Enab Baladi – Hassan Ibrahim
The discussion about Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)’s potential dissolution took center stage in the media, coinciding with battles led alongside opposition factions, during which they captured large areas from the control of the Syrian regime and its allies, culminating in its downfall.
The idea of dissolving the faction was articulated by the leader of Tahrir al-Sham, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, following his visit to the city of Aleppo, which was taken by opposition factions during the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation. He reinforced this with another statement that the HTS is part of the Syrian dialogue and could “dissolve at any moment.”
Al-Jolani’s statements were surprising and contradict the path he and his faction have charted over the years and differ from the impressions of him being “singular in decision-making” and seeking “personal glory,” opening the door to questions about the dimensions of the faction’s dissolution and the timing of such a move.
Dissolution and disbanding
On December 4, analyst for the Syrian file at the International Crisis Group, Dareen Khalifa, published a statement by al-Jolani, saying that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is considering dissolving itself to establish civil and military structures within new institutions that reflect the breadth of Syrian society.
Tahrir al-Sham responded to Enab Baladi‘s inquiries regarding what the Crisis Group published, stating that there has been no decision from the leadership regarding dissolution yet.
In an interview with CNN on December 6, al-Jolani stated, “We are talking about a larger project, we are discussing building Syria,” adding that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is merely part of this dialogue and could dissolve at any time, not being an end in itself, but a means to perform a task, which is to confront the Syrian regime.
Tahrir al-Sham is one of the most prominent fighting factions in northern Syria, officially emerging as Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Nusra Front) in December 2012. It is a faction that distinguished itself by breaking away from al-Qaeda, the most notable of the global jihadist factions. It later announced its separation from any organization and considered itself a local Syrian force.
Tahrir al-Sham remains listed on terrorist lists, and the name “Abu Mohammad al-Jolani” is still on the wanted list by the US, with a reward of up to ten million dollars for information leading to his capture.
After the regime’s downfall
Dareen Khalifa commented on the HTS’ consideration of dissolving itself (to establish military and civil structures), noting that whether Tahrir al-Sham will implement these ideas or put pressure on other factions remains to be seen in terms of compliance.
On his part, al-Jolani stated during his CNN interview that the goal of the revolution remains to overthrow the regime and that it is legitimate to use all available means to achieve this goal. He emphasized that the seeds of the regime’s defeat have always existed within it, pointing out that Iran and Russia attempted to revive the regime, support it, and buy it time, but the reality remains that “this regime is dead.”
Researcher on jihadist groups and religious movements, Abdul Rahman al-Haj, told Enab Baladi that al-Jolani hints at the dissolution of the faction regarding the post-regime phase, noting that establishing a state would require centralizing arms and ending militia and factionalism, which al-Jolani is aware of.
Al-Haj believes that al-Jolani indeed envisions that the ultimate aim is to establish a state in the truest sense, while he does not wish to replicate the experience of Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Regarding the timing of Tahrir al-Sham’s dissolution, al-Haj thinks it hinges on the idea of building an army and how to integrate factions into it. Thus, al-Jolani speaks in relative terms, but it is clear he has a solid vision for building the state, which also indicates preliminary concepts about the shape of the day after.
The researcher believes that the roles of all factions will end with the regime’s fall; otherwise, they will become burdens, as was the case in Afghanistan, ruling out any ambition for that among the factions.
The opposition factions began the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation on November 27. After reaching the city of Damascus on December 8, reports emerged about Bashar al-Assad fleeing Syrian territory. This was followed by the factions announcing the end of the Baath era.
Obstacles that troubled Tahrir al-Sham
Regarding its listing on terrorist lists, Tahrir al-Sham has repeatedly considered the classification unjust. This was reflected in a response from the media office of the HTS in an electronic correspondence to Enab Baladi regarding the renewed classifications of the faction, including one from Australia on February 17, 2022, labeling it as a terrorist faction.
Tahrir al-Sham has faced several challenges during its control over Idlib, the most notable being the crisis concerning “collaboration and communication with internal and external entities,” which caused turmoil within the group, creating a struggle between factions and signs of disintegration. This led to the arrest of the second-in-command of the HTS, Abu Maria al-Qahtani, and senior first-tier leaders, with signs appearing by June 2023.
This resulted in the defection of the third-ranking leader, Jihad Issa al-Sheikh (Abu Ahmad Zakour), who revealed issues for which al-Jolani was responsible, including bombings and collaboration with foreign intelligence services.
The issue quieted down in the media, with al-Jolani remaining and Abu Ahmad Zakour defecting. Al-Qahtani was killed on April 4 in a suicide bombing inside a hideout in one of the farms near the city of Sarmada, a month after being released following six months of detention and being acquitted by the HTS.
On November 13, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), the political umbrella for the HTS, executed a death sentence against three men accused of killing Abu Maria al-Qahtani.
Since February 26, Tahrir al-Sham has faced peaceful protests and demonstrations from civilians, activists, military personnel, and clerics demanding the overthrow of al-Jolani, opposing the monopoly of decision-making and the concentration of power.
The response to this movement included promises for reforms and intensive meetings between al-Jolani and dignitaries and ministers in the Salvation Government, deemed “ineffective” by some, followed by arrests of several protesters and violently dispersing a sit-in tent. Such demonstrations have significantly dwindled over the past month.