 million dollars for information about him on December 20, 2024, which it had offered since 2020. Meanwhile, the removal of the faction from terrorism lists is still under consideration and depends on changes in behavior, as Washington has recently shown a different tone towards the faction and its leader.