Enab Baladi – Khaled al-Jeratli
For months, not a day passes without a significant development on the fronts of the “Axis of Resistance” with Israel, reinforcing indications that an Israeli war against Lebanon is looming, targeting the Lebanese Hezbollah militia, which is a central pillar in the axis overseen by Iran for decades and a close ally of the Syrian regime.
As the tensions escalate, differing each day from the previous, the regime’s stance has remained constant despite being a key player in the “Axis of Resistance,” raising questions about the continuity of the regime’s link to it.
While Iranian threats to retaliate against Israel have consistently continued for about a month and a half, it does not seem that the regime is ready to engage in the ongoing war. However, observers believe that Iran does not seek a strong bond of the regime with the axis, as it has what it needs from Syria.
The nature of the regime’s link with the “Axis of Resistance”
The regime, through its government institutions, ministries, and media outlets, expresses solidarity with the events around it. For example, it showed solidarity with Iran when the head of the political bureau of the Hamas movement was killed in Tehran by Israel and expressed sympathy with Lebanon when communication devices with Hezbollah elements exploded, resulting in dozens of casualties over two days. However, its southern front with Israel remained calm, with the exception of some controlled breaches here and there.
Nawar Shaaban, a military affairs researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, believes that the way the Syrian regime handles the surrounding military events is different from the rest of the “Axis of Resistance,” but this treatment cannot be considered related to Iran’s influence in Syria.
Shaaban told Enab Baladi that Iran’s intelligence influence in Syria has gone beyond its relationship with the Syrian regime, no longer caring about the positivity of the relationship with decision-makers in Syria.
He added that the regime has kept itself distant from the events, from the Gaza war to the escalation in Lebanon, but this distancing cannot be considered an official stance against Iran, as many attacks towards Israel are launched from Syria, where the regime holds power.
For his part, Marwan Farzat, a political analyst specializing in Iranian affairs, believes that the current data may reflect the regime’s desire to not engage in escalation, but it cannot be considered a detachment from the axis as a whole.
Farzat told Enab Baladi that even if there was a desire to exit the axis in Damascus, there are no tools to meet it.
He added that the regime exploits the current chaos to regain control over some levers that Iran had taken from it, such as reclaiming control over the southern provinces bordering Israel with Russian support.
Russia had previously announced, on multiple occasions, establishing military points along the border with the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, coinciding with repeated shelling operations from Syria towards Israel.
Will Iran wait?
Iran’s arms in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen are interconnected, and Tehran has always used the term “unity of fronts” to express the readiness of the “Axis of Resistance” to open multiple fronts against Israel. Meanwhile, the Syrian front remained calm as military operations increased on other fronts.
Marwan Farzat believes that the regime can continue its current distancing, and the current situation is not bothersome to Iran as long as it does not obstruct its plans to supply Hezbollah through Syria.
Researcher Nawar Shaaban told Enab Baladi that important meetings between the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its arms in the region take place in Syria, and significant military points, including manufacturing centers, are located there.
Shaaban believes that the regime plays around the point that the entire region is busy with Iran, but it is unable to block Syria’s geography from Tehran.
Shaaban sees that the regime’s behavior is certainly annoying to Iran, but the latter can pressure the regime in various ways, as its arms have spread throughout the Syrian interior.
He added that there is not much space for the regime to invest, except for Iranian engagement on hot fronts and the region’s focus on Iran.
Did the regime make deals?
With the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Flood from Gaza about a year ago, Andrew Tabler, a researcher specializing in Syrian affairs and American policy at the Washington Institute for Research, wrote a brief analysis saying that to restrict Iranian options and prevent the crisis from escalating through Syria, Washington should direct a clear warning to Bashar al-Assad not to enter the war and curb Iranian militias along the Golan border.
Tabler expected that the regime would exploit Abu Dhabi’s mediation in its crisis to demand more upfront money from Gulf states, which had previously offered concessions to al-Assad without return.
The researcher believes that sanctions on the regime in Syria should not be eased in any way without clear evidence that it restricts Iran’s options in facing Israel, Jordan, and other US allies in the region.
During the early days of the Israeli war on Gaza, the American Axios website reported that the UAE had warned the regime in Syria against intervening in the war between Hamas and Israel or allowing attacks on Israel from Syrian territory, according to two unnamed sources familiar with UAE diplomatic efforts.
Escalation: An Iranian decision
In a previous conversation with Enab Baladi, security policy specialist Muhannad Saloum said that the decision to expand confrontations in the region, extending to neighboring countries from the government or non-government entities supported by Iran, including Syria, is “entirely an Iranian decision.”
He added that the collapse of the regime or threats to the existence of militias such as the Lebanese Hezbollah or others in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen wouldn’t threaten the entire “Axis of Resistance,” considering that Iran forms the center of this axis.
Conversely, Iran’s engagement in a confrontation threatening its existence would pose a danger to the axis as a whole for the same reasons, which Tehran cannot allow.
The researcher believes that Iran relies on the strategy of “showcasing escalation,” but this showcasing can also be interpreted as direct escalation and can be dealt with accordingly.
Saloum said then that the Al-Aqsa Flood will affect alliances in the region but will not cause a fundamental change, especially considering the historical backgrounds that led to the formation of these alliances.